As the number of Chinese citizens working,
studying and traveling overseas rises in line with
China's growing global clout, the government is
under mounting pressure to provide for their
off-shore security. As Beijing grapples with how
to respond, it must balance domestic calls for
help with foreign perceptions that its economic
expansion into developing countries is imperial in
nature.
Officially, China sends about five
million workers and 350,000 students abroad each
year; unofficially, taking into account unofficial
migration, that figure is undoubtedly much higher.
With its economy spreading deeper into the
developing world, including into Africa, the
Middle East and Southeast Asia, Chinese citizens
increasingly find themselves in situations where
neither the
Chinese nor local
governments have been able to respond adequately
to crises in their host countries.
The
lack of a comprehensive strategy to protect
Chinese citizens and companies in times of tumult
has opened the government to criticism,
particularly among Chinese bloggers who have
pilloried Beijing's perceived inaction and
ineffectiveness. Many have questioned the
government's self-proclaimed "superpower" status,
noting in comparison that the United States has
often deployed force to rescue its citizens in
crisis situations abroad.
In January 2012,
for instance, US Special Forces carried out a
nighttime operation to free an American and a
Danish aid worker held by Somali pirates. In
another dramatic rescue, in 2009, three US Special
Forces snipers killed three Somali pirates with
single shots from long distances to rescue
American sailor Richard Phillips, who was being
held for ransom on a ship off the coast of
Somalia.
Such operations carry heavy
political risks that China is clearly trying to
avoid, especially in light of widespread criticism
in the West of China's resource extraction driven
approach to Africa. If China deployed its military
in a rescue operation there, it could backfire
badly by empowering critics with evidence to
support their claims about China's supposed
imperialist intentions in Africa, the Middle East
and Southeast Asia.
The largest mission
that China has deployed to protect its workers
came in early 2011, when it sent four military
transport planes and a guided-missile frigate to
rescue thousands of Chinese citizens working in
Libya after the eruption of anti-government
protests and rebellion. Although it was purely a
rescue mission with no shots fired - unlike the US
Special Forces deadly missions against Somali
pirates - it laid bare China's capabilities and
deficiencies in projecting power far from home.
Military operations in far-flung theaters
are still logistically difficult for China, not
least because it lacks the extensive intelligence
networks in developing countries the US and Europe
have taken decades to build. Instead, China has
historically relied on international organizations
to help its citizens abroad. In 2007, for example,
the International Committee of the Red Cross
helped negotiate the release of seven Chinese oil
workers held hostage in Ethiopia.
China
has sought to reduce the risk to its citizens by
building close relationships with governments in
countries where it has major investments. This has
not been an easy strategy. China tried to maintain
close relations with South Sudan, which became an
independent country in July 2011, as well as with
Sudan, the country from which South Sudan broke
away. This diplomatic position became virtually
untenable as the two countries became embroiled in
a dispute over oil resources, with China suddenly
stuck in the middle.
In 2012, two separate
kidnappings in which more than 20 Chinese workers
were taken hostage in the Sinai, Egypt and South
Kordofan, South Sudan, underscored China's
inability or reluctance to respond with force.
These particular cases made headlines in China
about the plight of their citizens abroad. There
were other well-publicized cases in 2011,
including the still unresolved murder of 13
Chinese sailors on the Mekong River in northern
Thailand.
There have been numerous other
less-publicized crises involving overseas Chinese
citizens, often motivated by local resentment of
Chinese investments or management of those
investments. They include the kidnapping of four
Chinese oil workers in Caqueta, Colombia in
January 2011; the evacuation of 300 dam workers
from Myanmar's Kachin State due to fighting
between the government and rebels in June 2011;
and the burning to death of four Chinese workers
in an arson attack in South Africa in November
2011.
Most recently, on August 5, Zambian
miners killed their Chinese manager by pushing a
mine trolley at him during a riot at a coal mine
there. In 2011, two Chinese managers at the same
mine were accused of attempted murder after they
fired on miners during a similar pay dispute, but
Zambia dropped those charges.
