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Reluctant Turkey edges towards US
camp
By K Gajendra Singh
Since
coming into power in the November elections in Turkey
last year, the pro-Islamic and inexperienced government
of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has been
under unrelenting United States pressure to commit
Turkey to its war plans on Iraq to bring about a regime
change in Baghdad.
But nearly 80 percent of
Turks are opposed to a war on a Muslim country,
especially without any apparent justification or without
United Nations approval. With the unhappy experiences of
the 1990-91 Gulf crisis and war, which left deep social
and economic scars on Turkey's polity and economy, the
Turkish leadership remains most reluctant to
whole-heartedly join the US.
Seduced by
none-too-subtle US hints of getting back "lost" Kurdish
areas in north Iraq, which had been included in the map
of the republic salvaged by Kemal Ataturk from the ruins
of the Ottoman empire after World War I, then Turkish
president Turgut Ozal became an energetic supporter of
the coalition forces of George Bush senior against Iraq
in 1990-91.
Indeed, he almost opened another
front in the war, but was stopped from doing so by stiff
opposition from his powerful military. But in the
aftermath of the 1991 war, instead of receiving oil-rich
Mosul and Kirkuk, economic sanctions against Iraq and
closure of the Iraqi pipeline via Turkey cost Ankara at
least an estimated US$50 billion in lost trade and
revenue opportunities.
There has also been an
upsurge in unemployment as the sanctions have halted the
thousands of trucks that used to ply daily between
Turkey and Iraq, aggravating the economic and social
problems in southeast Turkey, the heartland of the
Kurdish rebellion for autonomy or independence from
Turkey.
With the recent commutation to life
imprisonment of a death sentence passed on Kurdish rebel
leader Abdullah Ocalan, and the relaxation of a ban on
the use of the Kurdish language, Turkey has gone some
way to at least calming the Kurdish problem. An
Ocalan-led PKK (Kurdish Workers Party) rebellion has
cost Turkey over 35,000 lives, including 5,000 soldiers,
since 1984. It has also cost the state coffers $6
billion to $8 billion a year and tied up a third of the
Turkish army in the southeast of the country. Thousands
of Kurdish villages have been destroyed or relocated and
millions of Kurds have been moved out or have migrated,
shattering the economy of the region.
And now the region faces the imminent
prospect of war in Iraq, with Turkey, which shares a
long border with that country, particularly fearful of
the impact of an autonomous or, even worse, of an
independent Kurdish region in the northern part of Iraq.
And given past history, Ankara cannot be too
sure that the US will look after its interests in
relation to this. As a deputy prime minister once
ruefully confided to this writer, "Mr Ambassador, you
cannot trust the Americans, not even their written
promises." This remains true even now for those who
support the US, be it willingly or unwillingly.
Outgoing Turkish Premier Bulent Ecevit, leader
of the Democratic Left Party, along with his coalition
partners had expressed a strong preference for a
peaceful solution to the Iraqi problem. Ecevit favored a
foreign policy of looking to the east, and underlined
that Turkey had to live with its neighbors.
Historically, Iraq has been very friendly
compared to Syria, Iran and Greece, with whom Turkey's
relations have been acrimonious and full of tension. But
the Ecevit government, through a financial lifeline
supplied by US-controlled international organizations
such as the International Monetary Fund, was beholden to
Washington and he could not openly oppose US plans.
Turkey's economic dependence on the US is still
a very important factor. Thus, the pro-Islamic and
conservative AKP government, which has an unprecedented
two-thirds majority in the legislature after winning 34
percent of the votes cast, and which wants to
consolidate and further expand its base in the
conservative Muslim electorate, has been put in an
unenviable position.
AKP leader Recep Tayyip
Erdogan was accorded red carpet treatment in Washington
and the White House during his December visit, where
earlier Islamist and pro-Islamic parties and leaders
would have been shunned. But he was also "briefed" by US
President George W Bush and later by US Secretary of
State Colin Powell, National Security Adviser
Condoleezza Rice and other Pentagon officials.
The AKP and Erdogan, who have all along been for
a peaceful solution to the US-Iraq problem, said, "We
would prefer the problem were solved through peaceful
means, but I now see that war is growing more probable
than ever." Making virtue of necessity, Erdogan then
tried for compensation, reminding the US that Ankara had
lost billions of dollars since 1991's Gulf War.
