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2 Western
withdrawal portends Afghan
peace By Brian M Downing
The United States is withdrawing troops
from Afghanistan though the recent agreement with
President Hamid Karzai indicates that the US will
retain a significant presence, civilian and
military, for many years to come. It is unclear
how many Western troops will remain but the level
will certainly be far lower than the roughly
80,000 there today. This will mean of course that
responsibility for security will shift largely
onto the shoulders of the Afghan National Army
(ANA).
The ANA will be charged with
countering the Taliban and other insurgent groups,
which are chiefly in the south and east.
Evaluations of their competence vary considerably.
This is unsurprising as assessments are based on
anecdotes or official reports, neither of which is
reliable as each is prone to seeing what supports
pre-existing views on the war or established
institutional
objectives.
It is important to assess the
ANA not in terms of the armies of the world but in
the context of its expected role in the war in the
south and east. It is not expected to take on the
insurgents in conventional engagements between
sizeable forces. Nor is it expected to use
counterinsurgency techniques to win over popular
support, welcome though that would be. The ANA has
the more manageable task of simply continuing the
stalemate against them. And quite possibly, the
Afghan army will be able to arrange truces with
the insurgents which may lead to a broader
settlement.
The ANA The US has
been trying to rebuild an army in the country
after several years of leaving the project in the
hands of private contractors. It has been,
needless to say, an uphill struggle, though
obviously not owing to a lack of martial spirit in
the populace as Afghan history more than suggests.
Nor has the effort suffered from lack of
opposition to the Taliban, who are widely despised
for intolerance, oppression, and even for their
poor record in developing the country while in
power (1996-2001).
Similarly, though
largely lost amid the triumphant narratives and
ensuing chaos after the Russians left in 1989,
there was no shortage of domestic opposition to
the mujahideen forces, who were widely seen as
hidebound traditionalists and unwitting pawns of
foreign powers. The Afghan army, against all
expectations, held its own for many years after
1989 and was never defeated by the mujahideen.
The army's collapse in the mid-1990s came
only after the Soviet Union itself collapsed and
aid to Afghanistan suddenly ended. A similar
standoff is likely after US and International
Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) troops withdraw,
but a similar end to foreign aid is not. US and
other Western aid will continue, as will aid from
Russia, India, Iran and nearby Central Asian
republics.
Nonetheless, there are serious
problems inside the ANA. Afghans do not like to
serve extensive periods away from their home
districts, not under the old kings of decades
past, not under communist presidents, and not
under Karzai today. This has led to high desertion
rates of 10% to 15% that have been only partially
redressed by geographic rotations of army units
and extended leaves every six months or so.
A more disabling and less soluble problem
stems from deep ethnic tensions and mistrust
within the army, from the high command in Kabul to
a rifle company on a remote outpost in the south.
Afghanistan fielded armies in many conflicts prior
to the Soviet war, but wars were limited and
national integration of various peoples did not
take place, as it did, say, in the US during the
world wars, when most immigrant peoples served and
in so doing became integrated into the US
mainstream. The war against the Soviet forces was
a national effort of sorts, but mujahideen groups
were organized along ethnic and regional lines,
with only limited political significance.
The Afghan forces that ousted the Taliban
in 2001-02 were predominantly from the north, with
the Tajiks foremost among them. Seeing themselves
as national liberators - with considerable
justification - the Tajik commanders allotted
themselves the majority of key posts in the
defense ministry and the emerging ANA.
Though seen as just desserts to some,this
irritated the Pashtuns, who see themselves as the
largest ethnic group and the country's natural
leaders, political and military. President Karzai,
a Pashtun of the Popalzai tribe, ousted scores of
Tajik officers and replaced them with fellow
Pashtuns. Many Tajiks see this as a purge that has
harmed the army and country alike. [1]
Tajiks, however, remain over-represented
in the rank and file and resentment towards their
Pashtun officers is rife. Many are seen as
unqualified political appointees and unit cohesion
and efficacy have suffered. ANA forces in training
camps give no signs of the spontaneous confidence
and crispness of good soldiers. Instead, there is
a clear "staged" quality to their appearance, as
though instructed to look smart for the cameras
and dignitaries, and complying as best they can
before relaxing after the show.