Investment-led migration The
growth in crises for overseas Chinese is related
to several push factors. First, China is now
operating in more countries than ever before. More
than 1 million Chinese are in Africa, up from
about 100,000 less than a decade ago. Similarly,
trade between Africa and China reached US$120
billion in 2011, from less than $20 billion in
2001.
Second, China's new development
strategy focuses specifically on emerging markets,
with the Chinese government often providing tacit
support to companies to invest in geopolitically
insecure regions where other countries' companies
dare not to venture. For instance, state-owned
China National Petroleum Corporation has signed a
$7 billion contract with the government of
Afghanistan to develop three oil fields along the
Amu Darya river in northern Afghanistan. There
have been credible reports, however, that China,
or its Afghan partners, had to pay off Taliban
insurgents to exploit the oil fields, or risk
reprisals.
In Karachi, Pakistan, a
motorcycle bomb exploded outside the Chinese
consulate on July 12. Shortly afterwards, a
spokesperson for a group called the
Lashkar-e-Balochistan (Army of Balochistan)
claimed responsibility for the bomb, saying that
"China and other foreign powers are making
agreements with Pakistan that are not acceptable
to the Baloch people."
The group added
that "China and other foreign companies should
stop fleecing Balochistan's resources and should
immediately exit the province otherwise personnel
and infrastructure would continue to be targeted
in the province." The threat highlights the
dangers Chinese nationals face when operating in
such politically volatile environments.
Third, Chinese companies usually require
workers to live in special encampments where their
security staff is often inexperienced,
underequipped and undermanned in order to cut
costs. In contrast, many Western companies place
their staff in better-financed, high-security
encampments, which may remove the staff from the
local community and appear segregationist but
nonetheless tends to provide greater security.
Fourth, transnational armed gangs and
criminal syndicates have apparently found that
overseas Chinese laborers are an easy target for
ransom, partly due to the relatively low levels of
security in which Chinese workers reside. In the
most unusual example, on August 25, Angola
deported 37 Chinese nationals who were allegedly
targeting other Chinese businessmen for
kidnappings for ransom.
Maintaining a soft
footprint is essential for China to preserve the
now substantial investments it has made in Africa,
the Middle East and Southeast Asia. As threats
rise to China's overseas citizens and investments,
attention will focus more sharply on Beijing's
response, including its willingness to use force
to protect its citizens and commercial interests.
If China does begin to project power to
protect its workers, it will inevitably lead
Western countries to question whether Beijing has
abandoned its "non-interference" policy in
international relations, which dates back decades
and China seeks to preserve today.
On the
other hand, China faces rising domestic pressure
to protect its overseas citizens and interests. In
May, Chinese policymakers took an important
initial step when they issued new regulations for
the management of foreign labor service
enterprises to protect their overseas workers. The
regulations, which will cover only a portion of
China's overseas citizens, were officially
implemented on August 1.
Significantly
they emphasize a "soft" tact towards protecting
workers, rather than a "hard" approach that would
involve deployment of the military. One notable
provision in Article 12 of the regulations
requires companies to arrange for laborers to gain
knowledge of the foreign languages where they
work, as well as for companies to teach their
workers about the relevant laws, religion, and
customs of the host country before deploying them
abroad.
Jacob Zenn is a legal
adviser and international security analyst who
graduated from the Johns Hopkins SAIS campus in
Nanjing, China in 2007. He has lived, studied and
worked in Africa and was most recently placed on
assignments in South Sudan and Nigeria. He writes
regularly for the Jamestown Foundation, Asia Times
Online, and the SAIS Central Asia-Caucasus
analyst. He can be contacted at
zopensource123@gmail.com
(Copyright
2012 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights
reserved. Please contact us about sales,
syndication and
republishing.)
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
