Page 3 of
3 The search for
an Asian face By Chietigj
Bajpaee
points (the Taiwan Strait,
the Korea Peninsula and Kashmir) have made Asian
conflicts of global significance.
Barriers to an Asian community A
further barrier to Asian integration is the
ongoing debate over the values and interests that
Asia shares.
In the case of Japan, Taiwan
and India, democracy and the rule of law are the
binding factors, while in the case of China and
Southeast Asian states, a
belief in soft authoritarianism, non-intervention
and state sovereignty as encompassed by China's
Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence and
ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation defines
Asian values. Australia, India, Japan and the US
are forging a closer relationship that Japan has
termed the "arc of freedom and prosperity", which
some have regarded as an attempt to hedge against
a China-dominated Asian order.
On the
other hand, the success of China's model of
economic development without political
representation, which some have termed the
"Beijing Consensus", suggest it as an alternative
model of Asian values. This has been further
reinforced by the precarious nature of Asia's
democracies, as evinced by a military coup in
Thailand, unpopular ruling governments that are
subject to scandal in the Philippines, South Korea
and Taiwan, and authoritarian democracies in
Singapore and Malaysia.
Even in countries
with true democracies, such as India and Japan,
politics is often dominated by personality cults
rather than policy platforms. This is especially
true with the persistence of the Gandhi-Nehru
dynasty in India and the Liberal Democratic Party
in Japan.
Regional integration has also
been deterred by long-standing mistrust. For
example, China and the US were opposed to Japan's
initial proposal for an Asian Monetary Fund in
which they felt they would be marginalized.
Similarly, the US opposed then-Malaysian premier
Mahathir's proposal for an East Asia Economic
Caucus that would exclude the United States.
Asian forums that exclude the US have
received renewed attention with the formation of
the East Asia Summit, ASEAN + 3 and the SCO. Other
regional forums such as SAARC (South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation) have had
mixed records of success given underlying mistrust
among member states.
While growing
economic interdependence may help to deter
conflict, growing Sino-Indian and Sino-Japanese
trade and investment have failed to deter
political and security frictions. Within Southeast
Asia, ethnic tensions are deterring regional
integration, as demonstrated by opposition in
Indonesia and Thailand to Singapore's investment
in their telecom sectors, which is a manifestation
of long-standing racial tensions with the region's
prosperous ethnic-Chinese minority. Not
surprisingly, intra-regional trade in Southeast
Asia remains below 25%.
Furthermore,
growing regionalism and multilateralism do not
necessarily equal a more stable and peaceful Asia.
In many cases, mutual mistrust is fueling the
creation of a plethora of competing multilateral
forums. For example, Japan has pushed for the
ASEAN + 6 process of economic integration as an
alternative to the ASEAN + 3 to dilute China's
dominance. The US has pushed its own model of
economic integration with the FTAAP proposal.
In the security sphere, inclusive and open
forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and
Shangri-La Dialogue co-exist with exclusive and ad
hoc arrangements such as the US bilateral security
treaties with Japan, South Korea, Australia,
Singapore and Thailand, the US-led Proliferation
Security Initiative, the US-Japan-Australia
Strategic Trilateral Dialogue, and the
Sino-Russian-led SCO.
The growing
participation of Japan, Australia and India in
numerous regional forums such as the East Asia
Summit has been justified by the need to balance
China's growing influence in Southeast Asia. ASEAN
itself was formed to ward off China's influence,
and the exclusion of Taiwan from all multilateral
forums with the exception of APEC is also a source
of concern given its importance in both the
economic and security spheres.
The
overlapping nature of these forums is also a
function of attempts by numerous states to use
regional forums to promote their own ideologies
and agendas. For instance, China's shift from an
aversion to multilateral forums and institutions
toward playing a leadership role in such groupings
as the SCO and the Boao Forum is a function of
Beijing's desire to promote itself as an emerging
and peaceful power and maintain amicable relations
with states along its periphery, especially those
rich in resources.
In Southeast Asia,
where China and India are competing for influence
to access energy resources and markets and contain
instabilities along their border, both states have
established multilateral forums that exclude the
other - China is excluded from the Bay of Bengal
Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and
Economic Cooperation and the Ganga-Mekong
Swarnabhoomi Project, while India is excluded from
the Greater Mekong Subregion Economic Cooperation
Program. Forums where both states are
participants, such as the Kunming Initiative, have
made limited progress. China and Japan are also
competing for influence in the Indochina region
through infrastructure projects.
East-West Corridor
project Finally, the nature of
multilateralism in Asia with minimal
institutionalization, an emphasis on
non-intervention, respect for sovereignty,
non-confrontation and face-saving, as manifested
in the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence
and ASEAN Way, has led to regional forums playing
a marginal role in times of crisis as bilateral
arrangements (usually with the US) play a more
significant role. For instance, ASEAN played a
minimal role in addressing the deteriorating
security situation in East Timor, as well as the
relief efforts after the Asian tsunami in 2004 and
addressing the spread of SARS and bird flu.
"Asian values" do not translate into
uniform economic and political policies that are
practiced by all Asian states. Cultures, values
and civilizations are not monolithic, mutually
exclusive and static. They are constantly evolving
under the influence of other cultures,
civilizations and value systems, from economic,
social and political crises, and new technologies.
There is a continual process of cultures
reinventing and rejuvenating themselves by peeling
away the rotten, backward and inefficient parts,
further cultivating the strengths, and
incorporating superior elements of other cultures
and value systems. This has been apparent in
Asia's numerous manifestations of
community-building.
Nonetheless, an Asian
community cannot be forged until the Cold War
comes to an end in Asia and long-standing ethnic
rivalries and World War II-era tensions, most
notably between Japan and its neighbors, are
overcome. Multilateralism and regionalism will
only contribute to a stable order if they are
inclusive. Reverting to Asia's original model of
regionalism and identity embedded in trade,
cultural exchanges, and fluid and tolerant
practices of religion will help to forge a new
Asian regionalism.
Despite the absence of
a common language or religion, an Asian community
can still coalesce around a consensus on the
conditions or ground rules for interaction, as has
been attempted with Japan's Arc of Freedom and
Prosperity, China's Five Principles of Peaceful
Co-existence, and ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation.
Chietigj Bajpaee is
a research associate at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies in Washington, DC, where
he works on numerous projects analyzing
macroeconomic, geopolitical and security
developments in Asia. He has been a research
assistant for the International Institute for
Strategic Studies in London and a risk analyst for
a New York-based risk-management company. He has
lived in Hong Kong, India, the United Kingdom and
the United States. He can be contacted at
cbajpaee@hotmail.com.
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