Thai
army secretly plans for the worst By Steve Sciacchitano and John Cole
Over the past four months, the Royal Thai
Army (RTA) has quietly embarked on a
multi-faceted, kingdom-wide program to strengthen
internal unity and improve capabilities in a
number of key areas. This program has been
implemented without media coverage or public
knowledge and builds on previous programs, some of
which go back several years.
While each of
the measures can be justified individually on
military or bureaucratic grounds, taken together
they collectively point to a design to prepare the
army to defend its interests against political
opponents, including presumably criminally
convicted former premier Thaksin Shinawatra.
RTA challenges ahead could include
potential instability provoked by Thaksin's return
from self-exile as a free man through a
controversial
government-granted amnesty. Another would be any
government attempt to curb the army's political
independence, either by transferring RTA
commander-in-chief General Prayuth Chan-ocha and
replacing him with an officer more to Thaksin's
liking at this October's annual reshuffle, or
longer term through a significant reduction of its
budget.
External challenges could also
take the form of more heavy flooding on a scale of
last year's disaster, challenging the army to live
up to the popular expectations built through its
professional handling of last year's crisis or
face a grassroots backlash. It must also look to
ensure stability during the royal succession when
the 84-year-old King Bhumibol Adulyadej finally
passes from the scene and heir apparent Crown
Prince Vajiralongkorn accedes to the throne.
The RTA's internal strengthening program
can be divided into two broad areas: personnel
actions and force structure and command
expansions. While the most dramatic development is
the planned activation of two new combat divisions
- one each in the north and northeast, the
heartland of the army's Thaksin-aligned "red
shirt" opponents - perhaps the most revealing was
a seemingly innocuous Prayuth-ordered personnel
action.
In early February, Prayuth had a
specially designed test administered to all
serving battalion commanders. Thai battalions vary
in strength from roughly 500 to 800 soldiers,
depending on the type of unit, and there are
approximately 210 colonels and lieutenant-colonels
commanding battalions kingdom-wide. Although
billed as a test, the 17-page document was in fact
more of a detailed survey soliciting the
hand-written views of commanders regarding the
most difficult issues now facing the army.
To call this move unusual would be an
understatement. In past years, RTA senior generals
would have regarded battalion commanders as too
junior to merit such interest. As field tested in
the September 2006 coup that overthrew Thaksin's
administration, the importance of battalion
commanders has risen significantly, particularly
in light of the still polarized political
situation.
While these commanders may be
junior when compared to the likes of Prayuth, to
the soldiers and junior officers under their
direct command they are the ultimate authority,
senior enough to be rendered almost unquestioning
obedience, yet close enough to their rank and file
soldiers to know many of them by name.
In
the event of a future coup or counter-coup, or
even a civil war, battalion commanders will be the
critical key links in the chain of command in
getting units to move out of their garrisons and
onto the streets, or conversely by issuing orders
not to mobilize. RTA officers organize and ally
themselves by their respective Chulachomklao Royal
Military Academy (CRMA) graduating class.
History shows specific classes tend to
rise or stagnate together, meaning competition
among CRMA classes is a significant factor in
determining and further defining an individual
officer's loyalty. At any given time, the RTA's
various levels of command are usually dominated by
two or three consecutive CRMA classes, which may
be allies or rivals for influence. For example,
Prep Class 10 officers, known for their allegiance to
classmate Thaksin, were systematically sidelined
by coup-makers after the 2006 putsch.
With
this in mind, Prayuth's survey can be interpreted
as an attempt to establish and maintain personal
relationships with this key group of officers, as
well as a bid to identify those officers who might
be unhappy with the army's leaders or policies.
Assuming officers filled out the test honestly,
the results would show who might be inclined to
join with the known pro-Thaksin faction within the
military.
Insiders have reported that the
results have been favorable to Prayuth's
leadership and that several battalion commanders
have been called to Bangkok to meet individually
with the commander-in-chief to share and discuss
their respective ideas. The most important result
of this innovative testing/survey program seems to
have been to strengthen support for Prayuth with
the battalion commanders and thereby further
unifying the army under his command.
Class consciousness In a
related move, Prayuth has also acted to broaden
his base of support within the army by supporting
the promotion and assignment to key positions of
officers outside of his own prep class. This is
significant because there had been a serious
degree of dissatisfaction within the RTA officer
corps over Prayuth's perceived favoritism in
promoting his own Class 12 officers at previous
reshuffles.
While this shift is no doubt
due in part to the advancing age of Prayuth's
classmates, many of whom are fast approaching
mandatory retirement, Prayuth apparently made a
conscious change in his management approach.
The recent promotion of two officers from
Class 13, a younger academy class, to the
commanderships of the powerful 2nd and 3rd Army
Regions is a clear example of Prayuth's changed
approach. The 4th Army Region Commander was
already a Class 13 member. Insiders expect the
trend to continue at the upcoming annual military
promotion and reassignment list, usually announced
in September with an effective date of October 1,
with the first Class 14 officer to be promoted to
four star level and given an assignment to one of
the five key positions in the RTA hierarchy.
That officer, Lieutenant General Udomchai
Sitabut, widely viewed as a professional officer
currently assigned as commander of the critical
1st Army Region, is believed to be on track to
replace Prayuth as RTA commander-in-chief upon his
mandatory retirement in September 2014. Udomchai
is also a 21st Infantry Regiment alum who as a
Special Colonel succeeded Prayuth as the commander
of that prestigious unit. He is also a recipient
of the Thai Medal of Honor and is known to be
close to the royal family.
