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Russia goes its own way on
Iran
By Hooman Peimani
On August 2, Rajab Safarov, a political adviser
to Russian President Vladimir Putin and director of
Russia's Iranian Studies Center, announced plans for
long-term economic cooperation between Russia and Iran.
Though yet to be signed by both sides, the plan provided
for a significant expansion of bilateral relations in
many areas, including trade, arms sales and construction
of nuclear power reactors. Coming as it did on the
arrival date of an American delegation led by US Energy
Secretary Spencer Abraham - a delegation tasked with
persuading Russia to halt its nuclear cooperation with
Iran - Safarov's announcement amounted to an emphatic
avowal of Russia's determination to pursue its own
national interests, even in the face of vociferous
American opposition.
Some history is in order.
In the contemporary era, Russian-Iranian economic
relations date only back to the 1960s, when political
and economic considerations combined to force both
countries to establish close ties. The Soviet Union
became a major contributor to the creation of Iran's
heavy industry.
Then came the 1979 Iranian
revolution, which proved an insurmountable ideological
obstacle to the continuance of political and economic
relations. Russia's occupation of Afghanistan and Iran's
backing of anti-Soviet Afghan mujahideen groups worsened
these relations, leading the Soviet Union to turn to
Iraq, which was then at war with Iran. The Soviet Union
became Iraq's main supplier of weapons. It was not until
1987 that the Soviet Union shifted to a more balanced
policy and began the gradual process of improvement of
Iranian-Soviet relations. The two countries' conclusion
of a variety of economic agreements and a major military
one put them on a friendly path in 1989, a year after
the end of Iran-Iraq war.
Then came the breakup
of the Soviet Union. In the post-Soviet era, economic
ties have expanded significantly as political and
economic realities have made Iran and Russia "natural"
partners. Various economic sanctions or restrictions on
Iran stemming from its isolation have limited its
international trade partners. When it comes to
satisfying Iran's needs in heavy and advanced industrial
equipment and in sophisticated weapons, China and Russia
have become the only available trade partners.
Meanwhile, Russia, having lost its Soviet-bloc market
and having failed to penetrate many others, is faced
with a growing need for hard currency that makes Iran an
attractive and indispensable economic partner. The two
sides' similar viewpoint on many regional and
international issues has created a suitable political
ground for their growing economic relations.
Russia's bid to improve ties with the United
States in the 1990s made it accept some restrictions on
military and non-military nuclear exports to Iran.
According to a 1995 agreement between then Russian
president Boris Yeltsin and then US president Bill
Clinton, Russia agreed to stop selling conventional
weapons to Iran beyond those already under contract.
Also, the United States has continued to pressure Russia
to stop helping Iran with its nuclear power projects.
Russia's recent improving ties with NATO and its
accession to G8 membership - as well as its interest in
joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) - are
expected to create a strong stake for the Russians to
meet the American request regarding its ties with Iran.
Against this background, Safarov's announcement
of a plan for long-term Russian-Iranian economic
cooperation may have come as a surprise to the
Americans. Even if it was put forward only as a
negotiating ploy, the plan announced an astonishing
level of increase in trade and cooperation between
Russia and Iran. As announced, the value of
Russian-Iranian trade would increase to US$5 billion
annually, an amount that wouldn't count Russia's
continued sale of "non-offensive weapons" to Iran, which
should itself amount to another $5 billion in business
over the next three years. These weapons would include
fighters, helicopters, submarines and air defense
systems. As well, Russia will provide Iran with a
security belt, including an air defense system, for the
still-under-construction Busheher nuclear power reactor
(constructed with Russian aid). Most important, Safarov
announced Russia's readiness to sell six more nuclear
reactors to Iran.
Elaborating on the cooperation
plan, Safarov made clear that Russia's bid to expand
ties with the West should not be viewed as readiness to
follow American policy regardless of direction.
Pointedly noting the West's largely unfulfilled promises
to help Russia economically, he said Russia would seek
her own interests even if they do not coincide with
those of Western countries.
What are those
interests vis-a-vis Iran? Among other factors, there are
security imperatives and economic realities that make
friendly ties and economic relations with Iran a
necessity for Russia. The security imperatives include
Russia's desire to prevent its encirclement by hostile
states and to promote the stability of Central Asia, the
Caucasus and Afghanistan, where both countries have
large stakes. The economic realities include Russia's
current inability to penetrate Western markets and the
short- and long-term importance of large and growing
Asian and Middle Eastern markets to its economy.
Putin recently identified relations with "the
CIS and the East" as his country's priority despite its
interest in extensive economic ties with the West. It
seems that the Russians have realized that the latter
will likely remain an unachievable objective in the
foreseeable future. The post-Soviet history has
disillusioned them about the West's interest in their
economic recovery beyond the level necessary to ensure
the stability of a nuclear superpower whose
disintegration could put its nuclear arsenal in the
"wrong" hands.
Although economic relations with
the West are still a Russian objective, economic and
political realities have made ties with dissatisfied
regional powers such as China, Iran and India a more
realistic and economically promising option for Russia,
another dissatisfied regional power in search of
restoring its lost global status.
Dr
Hooman Peimani works as an independent consultant
with international organizations in Geneva and does
research in international relations
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