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Missing: A modern-day Silk
Road
By Stephen Blank
We have
long known that the development of long-range
transportation projects, including energy pipelines,
brings together markets and peoples and provides a major
impetus to long-term economic growth. Similarly we have
also long known that a fundamental cause of Central
Asia's backwardness was its remoteness from major
shipping and transportation lanes.
Therefore a
basic precondition of Central Asia's economic growth is
its linkage to such lanes and the completion of major
infrastructural projects in energy, rail, air, sea and
land transport that connect it to foreign markets.
This consideration, after all, is what the
struggle over energy pipelines is all about. Finally we
have also known that such major projects also bring
governments together, often against third parties whose
interests may be at odds with those states who are
linked together by such projects. All three developments
seem to be prominent in Russia's evolving foreign
policies in Central and East Asia and in India's
connection to Iran.
Recently Moscow has also
been able to move forward on at least two of three major
railway plans that are intended to buttress its economic
position, exploit its geography and increase its
presence in East Asia and Central Asia. The latter
railway and transport network also includes India and
Iran. The East Asian system is found in the support
expressed by both Koreas for Russian assistance in
opening the railway between them and linking it to the
Trans-Siberian railroad and the resumption of
construction toward completion of that linkup.
This project not only is a step towards
reconciliation of the two Koreas and their economic
integration, it also enhances Russia's standing in he
overall Korean peace process and ability to play a
greater role in East Asia. If the projected
Sakhalin-Hokkaido and Sakhalin-Russia systems open, they
too would facilitate the growth of Sakhalin and bring
Russia closer to Japan's and Asia's overall economy.
Russia's geographical position enables its
policymakers and planners to think of it as a hub, if
not the hub of a revived Asiatic transportation network
that links together all the different parts of Asia
through Russia and connects Europe to Asia as well.
Ultimately, all these projected lines, if they
materialize, could form part of a giant network of
transportation lines linking together all of Asia and
Russia. Russia's ambition is that this and other similar
projects will facilitate a general recovery of the
economy in Russian Asia which is essential if Russia can
maintain its hold on the region and sustain a lasting
economic-political influence there. In this sense these
railway projects are symbols of a much greater process
that is now underway to connect not just producers and
buyers but also energy suppliers and consumers.
The two railways in question, apart from what
they symbolize, also fulfill the three conditions listed
above of bringing together markets, bringing together
governments, and revitalizing regions now excluded from
major trading lanes.
Similar considerations
undoubtedly animate the Russo-Iranian-Indian transport
corridor that is now coming into being. Both India and
Iran, not to mention Pakistan, are increasingly
interested in overland trade and transport with Central
Asia; meanwhile, Central Asia, too, desperately needs
secure outlets to its South. As long as Afghanistan and
its borders remain unsettled, none of the interested
states, including Russia, all Central Asian governments,
India, Pakistan and Iran, can maximize opportunities for
economic development that might emerge from Central
Asia's potential. However, with the prospective end of
the Taliban regime and the advent of a new regime that
will be under much greater international scrutiny and
perhaps impelled by domestic pressures to begin
reconstruction in earnest, Afghanistan can play a role
in the larger Central Asian economic picture.
The Russo-Irano-Indian corridor not only
facilitates Russia's ability to trade with South Asia
and exploit its geography as a "bridge" between Europe
and Asia, it should materially contributes to the
ability of all these and adjacent states - including
those of Central Asia - to trade with more distant
markets. At the same time, this project possesses
important political implications. It brings together
Russia, Iran, and India in a major project having
substantial material interest and reinforces their joint
interest against Central Asian insurgents, the Taliban,
and their supporters in Pakistan.
Whereas in the
past it would have strengthened foreign efforts to force
Pakistan to stop supporting the Taliban, today it offers
an inducement or incentive, even if only a relatively
small one, for Pakistan to move towards a reorientation
of its India policies. Otherwise this railway and the
transportation networks that will grow up around it
forces will add to Iranian support for India against
Pakistan. Second, this route, to the extent it becomes
successful, will also channel Central Asian economic
development into directions more favorable to those
three states who currently have a community of interest.
These considerations might help Pakistan rethink its
previous policies in Afghanistan and towards Iran and
India.
This railway and the associated energy
projects that Tehran and Delhi are discussing also mean
energy, as India needs energy, and is improving its ties
to Iran to get it as well as ties to Central Asia to
forestall Pakistani adventures. Finally, if this becomes
a major and successful project, it poses an alternative
to the EU's Silk Road project that bypasses Russia and
to American support for the Baku-Ceyhan energy pipeline
and pipelines under the Caspian. That would redound to
the benefit of Iran and Russia, who seek to exclude
American and West European influence from Central Asia.
In Central Asia and Russia, as elsewhere, trade
and the flag go together. Major transportation and
infrastructure projects offer real possibilities for
helping these areas recover from economic decline while
contributing to major political objectives of all
concerned. Recent evidence indicates these projects have
become major aspects of Russia's overall Asian policy,
but their consequences far transcend Russia's Asian
policy to include the two Koreas, Iran, India, and
possibly Japan. While these major initiatives thus have
great potential significance for the future, only time
will tell if they are successful in realizing Russia's
ambitions. And the unintended consequences of these
projects, possibly leading to other major programs, may
yet have even more significant outcomes for CIS members,
their neighbors and their partners.
Professor Stephen Blank, Strategic
Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle
Barracks
(The views expressed do not
represent those of the US Army, Defense Department or
the US Government.)
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