SINOGRAPH Chen case hints at crack
in old consensus mold By
Francesco Sisci
BEIJING - The case of the
blind dissident lawyer Chen Guangcheng, who at the
beginning of May escaped strict surveillance to
escape house arrest and enter the US Embassy
during a strategic dialogue between China and the
United States, has one particular feature:
Washington and Beijing reached two agreements
about Chen's fate in less than 48 hours. This is
unprecedented.
It is difficult for the
Chinese leadership, constrained by the bonds of
decision by consensus, to make fast decisions, but
it happened, as during the Sichuan earthquake in
2008, when within hours after the disaster, Prime
Minister Wen Jiabao was dispatched to the affected
areas.
But to reach a decision (in this
case, sending Chen to study to
Tianjin) and then only
hours later revoke it and come up with a creative
idea (not exile to America, but a study program in
the US) would have been impossible within the old
mold of consensus politics.
Consensus
among the top leadership is a process by which de
facto most decisions, if not all, are taken
unanimously. This process was initiated by Deng
Xiaoping, who wanted to avoid the concentration of
power China experienced with Mao Zedong and that
made possible Mao's mistakes.
Consensus
also enables the top leadership to minimize
dissent at the highest echelons, since everybody
is called on to agree with the majority view.
Top-level dissent could breed sedition, which
could create deeper fractions at lower levels.
The case of Chen, and the rapid succession
of complicated decisions taken, leads one to
conjecture that the old consensus policy is
changing. On the American side, Chen's case was
basically decided, we guess, by a small group of
people centered on ambassador Gary Locke,
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who was then
in Beijing, and President Barack Obama.
A
similar structure was possibly at work on the
Chinese side, with some chief negotiators
discussing matters directly with State Councilor
Dai Bingguo, Clinton's counterpart, and with
President Hu Jintao.
Then Hu must have
received a brief, a mandate from the politburo,
granting him power to make decisions on some
urgent matters of state security without formal
meetings. The fact that the Chinese press didn't
move to attack the Americans afterward further
confirms the "power of attorney" granted to Hu.
It is impossible to think that Hu has the
absolute power of Mao. The dispersal of power to
the periphery, which started after Mao's demise,
has been going on for some 35 years, and it is
very hard to reverse it. But what we may be
witnessing is the beginning of some kind of
mandate and division of power. On some decisions,
the periphery can rule, on some others the
politburo has to agree, but in some cases, the
president has ultimate authority.
It is
not democracy, but it seems to resemble the
division of power of the Catholic Church. Priests
and bishops can decide local matters; for some
long-term issues, the pope may want to get the
agreement of the cardinals or the bishops; but for
some pressing problems, the pope will intervene
directly.
Chen's agreement might not have
been ideal, and there was and could still be
backlash from some local or even central
authorities. But what would you expect from an
agreement cut on the fly and imposed on a Chinese
structure, which may not have wanted it and
certainly did not know how to handle it or what to
expect? Chen's case points to the circumstance
that both sides didn't want to disrupt the
strategic talks.
What derives from this is
that Hu has new clout. We can only guess, because
of the timeframe, that the case of Bo Xilai (the
former Chongqing Chinese Communist Party chief
suspended from his post after the February 6
flight of his aide, Vice Mayor and policed chief
Wang Lijun, to the US consulate in Chengdu) had
something to do with Hu's new status.
It
seems that thanks to the cleanup following Bo's
case, Hu was able to muster unprecedented powers
that his predecessors did not have. With these
powers, Hu can start political reforms and pave
the way for reunification with Taiwan, a feat that
escaped even the almighty Mao.
However,
political reforms are bitterly opposed by
mid-ranking officials who see clearly that greater
transparency and some division of power will
expose them to local public opinion and transfer
some of their sway to the center.
The
mid-ranking officials are the ones who stand to
lose the most from political reform, as they will
be put under the combined pressure of the people
from below and leaders from above-and thus the
possibility for corruption at this level, which
directly hurts the common people, should decrease.
It is not clearly how strongly Hu will
pursue political reforms, but definitely he has
incentive to do so. He may want to leave a deep
historical mark for his presidency, and political
reforms improve the chances of reunification with
Taiwan and peaceful development for China, two
clear missions for China.
Moreover, in
this situation, a concentration and division of
power will be a legacy for his successor - come
autumn with the 10-year transfer of power - who
will have more levers to apply his policies
without being obstructed at every step by a crowd
with petty vested interests.
Francesco Sisci is a columnist
for the Italian daily Il Sole 24 Ore and can be
reached at fsisci@gmail.com
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