At the same
time, the RTA is quietly expanding its force
structure. In a program approved several years
ago, the RTA has started to activate three new
combat divisions, two of which are to be situated
in Thaksin's geographical stronghold. The new 7th
Infantry Division has begun forming in the
country's north under the 3rd Army Region, with a
new headquarters located at Mae Rim on the eastern
side of Chiang Mai city.
In northeastern
Thailand, in the 2nd Army Region, the new 3rd
Cavalry Division is being activated with its
headquarters in Khon Kaen. While neither of these
two divisions is fully formed yet, both have major
combat elements already assigned and would be
capable of deploying several thousand soldiers in
the event of an emergency.
A third new
division, the 15th Infantry Division, has been
activated in the country's South under the 4th
Army Region. The decision to activate this
division was made several years ago and was
officially classified to keep the details secret
until the unit was fully formed. The 15th has now
been almost fully fleshed out, with new three
infantry regiments each with three infantry
battalions.
The entire division is being
based in the three southernmost provinces of
Narathiwat, Yala, and Pattani where a Muslim
insurgency is active. The 4th Army Region now has
two line infantry divisions assigned and
approximately nine new paramilitary units with
regular army cadre, known locally as Taharn Phran,
each comprised of six to eight 140-man companies
are also planned to be activated and permanently
based in the deep south.
The 15th Infantry
Division was activated for clear military reasons,
but even here there are political implications.
For the past seven years, the RTA has reinforced
its units in the south by rotating for periods of
one year six combat battalions drawn from the 1st
(Central), 2nd (Northeast), and 3rd (North) Army
Regions into the southern provinces.
With
the formation of the 15th Infantry Division well
underway, Prayuth secretly decided in January to
move forward to this July, instead of July 2013,
the date when these rotations would cease, a full
year earlier than originally planned. If this
decision holds, it means that the divisions which
are based in and around Bangkok, which earlier had
units deployed to the south, will now be back at
full strength and will increase the force Prayuth
could deploy in the capital in the event of a
political crisis.
However, RTA staff
insiders say that the recent series of coordinated
insurgent attacks in the south, as well as
intelligence that indicates a steady rise in the
insurgency's capabilities, have caused Prayuth to
have second thoughts about fully discontinuing the
rotational program.
High water
marks The RTA is also making serious
detailed plans for dealing with another season of
above average rainfall and the potential for more
massive flooding. The RTA Command and General
Staff College last month convened a two-week
closed symposium where uniformed officers and sergeants from
squad leader up to regimental commanders of units
directly involved in the flood relief effort last
year were ordered to participate.
Armed
with meteorological evidence that points to the
potential for a recurrence of last year's floods,
the army has put together an updated operations
plan based on lessons learned from last year’s relief operation and participating units have already received
orders to prepare.
Equipment such as small
inflatable boats and individual life preservers
which will make participating units more effective
in flood relief operations have also been procured
and prepositioned at designated units,
particularly with infantry regiments and their
line battalions.
Selected RTA engineer
units in the Bangkok region have already been
ordered to begin work on flood mitigation efforts,
such as cleaning canals, with at least two units
having recently received special major budget
increases for this mission from the royal family.
Prayuth is also bidding to build support
within the army military education system, which
collectively has been the most distrustful of his
tenure. On this past April's mid-year reshuffle
list, Prayuth approved the promotion of Major
General Pawpol Manerrin to Lieutenant General and
reassigned him from deputy superintendent to the
new superintendent of the Chulachomklao Royal
Military Academy (CRMA).
Never in recent
memory has the deputy at CRMA been promoted to
superintendent, especially one from a very junior
class four years younger than the officer he
replaced.
According to insiders, the
selection of Pawpol signals the increased
importance Prayuth is now paying to education and
training. Other changes are expected to be made in
the months ahead. The most significant of these is
a recently approved plan to expand the army
training command to be commanded by a four-star
general with a much larger budget and wider
responsibilities, including over all reserve
military training at civilian schools throughout
the kingdom.
Each of these measures can be
explained and justified on their own terms. An
expansion of the number of divisions is on the
surface indicative of an increased personnel and
procurement budget. More emphasis on professional
education improves the readiness and capability of
the army. More forces deployed to the South could
improve security there (although if not well
trained it could worsen the situation). Preparing
for more flood relief efforts requires no
explanation considering the scale and cost of last
year's disaster.
Taken together, however,
these moves constitute a massive, self-initiated
and coordinated program whose elements are tied
together by a drive to increase the internal
cohesion and loyalty of the army. While it's
difficult to predict exactly what this
multi-faceted program will mean for stability in
the months ahead, one thing is certain: Prayuth's
RTA is clearly preparing for any future
contingency it may face and bolstering its ability
to act on its own initiative in a potential
political crisis.
While Prayuth has until
now been successful in keeping these measures
largely secret from the public and press, he and
his staff were always aware that Thaksin would
eventually learn of them, given his known inside
contacts in the RTA. At the same time, the secret
moves could be interpreted as an indirect warning
to Thaksin of Prayuth's determination to defend
and forward the army's interests.
Steve Sciacchitano and John
Cole spent several years in Thailand while on
active duty with the US Army. Both were trained as
Foreign Area Officers specializing in Southeast
Asia and graduated from the Royal Thai Army's
Command and General Staff College. They are now
retired and the views expressed here are their
own.
(Copyright 2012 Asia Times Online
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