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Turkey and Iraqi Kurds join hands By M K Bhadrakumar
There was something
very odd when Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki
said on Friday that Turkey was becoming a "hostile
state" in the region. After all, Baghdad is
supposed to be the "soul" of the Arab world and
Turkey is supposed to be the role model for
democratized Arab nations like Iraq.
"The
latest statements of [Turkish Prime Minister Recep
Tayip] Erdogan are another return to the process
of interfering in Iraqi internal affairs and it
confirms that Erdogan is still living the illusion
of regional hegemony," Maliki said, adding: "It is
clear that his statements have a sectarian
dimension, which he used to deny before, but have
now become clear, and all Iraqis reject them ...
His insistence on continuing with these domestic and
regional policies will
damage Turkey's interests and make it a hostile
state for all."
Erdogan is unused to
hearing such tongue-lashing, although the
immediate provocation was a remark by Erdogan
himself, accusing Maliki of being "egocentric".
After a close-door meeting with the visiting Iraqi
Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani in Istanbul last
week, Erdogan lashed out, "The current prime
minister's treatment of his coalition partners,
his egocentric approach in Iraqi politics ...
seriously concerns Shi'ite groups, Mr Barzani and
the [Sunni-backed] Iraqiya group."
On the
face of it, Erdogan was merely being his usual
self when he dictated to Maliki how he should rule
Iraq. But The Turkish Foreign Ministry has since
weighed in with a statement on Saturday confirming
Erdogan spoke with deliberateness and that Ankara
has definite opinions on how democracy should
function in Iraq.
The statement said, "The
basis of the political crisis in which Iraq finds
itself is that Iraqi politicians seek to
consolidate power and exclude others, rather than
[follow] politics based on democratic and
universal principles. It is a fact that behind the
misperceptions that led to the accusations against
Turkey by Prime Minister Maliki, who instigated
the crisis in Iraq, this wrong understanding of
politics can be found."
Axis at
work The tensions between Turkey and Iraq
have been steadily building up, and of late they
have sharply escalated. The "crisis in Iraq"
referred to in the Turkish statement is Maliki's
ongoing political battle with Iraqi Vice President
Tareq al-Hashemi, which has taken a sectarian
Shi'ite-Sunni dimension. In sum, Turkey has waded
into Iraq's sectarian politics and is positioning
itself on the side of the Sunnis and the Kurds.
Hashemi is currently in Istanbul and met
Erdogan before the latter fired the verbal
fusillade at Baghdad. But this is only one
template of the plot. The fact that Hashemi
arrived in Turkey on the final leg of a tour,
which took him to Qatar and Saudi Arabia, gives a
regional backdrop to what is unfolding. (By the
way, Erdogan also just concluded a round of
consultations in Riyadh and Doha.)
Indeed,
Maliki has been in the Saudi and Qatari crosshairs
as well. Riyadh and Doha see him as an Iranian
surrogate and make no bones about their desire to
have him replaced. They boycotted the recent Arab
Summit in Baghdad where Maliki acted as the host.
Thus, the very same regional axis of
Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar that is working for
"regime change" in Syria is also on a
confrontation path with Maliki - and the leitmotif
is once again isolating Iran in its region.
In immediate terms, Erdogan is also
smarting under the perceived slight by Tehran,
which frustrated his hopes of Turkey acting as the
facilitator of the talks between Iran and the
"Iran Six" (also known as the P5+1, the US, Great
Britain, France, Russia and China plus Germany.)
Tehran administered the snub in the full glare of
world publicity when it proposed Baghdad as the
venue of the next round of talks with P5+1 on May
23. Erdogan's standing as the sultan of the Muslim
Middle East took a lethal blow.
Interestingly, following the sharp
exchange of words with Erdogan, Maliki left for
Tehran on Sunday on a two-day visit. What annoys
Maliki most that Erdogan has embarked upon a
course of robustly strengthening ties with Kurdish
leader Barzani. Ankara promotes an alliance
between Barzani and Iraqi Sunni leadership with a
view to challenging Maliki's leadership in
Baghdad. (Turks ensured that Barzani met Hashemi
in Istanbul last week.) Ankara is playing on
Barzani's political ambitions as the supremo of
Kurdistan, the autonomous Kurdish entity with
Arbil as its capital in northern Iraq. At a press
conference in Istanbul after meeting Hashemi,
Barzani accused Maliki of harboring dictatorial
ambitions.