ANA troops
are lackluster in the field as well. Insurgent
attacks do not lead to rapid responses. "No! We
don't go after them," an ANA officer said after
one attack. "That would be dangerous!" [2] Nor are
patrols sent out to keep insurgents off balance in
accordance with counterinsurgency doctrines and
common sense as well. Responses to a sister unit
that comes under attack are similarly
disappointing. Few units want to go out on an
operation without the assurance of immediate help
if needed.
In recent months it has become
appallingly clear that insurgents are able to
convince some ANA soldiers to attack their fellow
ANA soldiers and International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) troops as well. The shooters are
almost always Pashtun; the victims almost always
aren't. Ethnic mistrust has become intense,
chiefly between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns of
course.
In many regions ANA forces have
made informal agreements with insurgents not to
attack each other. These local truces are not as
problematic as it might seem. ISAF forces were
known to do the same, and earlier, many mujahideen
commanders forged truces with their Russian
adversaries.
Even the famed mujahideen
commander Ahmed Shah Massoud made truces with the
Russians, some rather lengthy. Late in the
conflict, Russian generals wanted to grant
regional autonomy to his Tajiks in return for an
enduring truce. Unfortunately, the arrangement was
vetoed by Moscow and Kabul. [3]
A severe
deficiency in the eyes of most American observers,
these agreements reflect war-weariness stemming
from over 30 years of intermittent warfare. More
importantly, they reflect Afghan norms about
limiting warfare. As will be seen shortly, these
truces may be helpful in bringing about a
meaningful settlement.
Alternative
forces General David Petraeus, during his
tenure in charge of the US effort, pressed for the
creation of tribal militias, armed and paid by the
US. Karzai opposed them as conducive to a new
generation of warlords and banditry, but Petraeus
was able to win out. These militias, or
arbakai, the US held, would mobilize
Pashtun tribal levies against the Taliban and
avoid the problems of ethnic mistrust and taking
young men away from their home districts.
It was further hoped that the militias,
resonant as they were with the venerable lashkars
of Pashtun history, would strengthen tribal
structures - a critical if underappreciated part
of the war effort. The Taliban draw support in
regions with weak tribal structures, as part of
their attraction is a new form of organization and
a unifying ideology to replace the social
formations shattered by so much war.
Unfortunately, the US plan did not work
out. Tied to outsiders by pay, equipment, and
training, the arbakai were resented as
external intrusions and to the extent they
functioned, they further weakened tribal
structures. Furthermore, Karzai's concern of the
arbakai furthering lawlessness was
unfortunately borne out.
It would of
course make at least some sense to organize the
ANA along ethnic lines, with Tajik units, Uzbek
units, Pashtun units, etc. Each of those peoples
fought long and hard against the Russians, in part
owing to ethnic homogeneity and kinship ties that
aided cohesion and efficacy.
In US
thinking at least, there is the idea of a national
army bringing about political unity. But Karzai
would rightly see such units as leading less to
national unity than to further fragmentation.
Besides, Tajik and Uzbek units operating in the
insurgent south would aggravate ethnic mistrust
there. The insurgents already see, with only a
little justification, the Kabul government as
under the sway of northerners.
Some
positive though not entirely untroubling dynamics
are underway inside the ANA. Racked by ethnic
mistrust, units are undergoing quiet informal
regroupings. Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns are
formally integrated into the same battalion on
organizational charts, but informally,
non-Pashtuns are operating according to separate
horizontal and vertical networks that place more
trust in fellow Tajiks or Uzbeks.
Colonel
Durrani, a Pashtun, may be the battalion
commander, but most Tajik soldiers know he is an
inept political appointee. It's best to listen to
fellow Tajik Major Massoud. Furthermore, command
structures leading to Kabul have parallel ones
leading to ethnic commanders in the north - some
of them from the old days of the Russian war.
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