He argued that the precarious state of Turkey's
economy would be shattered and prospective losses would
amount to billions if the US attacked Iraq, including
the tourism sector, which generates $12 billion a year.
Its border trade in the south with Iraq would die. To
Erdogan's shock, the US offered a few billion only.
Erdogan, keen to maintain US and Western support for his
pro-Islamic party and Turkey, talked of democracy in his
country, but the US has not budged in its demand for
support in its war on Iraq. There is as yet no agreement
on Turkey's part or the nature of its commitment and
terms of participation with the US. Officially, the
final word now rests with the Turkish parliament.
Turkey's Prime Minister Abdullah Gul said this
week that his government and the armed forces "very much
wish to avoid a war" in Iraq, but were weighing a
request by the Bush administration to deploy thousands
of US troops through Turkey to create a northern front
against Saddam Hussein.
"We strongly value
relations with our American friends," Gul said in an
interview after returning from a five-country Middle
East diplomatic mission that had been interpreted as an
affirmation of Turkey's antiwar stance. Gul emphasized
that the military and civilian leaderships were working
together to come to a decision.
The Bush
administration has been increasing pressure on Turkey,
which is a key ally and NATO's sole Muslim member, to
open its ports and bases for use in a possible war
against Iraq. The US also has asked Turkey to allow the
deployment of tens of thousands of US troops who would
transit Turkish territory into Kurdish-controlled
northern Iraq, where they would open a second front
against Saddam's forces. On Monday, 150 US military
inspectors arrived in Turkey to begin examining 10 air
bases and two ports for possible use by American forces.
The Turks point out that US troops billeted at
Saudi bases in 1990 are still there. Many Turks fear
that US troops, once they come, would stay on in the
region. And Turkey clearly wants to protect its
interests in northern Iraq. Ankara considers it
indispensable for Turkey's national and political
interests that following any operation, control of the
region will be under the Turkish armed forces rather
than any foreign military power.
This is not to
the Pentagon's liking, as was bluntly put across by US
Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, who was
recently in Ankara. The US wants Turkey to fight along
with the Kurdish peshmerga (guerrillas) in
northern Iraq, which is not acceptable to Turks.
Instead, Turkey wants to play the role of referee and
parent in the region, and Turkey's degree of involvement
would determine the strength of the country's hand in
Iraq's post-Saddam future.
Since the formation
of the AKP government in November last, there has been a
flurry of US visitors; senior officials from the
Pentagon, Commerce and State departments and generals.
Visitors such as Under Secretary of State Marc Grossman
and US ambassador Robert Pearson in Ankara have told the
Turkish economic elite where their interests lie, and
the need of US goodwill for their economic survival.
General Richard Myers, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs
of Staff, was the latest visitor. Barely a week goes by
without a trip to the Turkish capital by a high-ranking
US official or general.
At the same time, after
a whirlwind tour of a dozen European capitals and
Washington, before the European Union (EU) summit in
Copenhagen, both to ease the anxiety of Western leaders
about his new pro-Islamic party and to canvass support
for fixing a date for discussions for Turkey's entry
into EU, Erdogan has turned his attention to the east.
He has visited the Turkic republics in Central Asia and
Moscow for discussions with Russian President Vladimir
Putin and others. Economic exchanges will increase, and
each side will be sensitive to the other's concerns on
the PKK and Chechnya, respectively. Erdogan is currently
in Beijing for a four-day visit.
Gul has visited
Syria, with whom Turkey's relations are now much better,
Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, where he once worked at the
Jeddah's Islamic Development Bank (1983-91) and Iran.
Disappointed with the EU response on the question of
Turkey's entry, the AKP leadership is now exploring all
its options and would like to strengthen relations with
countries to the east, including India.
Willy-nilly, though, Turkey is getting sucked
into the US war preparations, with the Turkish military
apparently keen to join the US this time. But the
military wants the politicians to take the final
decision. In 1990-91, the chief of the general staff,
General Tormutay, resigned in protest against Ozal's
policies, unusual in a country where normally prime
ministers have been made to resign by the generals.
Either way, Turkey has its own plans for the
days after a US war on Iraq. Foreign Minister Yasar
Yakis reasserted Turkey's "legitimate and strategic
interests" in the northern Iraq areas of Mosul and
Kirkuk in an interview published by the Istanbul-based
Hurriyet on January 6. Kirkuk is an Iraqi city under the
current control of the Iraqi government and one to which
both Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds have arguable claim.
