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Asia looks for consensuses
By Scott B MacDonald
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), to be in total control of the nation's political
life. This includes the stifling of democratic voices in Hong Kong and
threatening of Taiwan's political experiment - as both represent the view that
there can be more than one political viewpoint.
The unstated part of the Ramo's Beijing Consensus is that without
control over the nation's political discourse, the CCP cannot impose its
economic policies. The rule of law is not to establish a level playing field
for all actors, but to be used to maintain the political rule of a single party
and, by that, political stability. Change is allowed, but it is top-down,
imposed, and directed.
Yet the globalization and economic liberalization that have occurred have also
stirred social unrest brought about by serious environmental and corruption
problems that have eroded the CCP's legitimacy. There is a fundamental tension
in sequencing economic reform ahead of political reform - or, in the case of
China, the absence of political reform (except at a glacial pace). The result
is more as Ross Terrill observed, in contrast to Ramo's environmentally
friendly and corruption-free Beijing Consensus developmental end goal: "The
essential traits of the new Chinese Empire are three: its driving force comes
from above, not below; it sees itself as the guardian of truth; and any
compromises it makes with other powers are tactical in nature, not based on an
acceptance of moral comparability between China and the rest of the world of
sovereign states."
Despite the substantial problems facing China - both economic and political -
there is an appeal on the development front. Ramo is hardly alone in being
apprehensive that opening political systems (as part of the globalization
process) opens the door to instability. Yale University's Amy Chua starts her
book World on Fire:
The sobering thesis of this book is that the
global spread of markets and democracy is a principal aggravating cause of
group hatred and ethnic violence throughout the non-Western world. In the
numerous societies around the world that have a market-dominant minority,
markets and democracy are not reinforcing. Because markets and democracy
benefit different ethnic groups in such societies, the pursuit of free-market
democracy produces highly unstable and combustible conditions.
Yet
globalization has occurred throughout Asia, and the result has not been a
complete breakdown in law and order. Progress has actually been made on the
economic front. South Korea's and Taiwan's current open political systems and
advanced economies also came from a process akin to the Beijing Consensus -
with economic development ahead of political development. However, in both
cases there was an evolution from hard authoritarianism to soft
authoritarianism to a form of democracy, which is more open and accommodative
of a changing global system.
Along the lines of a more evolutionary shift of political institutions, Michael
Vatikiotis observed: "The pace and manner of political change may seem at odds
with Western norms, but there it would be wrong to assume that people are
naturally disposed to enduring tyranny and oppression. The form of freedom and
democracy they crave is not necessarily identical with that practiced in the
West, but there is a growing desire to be treated as subjects and not objects
of political life."
In a sense, this is the core of the debate that Asia faces with its future -
how to transit from closed political systems like China's where corruption
flourishes to more open political systems, which have problems but are seeking
to improve through better transparency and better corporate governance as well
as more flexible political institutions. Flexibility is key - it allows greater
accommodation of public demands in an environment of change. There is a point
where change must occur, within a managed context, or the risk of political
upheaval becomes overwhelming.
Is the answer the Beijing Consensus? India offers a major counterpoint to the
Beijing Consensus. Indeed, a "New Delhi Consensus" can serve as a counterpoint
to the authoritarian bent of the Chinese model:
A strong adherence to democratic government, based on parliamentary
give-and-takes.
Settling of major debates about economic policy via the ballot box and
parliament (a more difficult process in the short term).
A legal system relatively independent of the dominant political party.
An apolitical military establishment (unlike China's People's Liberation Army).
Support of the increasing multinational nature of local companies.
An economically expanding and politically articulate middle class, supportive
of globalization.
A desire to strike more of a balance than in the West between the haves and the
have-nots. Copying high-end Western materialistic society is not entirely a
viable option in the short term, but the gap can be closed over time.
While India has enormous problems surrounding economic disparities,
environmental pollution, infrastructure needs and corruption, it may just offer
a kinder and gentler approach to the thornier issues of globalization and
political order, especially when compared with China's top-down
authoritarianism. A New Delhi Consensus may also offer a milder form of
globalization than some of the hardcore aspects of the Washington Consensus and
its emphasis on totally unfettered free markets.
What is often forgotten in the development debate is that the West's success
came on the back of winners and losers, sociopolitical upheavals, and some
degree of human suffering. Additionally, a New Delhi Consensus, like a Beijing
or Washington Consensus, should not be adopted as an ideology, but rather as a
policy framework.
In many regards, Asia is in the process of economic convergence, pushed along
by the relentless nature of globalization. Over time, it will make a decision
between the Beijing Consensus and its New Delhi counterpart. By sheer
demographic weight and the rapid takeoff of these two economies, the rest of
Asia will be impacted, as will the rest of the world. The alternative to
finding the "right path" means political chaos and economic failure, something
that Asia cannot afford in the 21st century.
Notes
1. Joshua Cooper Ramo, "China has discovered its own economic consensus",
Financial Times, May 7, 2004, p 13. For a lengthier treatment, see his The
Beijing Consensus (London: The Foreign Policy Center, 2004).
2. Ibid.
3. See Lucian Pye, Asian Power and Politics (Boston: Harvard University
Press, 1985).
Scott B MacDonald is editor of KWR International Advisor.
(Posted with permission from
KWR International, Inc, (KWR), a consulting firm
specializing in the delivery of research, communications and advisory
services.)
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