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Russia, US on collision
course
By Hooman Peimani
The
September 11 meeting in Moscow of an American State
Department delegation with Russian Foreign Ministry
officials failed to help the Americans secure Russia's
approval of their proposed war against Iraq.
Unsurprisingly, the Russians expressed their opposition
to such war to the delegation led by John Bolton, the
American under-secretary of state. Russian Foreign
Minister Igor Ivanov warned that a new war in the
Persian Gulf could ruin international cooperation
against terrorism, while his deputy Vyacheslav Trubnikov
stressed that the proposed war was "absolutely
unacceptable" for Russia.
The surfacing Russian
opposition to the American policy towards Iraq, where
Russia has vested interests, is yet another clear
indication of a growing schism between Russia and the
United States and the practical end to an era of
cooperation between the two nuclear powers. Undoubtedly,
one should expect frequent clashes of interests between
the two countries over respected vested interests that
are of strategic importance to each side. Russia's arms
sales to and non-military nuclear relations with Iran
aside, they include the political, economic and security
direction of the Central Asian and Caucasian countries
and the eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO).
As opposition to an
American attack on Iraq has been a well-known Russian
stance for some time, the mentioned expression of
opposition did not surprise anyone. Russia has clear
interests in Iraq, which make it concerned about any
development with a destabilizing impact on that country.
What gave significance to the event was its revealing of
an emerging drastic change in Russian-American
relations. In the post-Soviet era, both Russia and the
United States have sought to forge tension-free
relations, but such relations have gradually changed
their cooperative element, especially since the election
of President Vladimir Putin. This is not a phenomenon
attributable to the personal characteristics of the
Russian president, but it is a logical outcome of a
changing political, economic and security environment.
In the 1990s, the severity of their domestic
problems made Russia pursue a very cautious foreign
policy. Added to this, Russia's worsening economic
situation and its growing need for foreign economic
assistance made it more cautious in its dealing with
major Western economic powers, including the United
States, its hoped-for source of financial assistance and
trade. Thus, the need for Western economic assistance
and the necessity of a long period of peace for
addressing domestic problems motivated Russia not to
seek its interests aggressively.
Today, Russia
has yet to address many domestic issues, but the growing
expansion of American political and military influence
in its vicinity and its loss of hope of receiving
substantial economic assistance from Western countries
have convinced it to change its policy of cooperation
with the United States. Certain recent events have
demonstrated the growing schism between Russia and the
US. They have included Russia's expanding economic and
political ties with Iran, Iraq and North Korea, the
members of the so-called axis of evil, and the worsening
Russian-Georgian ties over Georgia's alleged tolerance
of the Chechen rebels in its territory.
Against
this background, the growing schism between Moscow and
Washington will likely lead to open conflicts in certain
regions of special importance to Russia. Being evident
in the recent events, Central Asia and the Caucasus will
be two major candidates. As the American economic,
political and military presence is expanding in those
neighboring regions of which three countries
(Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Georgia) are hosting
American military forces, fear of encirclement will
motivate Russia to use all the means at its disposal to
force those countries to limit their ties with the
Americans.
Added to its geographical proximity,
years of membership in the Russian and Soviet political
entities have created many ethnic, economic and
political ties between Russia and its southern
neighbors, which enable the Russians to pressure these
countries, in one way or another. Pressure tactics could
include Russia's manipulation of their domestic
dissident movements and its limiting or blocking the
international trade of those countries passing through
its territory or through other Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) countries. For example, it
could seek to prevent or to prolong the construction of
the Baku-Tiblisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline due to begin this
week, a feasible scenario given the existence of a wide
range of armed dissident and separatist groups in
Azerbaijan and Georgia and Russia's opposition to its
construction. Military showdowns, as evident in the
ongoing conflict over Georgia's Pankisi Valley or in the
August naval maneuver in the Caspian Sea, will also be
used by Russia in cases when other means prove to be not
convincing enough.
Russia's use of such measures
against countries with close ties with the United States
will likely make them appeal to the Americans to help
them relieve the Russian pressure. In such case, an
American reaction in a military or non-military form
will not be surprising, although it will clearly worsen
American-Russian relations. As a few predictable
non-military measures, the Americans could use their
economic power to deny Russia loans or credits from
American or American-dominated financial institutions,
to create barriers to its trade with them and their
allies, and to impose economic sanctions on Russia. They
could also block Russia World Trade Organization
membership, which it has aspired to for quite some time.
Depending on the situation, the Americans could also
react by beefing up the military force of the affected
country or by expanding their military presence there to
deter any possible Russian military operation.
Tension and conflict between Russia and the
United States in Central Asia and or over Russia's
relations with Iran will go beyond those issues to
affect negatively their cooperation on certain areas.
Therefore, one should expect the rise of conflict over
issues on which the two sides have reached an
understanding. As NATO considers the membership
applications of many eastern European and CIS countries,
the NATO eastward expansion will probably become a
source of tension when that organization begins its new
round of membership selection in the near future.
Russia's recent affiliation with NATO will unlikely be a
strong incentive for the Russians to avoid conflicts
with NATO at the time when American military presence is
expanding along their southern borders.
The
failure of Bolton to secure Russia's approval of the
American policy towards Iraq indicated one more time
Russia' s emerging conflicts with the United States
arising from its national interests. As also reflected
in its dealing with Iran and North Korea, Russia is
determined to pursue its interests in Iraq and in the
rest of the rich Middle East requiring a foreign policy
different from the American one seen by many Arabs as
hostile and pro-Israeli. Although short-term diplomatic
considerations may demand flexibility and compromise in
the Russian policy towards the US, the recent history of
Russian-American relations leaves little doubt, if any
at all, that Moscow is heading towards an era of growing
conflict and tension with the Americans over pursuing
their national interests.
Dr Hooman
Peimani works as an independent consultant with
international organizations in Geneva and does research
in international relations.
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