Yakis said that while Turkey supports preserving
the territorial integrity of Iraq, Turkey would take
"certain measures" if Baghdad authorities "cannot
control the developments in their country" as a result
of a possible war. Yakis called for equal rights for
Turkomans (their kinsmen) in Iraq, and he said that the
oil in Turkoman-populated Mosul and Kirkuk belonged to
Iraqis. He then hinted that Turkey was pressured in 1926
to accept the borders determined by the League of
Nations at the 1922-23 Lausanne Conference.
Yakis also said that Turkey would prefer that
any action against Iraq should be handled within the
framework of NATO, because it would give his country
"legitimate grounds" to support such an operation. Later
elaborating, Gul added, "We attribute importance to the
preservation of Iraq's territorial integrity", adding
that "Iraq's resources should be spent for the benefit
of [the] Iraqi people. Of course, commercial relations
and mutual efforts would be further improved after peace
and stability are provided in the region". He added that
"there will be joint ventures [in Mosul and Kirkuk].
Many companies will be established, and all the
countries of the region will benefit from the blessings
of the region."
General Yasar Buyukanit, deputy
chief of General Staff, recently said that the US had
requested Turkey for assistance six months ago, and it
was getting impatient. "A northern front would be
decisive both politically and militarily. With such a
front, it would be far quicker and less risky for the US
to achieve its goal." This deterrent threat could even
perhaps avert a war, as some diplomats feel that
Turkey's current reluctance could lead Saddam to make a
miscalculation and bring on a war. But Buyukanit said
that "there is a need for deterrent cooperation with the
US".
As is happening now, the AKP government has
given permission for necessary US inspections of
Turkey's military bases and ports. Buyukanit stressed
that a more comprehensive decision allowing upgrading of
military bases, dispatch of Turkish troops to Iraq and
stationing of US soldiers in Turkey must be made soon.
Apart from the NATO-committed Incirlik base near
Adana, the US wants use of other bases at Diyarbakir,
Batman, Mus and Malatya in south and east Turkey. A team
from the US has already inspected these military
airbases. It is preparing to rectify shortcomings to
upgrade them for war. And with Turkish government
approval, US planes could be deployed at the bases
beginning in February.
The US has applied for
the use of airports elsewhere, including Istanbul. But
more important, the US wants areas in the Kurdish region
in east and southeast Turkey to garrison around 80,000
troops for a ground attack against Kurdish north Iraq
and further south.
These bases do need
upgrading. On January 8, a Turkish Airlines passenger
jet crashed in fog in Diyarbakir, killing 75 people and
injuring five others. Civilian aircraft are handled on a
part of the military airfield. The next day, two F-4
fighter jets collided in heavy fog during a training
flight near Malatya, killing four pilots.
The
Incirlik base was used during the 1990-91 Gulf war, and
since then it has been used for bombing runs over Iraq
by US and British planes to protect the Kurds in north
Iraq. It was also used in the war against the Taliban
and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.
A move to allow
foreign troops into the country, though, requires
parliament's approval. About Turkey dispatching troops
to north Iraq, which the Pentagon doesn't favor,
Buyukanit underlined that "we aren't saying, let's go
and fight. Yet no one has ever told us that we can't
join a military campaign." When reminded of 1991 Gulf
War, when the Ozal government had pressed for Turkey's
involvement, while the General Staff resisted - a
virtual mirror image of the current situation -
Buyukanit replied, "In 1991, the situation was
completely different. At that time, the US had asked
Turkey to open a northern front without putting forward
any conditions [plans].
"Their current requests
are far more reasonable [specific]. We, as the military,
want to hold back any possible wave of refugees from
northern Iraq before they reach our borders in order not
to repeat the experience Turkey faced during the Gulf
War. Moreover, we should assume a role if the country
wants to have a say in the post-Saddam period."
Many thousand Turkish troops are already in
north Iraq. Naturally, the Turkish media is openly
discussing what Turkey should or could do. Writing
recently in the prominent Turkish daily Milliyet,
veteran columnist Sami Kohen acknowledged that apart
from Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, "the other
[reason for invasion] has to do with the US quest to
take oil resources under its control. The real US goal
is much more comprehensive and suffused with hubris. The
Bush administration wants to establish an altogether
'new order' across the entire region. And that involves
necessary regime changes in certain countries in this
region in line with the US strategic concerns.
"Thus, the whole problem comes down to
overcoming such obstacles as Saddam in order to lay the
foundations of US dominance over the Middle East. This
is the underlying and long-term goal the US has its
sights on in carrying out a possible military campaign
in Iraq."
