Central Asia

Kyrgyzstan muscles up ... but for whom?
By Sergei Blagov

MOSCOW - Citing concerns over perceived terrorist threats, the former Soviet republic of Kyrgyzstan has pledged to strengthen and professionalize its small army. However, few in this once-tranquil Central Asian nation are missing the message: by forming new elite armed units, Kyrgyz authorities may well be also bearing in mind domestic opposition, ethnic minorities or potential conflicts with neighbors.

Earlier this month Kyrgyz Defense Minister Esen Topoyev announced that Kyrgyzstan had started on the creation of an elite rapid reaction force to tackle a terrorist threat from Afghanistan as well as "local outbursts of extremism".

Topoyev refrained from revealing the size of the would-be rapid reaction force, but stated that it would only consist of officers and warrant-officers. He added that they would be paid some US$150 a month, roughly three times the current average salary of Kyrgyz officers.

Kyrgyz authorities have legitimate security concerns, mainly in the wake of the so-called "Batken wars". In August 2000, well-armed Islamic rebels crossed into Kyrgyzstan and engaged government troops. As the insurgents - mainly mercenary snipers, according to Kyrgyz officials - penetrated into Kyrgyz territory, the hostilities widened as fighters attacked the Batken district of Kyrgyzstan located near the Tajik-Kyrgyz border.

The rebels were reported to be part of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), once led by Jumaboi Namangani. The fighters were understood to be seeking to enter Uzbekistan from the north through Kyrgyzstan. It was even claimed that 1,000 of Namangani's fighters were able to occupy Kyrgyzstan in a week or so. Subsequently, Namangani was reported to have been killed in the course of the Taliban demise, yet these reports are yet to be confirmed.

The IMU were fighting for the release of religious Muslims in Uzbek prisons whom they believed to be falsely charged, as well as the establishment of Sharia law in the country. The movement opposed Uzbek President Islam Karimov, who had clamped down on what he saw as a threat to his country's security from Islamic extremism.

This was the second time that political violence had seized the mountains of Central Asia. In August 1999, dozens of gunmen crossed into Kyrgyzstan from neighboring Tajikistan, seized a village and took at least six hostages, including four Japanese geologists and a Kyrgyz major general, Anarbek Shamkeyev, commander of interior ministry troops.

It was in no way a coincidence that the Batken wars took place in August; many mountainous routes in Kyrgyzstan become passable by late summer only. On August 2 Topoyev claimed that small groups of extremist fighters might be trying to infiltrate from neighboring Afghanistan, where the international anti-terrorist operation has yet to be completed, and pledged that the Kyrgyz army would not let any rebel groups cross.

On the other hand, Topoyev also pledged to reform the Kyrgyz armed forces. However, he conceded that no less than eight years would be needed to stop conscription and to turn the Kyrgyz army into a professional force.

Currently, the Kyrgyz army includes some 12,000 personnel organized around the nexus of what used to be the 288th infantry division of the former Soviet army based in Kyrgyzstan. The Kyrgyz national army has been severely underfunded as the government has allocated less than $20 million a year as the country's military budget.

Moreover, the Batken wars also dealt the Kyrgyz armed forces some financial blows. In 1999, the Kyrgyz army spent about $30 million, or roughly one sixth of the country's total budget, to combat rebels in Batken.

Not surprisingly, Kyrgyzstan has sought outside aid to strengthen its army. Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev has long urged Moscow to strengthen the country's military, notably air force, which had just one Mi-8 helicopter, obviously not enough to fight well-armed rebels in mountainous terrain.

Last June, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov traveled to Kyrgyzstan and pledged to boost military ties with the Central Asian state as the two countries inked a few security deals. On June 13, Ivanov and Topoyev signed an agreement on the status of Russian military personnel in Kyrgyzstan, as well as a memorandum on the lease of military facilities by the Russians.

Russia and Kyrgyzstan have maintained close political and military ties, and Akayev has tended to support the Kremlin's policies in the region. In response, Moscow has backed Akayev's regime and warned against interference in Kyrgyz internal affairs.

However, Topoyev's referral to "local outbursts of extremism" arguably indicates that Kyrgyz authorities could also use the rapid reaction forces against domestic opposition, notably in the wake of recent mass protests in Southern Kyrgyzstan. Protests have been provoked by a controversial border treaty under which Kyrgyzstan transfers some 95,000 hectares of its territory to China.

Since earlier this year, the Akayev administration has faced criticism over the border deal. Last March, 5,000 people gathered in the Jalal-Abad province of impoverished southern Kyrgyzstan, and in the ensuing rioting, five protesters were killed and dozens of civilians and police injured.

It has been claimed that rivalries between the country's clans also contributed to recent tensions. Notably, southern Kyrgyz clans have grown increasingly discontent with the reluctance of Akayev's northern clan to share the power. Moreover, there is a large ethnic Uzbek minority in southern Kyrgyzstan, while some Uzbeks feel that the Kyrgyz government discriminates against them.

Southern Kyrgyzstan is home to a large ethnic Uzbek minority, while opposition to the Akayev government has been manifested through unsanctioned religious groups, notably the Hizb-ut-Tahrir. It has been argued that southerners, Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, have banded together in their aim of ending the northern clans' stranglehold on power.

On the other hand, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have been at odds over water resources. The downstream Uzbekistan requires more water for its growing agricultural sectors and rising populations, while the economically weaker upstream Kyrgyzstan wants to use more water for electricity generation.

Uzbekistan has carried out military exercises that look suspiciously like practice runs at capturing by force the Toktogul water reservoir in Kyrgyzstan. Hence, with a backdrop of competition for water, it's not hard to see why Kyrgyzstan might want some better protection for its resources.

Ironically, Kyrgyz authorities are eyeing a stronger army at the very moment some 2,000 American personnel are occupying the Manas air base near the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek, where up to 5,000 coalition soldiers are expected to be based eventually. Although this force could help Kyrgyz authorities to deal with terrorist threats, coalition troops are unlikely to back the government in disputes with the opposition.

Therefore, although Kyrgyzstan explains its drive towards a stronger army by a mantra of "terrorist threat", the brand new Kyrgyz elite forces could eventually have other targets as well.

(©2002 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)

 
Aug 7, 2002



 

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