What is China’s PLA doing in Laos?
Beijing's 'Train of Peace' mission to provide medical care to Lao armed forces was nominally a goodwill mission but underscored the country's strategic importance to China's plans for Southeast Asia
China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the world’s largest fighting force with over 2.3 million soldiers, is fast expanding its operations in its near abroad.
A 90-person PLA medical team recently concluded a little noticed goodwill mission in neighboring Laos. Dubbed “Train of Peace 2017”, the team of Chinese army medics and physicians brought medicine, equipment and a newly deployed 14-tent field hospital to the landlocked country of nearly seven million.
This came as good news considering Laos’ rudimentary healthcare infrastructure and grinding poverty rates. From July 27 to August 6, the Chinese goodwill team distributed 20,000 boxes of medicine, received over 6,500 patients and performed more than a dozen surgeries for senior Lao commanders as well as junior officers, all free-of-charge.
Based in the Lao capital Vientiane and the northern municipality of Luang Namtha bordering China, the mission catered first to members of the Lao People’s Armed Forces and their dependents. In particular, PLA doctors made special rounds to the Lao army’s 11th regiment, 703th regiment and the Vientiane garrison command.
On August 2, the PLA team unveiled with Lao colleagues a China-donated clinical medicine training center at the army general hospital, the first and only institution of its kind in the Lao military’s health system. Overall, the “Train of Peace” mission received positive reviews from Lao service members and civilians alike, state media reported.
While Chinese media portrayed the mission as purely humanitarian, the geopolitical reality is more nuanced. Laos’ position at the head of China’s One Belt One Road ambitions for mainland Southeast Asia was also likely a motivating factor behind the PLA’s humane outreach.
The proposed Kunming-Singapore railway, designed to pass through Laos and on to mainland Southeast Asia, will conceivably provide China’s landlocked southwestern regions another outlet to the ocean while augmenting Beijing’s regional influence.
It is thus in Beijing’s interest to be on good terms with the Lao ruling elite to ensure the project moves ahead smoothly. Construction of the US$5.56 billion railway’s Lao section began last December and is expected to take five years to complete. The project will be 70% funded by China and is Laos’ largest ever infrastructure undertaking.
While the railway is a source of excitement for many Lao urbanites, it is a cause of unease in the countryside among villagers situated in construction zones, particularly for those who claim they have not received fair compensation from the government for their relocation.
All this is being brushed aside in the name of future economic gains. But the railway could create new problems as well, critics say. Improved infrastructure will also undoubtedly benefit the burgeoning cross-border drug trade, of which Laos is a major transit point.
On August 5, Chinese border guards in Yunnan province’s Mengla County captured smugglers returning from Laos with over 100 kilograms of raw opium. The bust comes amid growing bilateral exercises, including joint maneuvers held last September between 280 police officers in the name of counterterrorism, that have brought the two sides’ security forces closer together.
Like other communist armies, the Lao military adheres strictly to a party-control model. Building military-to-military relations therefore is critical to the furtherance of China’s interests. Besides allowing PLA servicemen a first-hand understanding of Laos, the “Train of Peace” mission also looked to cultivate personalized links between Chinese and Lao militaries that could be of future use.
But how would China’s initiative impact Vietnam, which also shares strong ties with the Lao military as a fellow communist state? Indeed, some analysts wonder if the “Train of Peace” initiative is part of a wider Chinese effort to enhance ties with the Lao military at the expense of Hanoi.
The special relationship between the Lao and Vietnamese armed forces was cemented during the Lao civil war, in which the then North Vietnamese army played an indispensable role in helping Lao revolutionaries to eventual victory.
Today, the Lao army still relies heavily on the support of Vietnam, seen in the frequent exchanges between the high commands. Thousands of Lao officers have received training at Vietnamese military academies over the years.
As Chinese power expands southwards, Laos and Vietnam are both grappling with how to balance an increasingly confident and economically dominant China. While Laos welcomes aid from everywhere, its communist leaders are known to be weary of over-dependence on a single donor. China is currently Laos’ biggest foreign donor and investor.
Yet some Lao leaders are known to be skeptical about China’s ultimate intentions.
Indeed, the director of the Lao military’s general political department might have taken an indirect shot at China during his August 2 visit to Hanoi, at which he underscored the Lao and Vietnamese armies’ role in guarding against unnamed “hostile forces’ sabotage plots trying to split the special solidarity between Laos and Vietnam.”
Although the PLA’s military mission to Laos might be seen as an attempt to isolate Vietnam, particularly as the two countries joust over disputed territories in the South China Sea, China is playing a bigger game in Laos with infrastructure investments that aim to deepen its trade and influence in Southeast Asia.
While the PLA’s “Train of Peace” aimed specifically at improving ties with the Lao military, its wider aim was to build bridges that will help China extend its power well beyond landlocked little Laos.
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