The convergence of interests
between Ankara and Arbil is nothing new. It dates
back to the imposition of the "no-fly zone" over
northern Iraq by the US, Britain and France in the
early 1990s. Turkey played a key role in the
emergence of Kurdistan as an autonomous region
within Iraq.
Today's matrix has a strong
economic dimension too: Barzani needs an outlet to
the outside world for trade, especially
Kurdistan's oil exports; Turkey provides it and,
in turn, immensely profits out of it. The business
links between the two sides are flourishing and
today accounts for more than half of Turkey's
US$12 billion trade with Iraq.
On another
plane, Turkey is prepared to go the whole hog in
promoting Barzani if only he gives a helping hand
to muzzle the Kurdish insurgency in eastern
Turkey, led by the separatist Kurdistan Workers'
Party (PKK), which operates out of sanctuaries in
northern Iraq.
Barzani was given a red
carpet welcome by the Turkish leadership,
befitting a head of state. He met Turkish
President Abdullah Gul, Erdogan and Foreign
Minister Ahmet Davitoglu, apart from intelligence
chief Hakan Fidan. Barzani has kindled fresh hopes
in the Turkish mind that he would do something
tangible in preventing the PKK from bleeding
Turkey anymore in guerilla war waged from the
territory under his control in northern Iraq.
He told the Turkish media, "You won't get
anywhere with weapons. The PKK should lay down its
arms. I will not let the PKK prevail in northern
Iraq ... If the PKK goes ahead with weapons, it
will bear the consequences." These words will come
as music to the Turkish ears.
Kurdish
conundrum Ankara's dilemma, however, is
that Barzani has said such fine words in the past
also about cracking down on the PKK, but changed
tack once he returned home to Arbil. The hard
reality is that the sympathy toward PKK's cause is
widespread among the Kurdish peshmerga (fighters)
in northern Iraq.
But then, there could be
a qualitative difference this time. For one thing,
Barzani, who has keen bazaari instincts,
knows that Turkey could help him and his family
make an incredible amount of money through oil
exports via Turkish pipelines, and second, behind
Turkey stand the Saudis and Qataris, who will also
be prepared to bankroll him.
From the
perspective of the Saudis and Qataris, the fact
that Barzani can prove to be a thorn in the flesh
of Maliki makes him an object of interest. They
want Maliki to be weakened to a point that he can
be of no meaningful help to the beleaguered Syrian
regime. (Maliki has been helping Syria critically
with oil supplies and to generally break out of
the western sanctions.)
Erdogan made it a
point to highlight that he discussed the Syrian
situation with Barzani last week. Indeed, there is
a major Kurdish dimension to Turkey's Syria
policy. For one thing, the specter of the revival
of the old alliance between the Syrian regime and
the PKK haunts Turkey. In retaliation to the heavy
Turkish interference in Syrian affairs, Damascus
has begun showing renewed interest in the PKK.
These are low-key moves at present but are
ominous enough about what could happen if push
came to a shove and Damascus finally made up its
mind to pay Ankara back in the same coin. It is
relatively easy for Damascus to hit back at Turkey
if it takes a strategic decision to do so, because
the PKK's leadership comprises Kurds of Syrian
extraction and one one-third of the PKK cadres are
of Syrian origin.
Conversely, in order for
Turkey to step up its interference in Syria in the
coming period, it needs to first minimize the
scope of retaliation by Damascus. Turkey hopes
that Barzani can lend a hand in reaching out to
the Syrian Kurdish groups.
Another
complicating factor is that Syria's Kurds, who
constitute about 10% of the country's population,
have been reluctant to align with the Muslim
Brotherhood and other Syrian opposition groups
unless their demand for an autonomous Kurdish
region in eastern Syria (where Syria's oil fields
lie) is conceded.
Most of Syria's Kurdish
population lives in the arid region of Ayn al-Arab
and in the Ifrin agricultural area bordering
Turkey. Kurds also dominate large neighborhoods of
Damascus and the commercial hub of Aleppo, which
lies less than 50 kilometers from the Turkish
border. Unsurprisingly, Kurdish autonomy within
Syria will ever remain a sensitive issue for
Ankara, as it could have a domino effect within
Turkey itself.
But the Kurdish groups
within Syria are a divided lot and it is here that
Barzani comes in. The largest Kurdish umbrella
group in Syria, known as the Kurdish National
Congress (KNC), enjoys Barzani's backing. If KNC
could be persuaded to link up with the Syrian
opposition, Turkey would feel far more
comfortable.
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