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Military buildup ends US-Russian
honeymoon
By Hooman Peimani
In his last week's meeting with Uzbek President
Islam Karimov in Tashkent, General Tommy L Franks,
commander of the American forces in Afghanistan, Central
Asia and the Persian Gulf, announced what many states,
including Russia, Iran and China, had long been
concerned about. Meeting Karimov after visiting
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, he announced that the
American military presence in Central Asia and
Afghanistan would increase, the Americans would expand
their military relations with the Central Asian
countries and the American forces would stay longer than
expected in Afghanistan.
On the same day, an
American Congressional delegation visiting Tashkent, the
Uzbek capital, stressed the American determination to
stay in the region. Given Russia's current political,
economic and military vulnerability, there is little
doubt, if any at all, that an expanding American
military presence in Russia's proximity will contribute
significantly to a strategic rift between Moscow and
Washington, with regional and global implications.
The American military presence in Afghanistan
and in certain countries in its proximity, that is,
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, has been a source of concern
for three regional powers, namely China, Iran and
Russia, since the arrival of the first American units in
October 2001. Sharing long borders with Afghanistan
and/or Central Asia, they were suspicious of the
long-term objectives of the Americans in their region
where they have vested interests. That region is also of
interest to the Americans for its significant oil and
gas resources and for a potential role that it could
play in "containing" the three regional powers with
reasons for grievances with the United States.
In the aftermath of September 11, Russia's
opposition to the stationing of American military forces
close to its borders in Central Asia and the Caucasus
made its neighboring Central Asian states reject the
idea of letting American forces use their territories
for their operation in Afghanistan. However, certain
factors convinced the Russians to change their position
and to get credit for their cooperative policy in their
future dealing with the Americans. They included
Russia's interest in the Taliban regime's fall, its
interest in expanding economic ties with the United
States requiring friendly bilateral relations, and its
concern about a possible acceptance of American requests
for bases by Central Asians despite its opposition.
To allay the Russian concerns, many American
military and civilian officials stressed last year the
short term nature of the American military presence in
Central Asia and Afghanistan and the immediate
withdrawal of their troops from there once their
military operation was over. However, Russia, along with
Iran and China, was well aware of the probability of the
Americans using the opportunity to stay in the region
long after meeting their announced military objectives.
The well-known American political and economic
interests in Central Asia and the Caucasus aside, the
pattern of American military deployment in Central Asia,
unjustifiable for a limited warfare in Afghanistan,
served as a clear indicator of the intention to stay for
a long time. Having secured an airbase in Uzbekistan
neighboring Afghanistan, the Americans also obtained the
right to use another airbase, this one in Kyrgyzstan,
without any apparent necessity or usefulness, as the
country does not share a border with Afghanistan. The
Kazakh government turned down the US request for a third
airbase in Kazakhstan, a country far from Afghanistan.
However, it granted them overflight and emergency
landing rights, while the Americans received overflight
rights from Turkmenistan as well.
Despite their
buildup in Central Asia and Afghanistan, the Americans
also deployed heavily their naval and air forces in the
Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea, with no obvious direct
relevance to their type of operation in landlocked
Afghanistan, separated from the Arabian Sea by Pakistan.
While maintaining their bases in Saudi Arabia, they
secured new bases in Oman and Qatar, expanded their
forces in Kuwait and Bahrain, and received overflight
rights from the United Arab Emirates. Given the extent
of the American military deployment in Central Asia and
the Persian Gulf, the whole declared "anti-terrorist"
military preparation seemed, and still seems, totally
unproportional to the declared objective of uprooting
the remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaeda armed mainly
with light weapons.
Against this background, the
mentioned statements of American military and political
figures, including those of General Franks, contradicted
the American government's previous assurances for its
forces' short stay in the region, but they should not
surprise the Russians. Nevertheless, the resulting
expansion of American forces in Central Asia and
Afghanistan will surely contribute to worsening American
ties with Russia, whose approval made the American
presence in its former republics feasible in the first
place.
The American decision for long-term stay
in West Asia signifies an emerging aggressive American
foreign policy towards Russia, China, Iran, whose
elements have been surfacing since the election of
President George W Bush 18 months ago. Added to its
deploying military "advisers" in Georgia and to its
growing military ties with Azerbaijan, the long-term
American military presence in Central Asia will surely
create serious security concerns in Russia. Russia's
fear about its encirclement by hostile countries will
make it closer to Iran, a large neighboring country also
sharing that fear. The two countries' multi-dimensional
bilateral relations have been on a friendly path since
the last years of the Soviet Union.
While its
friendly ties with Iran are not a new development,
Russia's efforts to restore its extensive Soviet-era
relations with Iraq and North Korea indicate not only
its efforts to regain its lost markets, but also its
clear attempt to pursue its national interests without
regard to American disapproval. Russia now seeks to
demonstrate its fundamental differences with the United
States over various international issues, including ties
with certain countries on uneasy terms with the United
States. That is part of its bid to reestablish its lost
preeminent international status by capitalizing on a new
Russian foreign policy not aligned with that of the
United States.
Having that objective in mind,
the Russian government announced plans for major
contracts with Iran and Iraq in early August. Thus, it
disclosed preparing an agreement with Iran to sell $5
billion worth of advanced weapons and to expand their
annual trade to $5 billion, while expressing readiness
to sell six more nuclear power reactors to Iran. It also
announced preparing a plan for a $40 billion economic
pact with Iraq. Finally, President Vladimir Putin met
with North Korean President Kim Jong-il in Vladivostock
last week. During the meeting, he stressed Russia's
interest in connecting South Korean railways to the
Russian rail network via North Korea and China.
Russia's seeking closer ties with the members of
the axis of evil symbolically indicate the practical end
of its "honeymoon" with the United States and the
beginning of an era of tension and conflict in
American-Russian relations.
Dr Hooman
Peimani works as an independent consultant with
international organizations in Geneva and does research
in international relations.
(©2002 Asia
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