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Indian-Pakistani tensions jolt Iran
By Hooman Peimani
Iranian
Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council
(SNSC) Hassan Rowhani expressed his country's concern
about the tension between India and Pakistan in his late
June meeting with Pakistan's ambassador to Tehran Javid
Hussein.
In that meeting, Rowhani stressed the
necessity of defusing the dangerous situation for the
benefit of not only India and Pakistan, but also for the
entire region, which, according to him, could not
tolerate more tensions as it was already overwhelmed by
various developmental challenges.
He offered
Iran's good offices to prevent escalation of tensions
and to help defuse the situation. This followed previous
Iranian statements, including those of Foreign Minister
Kamal Kharazi, made during his May visits to India and
Pakistan which reflected Iran's policy towards the
Indian-Pakistani conflict. Such policy reveals Iran's
various concerns, which create stakes for the Iranians
in the Indian subcontinent's stability whose major
prerequisites are easing tension between the two nuclear
neighbors and their settlement of the dispute over
Kashmir.
In the contemporary era, Iran's ties
with India and Pakistan date back to their independence
in 1947. Its bilateral ties with both countries were
tension-free and friendly until the 1979 Iranian
revolution. Iranian-Indian relations have since
continued their friendly and cooperative nature. The two
countries' common views on certain regional and
international issues have created grounds for their
expansion of ties. They include their joint concerns
about Pakistan's growing influence in Afghanistan and
its efforts to expand to Central Asia, where both
countries have interests, as well as their opposition to
an American-led unipolar international system.
Unlike the latter, Iranian-Pakistani ties have
experienced fluctuations since 1979. A major source of
tension in the 1980s was their leveling allegations on
each other for supporting their respective illegal
opposition groups and for their contributions to
sectarian conflicts. However, their pursuit of
conflicting interests in Afghanistan became their main
source of conflict from 1992 when the pro-Soviet Afghan
government fell to November 2001 when the Taliban regime
collapsed. Afghanistan's significance for their security
and its importance as a gateway to Central Asia turned
that country into an arena of rivalry between Iran and
Pakistan. Having American and Saudi blessing, Pakistan's
creation and backing of the anti-Iranian Taliban and
Iran's supporting of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance
turned their conflicts into a proxy war until the
Taliban's demise. That event removed a major source of
conflict in their bilateral relations, but it did not
end their rivalry in Afghanistan.
Despite their
regional rivalry, Iran and Pakistan have continued their
peaceful ties, which have become extensive out of
necessity to include economic and military affairs.
Factors such as geographical realities, immediate
economic needs and their regional and/or international
isolation have created grounds for their peaceful
relations and even cooperation on certain issues such as
scientific and technological exchanges. Besides, they
have interests in cooperation as the founding members
along with Turkey of a regional organization: the
Economic Cooperation Organization.
Against this
background, concerns about a variety of issues have made
Iran interested in defusing the current tense situation
between India and Pakistan and in a peaceful settlement
of their conflict over Kashmir. A major concern is the
threat of escalation of any conventional
Indian-Pakistani war into a nuclear war with its
catastrophic results for both countries and possibly for
Iran in different ways. As Pakistan's neighbor, such war
would possibly expose its people and environment to
radiation and nuclear fallout, especially along its
territory bordering Pakistan. A predictable mass flight
of Pakistanis to Iran following such war would have
extensive economic, social and political implications
for that country. Moreover, the sheer use of nuclear
weapons in a conflict would set a precedent for its use
in other conflicts, such as future ones involving Iran,
a situation which Iran wants to avoid and that the
international community has avoided since 1945.
Another concern for Iran is the impact of a war,
whether nuclear or conventional, on regional stability.
As one of its aspects, the flight of potentially
millions of Indians and Pakistanis to regional countries
(Iran, China and Afghanistan) could contribute to social
tensions in those countries having limited or exhausted
financial resources. Another would be the upsetting
impact of a war on the regional balance of power. A
decisive victory would help the victor consolidate
itself as a regional power and seek its regional
objectives more aggressively. A sudden shift in the
regional balance of power could force Iran to challenge
the victor politically or militarily, a destructive
situation for Iran in need of a long period of peace to
address its numerous domestic and foreign problems.
Yet another concern would be an inevitable
pressure on Iran by India and Pakistan to take sides
with either of them explicitly or implicitly. This would
be a very probable scenario in a non-nuclear war over
Kashmir, which Iran would rather avoid, as it needs
peaceful and friendly ties with both India and Pakistan.
As dissatisfied regional powers, the two are potential
long-term allies of Iran, another dissatisfied regional
power. India has been a de facto ally in many areas, but
even Pakistan could become one if Iran and Pakistan
reached a durable regional understanding.
Moreover, Iran needs the two countries'
friendship to ensure that they will not become American
regional allies, a possibility given their sudden
closeness to the Americans since September 11. In
particular, Iran must prevent its neighboring Pakistan
from turning into an American long-term military base,
which would almost complete Iran's encirclement by
pro-American and/or hostile states. In the case of
India, Iran must ensure its friendship as an Indian
shift to the American camp would turn a friend into a
nuclear enemy and would deny Iran of an influential
regional friend with certain international status when
it needs to increase its network of friend to resist
American pressures. Friendly India is also a necessity
for balancing Pakistan.
Finally, Iran has an
economic concern. It needs peaceful and stable ties
between India and Pakistan as a prerequisite for its
desired export of gas to India through a pipeline via
Pakistan, whose contract was signed years ago, but whose
implementation has been postponed. India's justified
concern about putting its energy artery in the hands of
its archenemy (Pakistan) has prevented its
implementation, which would generate substantial amount
of revenue for Iran while preparing ground for a
possible oil pipeline.
The defusing of the
current crisis between India and Pakistan and the
settlement of their conflict on Kashmir are in the best
interests of Iran. This was reflected in the SNSC
secretary June meeting with the Pakistani ambassador and
in the May visit of Iranian foreign minister to
Islamabad and New Delhi. The latter aimed to defuse the
tense situation. Iran's efforts in both regards should
hopefully supplement those of other states to remove the
threat of a devastating was between the two neighbors,
which could escalate to a nuclear exchange, a
catastrophic scenario for their impoverished countries
and for their exhausted region.
Dr Hooman
Peimani works as an independent consultant with
international organizations in Geneva and does research
in international relations.
(©2002 Asia
Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
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