Kohen concluded that as the US cannot
be dissuaded, it is preferable for Turkey to take sides
with the Bush administration. "Unsurprisingly, Ankara's
top political and military officials have begun to think
more and more that Turkey shouldn't stand outside of a
war in Iraq. They see the disadvantages of doing so,
outweighing its advantages. Should Turkey decline to
participate in a common front in this war alongside the
US, this will no doubt end up costing us American
support that we need in a great many areas," he added.
Another columnist of the paper, Fikret Bila,
summed up the thinking of the Turkish government, "The
US will do what it's determined to do. It will do this
whether Turkey supports it or not. In such a situation,
Ankara's putting itself into the thick of developments
will yield better results than sitting outside."
Writing about the reluctance of the Turkish
government, the New York Times quoted a senior US
official, "From the military planning standpoint, we
have just about reached the critical mass point for a
yes or no from Turkey. It was emphasized that the US
needed several weeks for preparations and if Turkey
waited until January 27 - the day a UN weapons
inspectors' report was to be issued - to make a
decision, as it wanted, it might be too late. While the
US could conduct a successful attack to oust Saddam
Hussein without access to land bases in Turkey, such an
attack would be harder and uglier."
Bahrain and
Qatar, meanwhile, have reportedly agreed to host
American forces for as long as it takes to finish the
job. "Even Saudi Arabia will probably swallow its pride
and allow the US military to use the key Prince Sultan
airbase to run the air campaign, the first phase of the
war. Jordan, which shares a small but strategic border
with western Iraq, has made its choice. Despite public
opposition to the war from native Jordanians and the
large Palestinian population, King Abdullah II has made
clear that he will not stand in the way of any US-led
operation," reported the Times of London.
Indeed, Saudi Arabia will relent under pressure
and allow the US to use its airbases, but unlike 1990-91
it will not agree to its territory being used for basing
US troops and for launching ground attacks against Iraq.
Kuwait, on whom Iraq has not in its heart given
up its territorial claims and which was a victim of
Iraq's original aggression in 1990, will provide full
support and its territory for attack against Iraq. This
even though Saddam recently apologized to the Kuwaiti
people for his aggression in 1990-91, and some Kuwaitis
attacked and killed US soldiers while they were on
military exercises with Kuwaiti armed forces.
And yes, even Jordan, under duress, will agree.
But with 60 percent of the population of Palestinian
origin, the half English King Abdullah and half American
Crown Prince Hamza Hussein and the Hashemite kingdom
will be placed under enormous strains and face
tremendous turmoil. No wonder King Abdullah has been
repeating for many months that an attack against Iraq
will open a Pandora's box.
A war against Iraq
will inflict more misery on the hapless Iraqi people.
Nearly a million are already estimated to have died from
malnutrition and for lack of medicine (the Iraqi
population is now 16 percent smaller than it was in
1990).
According to Denis Halliday, former
United Nations assistant secretary general, the
sanctions imposed on Iraq since 1990 have had "genocidal
consequences". Halliday, who resigned as the UN
humanitarian coordinator in Baghdad in 1998, told Gulf
News recently that the Security Council "is a body out
of control and corrupted by the US".
Commenting
on the oil for food program, he said, "The Iraqis have
now sold $60 billion worth of oil under this program,
but have received less than $20 billion worth of food,
medicine and basic equipment and utilities such as
water, agriculture, education and healthcare. Some $40
billion has disappeared. It has gone into Kuwait, as
compensation, to finance the UN presence in this
country, with its 4,500 personnel. It is paying for the
new military inspections. It is paying for somebody's
establishment in New York, Paris and Rome. It is
ridiculous. The Iraqi people, who have great
difficulties because of a lack of money for
sophisticated drugs or equipment, are financing large
parts of the UN system. It is a crime, a financial crime
you might say, being imposed on the Iraqi people."
Thus the seeds are being sown for future
terrorism and terrorists, pitting Muslims against
Christians - a new Crusade against jihad. The US and its
allies might win in the short term, and at great human
cost. But have they thought of the days after, and the
long term?
K Gajendra Singh, Indian
ambassador (retired), served as ambassador to Turkey
from August 1992 to April 1996. Prior to that, he served
terms as ambassador to Jordan, Romania and Senegal. He
is currently chairman of the Foundation for Indo-Turkic
Studies.
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