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Putin and the growing trans-Atlantic
rift
By Ehsan Ahrari
As the
rift between countries of "old Europe" and the United
States over the latter's impending invasion of Iraq
continues to widen, President Vladimir Putin of Russia
is in the process of determining his courses of action.
In a dispatch from Moscow, New York Times reporter
Michael Wines describes an interesting dilemma facing
Putin. Wines writes, "For Mr Putin, the question is now
whether he can keep the Atlantic rift from swallowing
his dream of a Russia anchored in the West - or, better
yet, exploit the schism to speed up the process." At
least for now, one of the choices for Russia is not
about exploiting the trans-Atlantic schism, for it has
definitely decided to become an integral part of the
West. At the same time, Russia also enjoys the luxury of
siding either with Europe or the US and still come out a
winner.
It has taken two presidents - Boris
Yeltsin and now Putin - for Russians to realize that the
aspirations of their country to re-emerge as a
superpower are not likely to materialize any time soon.
It was a bitter pill for Yeltsin to swallow, for he
belonged to an earlier generation that could not imagine
any role for his homeland other than that of a
superpower. The younger Putin is more of a pragmatist.
He seems to have accepted, for now, the role of Russia
as a "second banana", or, worse yet, "one of the many
second bananas". More to the point, he seems to have
made the choice of siding with the West, since therein
lies the promise of Russia's integration into the global
economy, a path that might enable his country to achieve
its aspirations of re-emerging as a superpower.
On this point, former US president Bill Clinton
has definitely acted as a visionary. During his two
terms in office, he was always sensitive about not
leaving Russia to wallow in the misery of losing its
power and prestige - characteristics of being a
superpower - and ensuring that all sorts of economic
assistance was provided for that country in its very
arduous endeavors to build, from scratch, a viable
market economy.
The ultimate proof of the
correctness of Clinton's approach toward Russia stemmed
from the fact that George W Bush in essence continued
the same approach. But Bush's decision not to change his
predecessor's policy toward Russia could not have been
successful without Putin's resolve to continue the sage
line of his own predecessor, Yeltsin, to cooperate with
the US and the West.
The September 11, 2001,
terrorists attacks on the US proved to be another reason
for further cementing that cooperation. Now, Russia
could brutalize its own homegrown Chechen militants
without fear of being chastised by the US. After all,
the chief purpose of Operation Enduring Freedom was to
eradicate or capture the perpetrators of terrorist acts
against the United States. In the process of this
cooperation, the US still got the better end of the
deal; it acquired a number of military basing facilities
in Central Asia, which is traditionally regarded as
Russia's back yard. Even now, the US appears to be in no
hurry to pull out of its Central Asian military bases,
much to Russia's chagrin.
When Bush decided to
shift the focus of his global war on terrorism from
Afghanistan to invading Iraq, Russia found itself
opposing the move. For the United States, the objective
in Iraq has always been "regime change", even though it
went through a lot of zigging and zagging about it. For
Russia - as was also true for France, Germany and other
countries of "old Europe" - the main issue was ensuring
that Iraq no longer possessed weapons of mass
destruction. It is only since January or so that the US
has clarified its purpose by adopting an acutely
militant rhetoric and by continuing a massive buildup of
its forces around Iraq. Now it is clear more than ever
before that the real US objective all along has been to
topple Saddam Hussein from power.
On the Iraq
issue, as he did prior to the US military action against
Afghanistan, Putin is calculating his country's
advantages in determining his choices. This time,
however, Putin is likely to adopt a more nuanced
approach than he did in the past. That approach seems to
be following along the lines: Don't jump in the fray
between the US and "old" Europe regarding Iraq.
Calculate all the available options, and consider the
payoffs related to each option. Even after committing
yourself to one option, leave enough hedge room to
abandon that particular option in favor of another.
The Bush administration, continuing to monitor
closely the Russian maneuvering on the Iraq issue, has
initiated its own maneuvering of "preparing to label
several Chechen militant groups as terrorist
organizations", and by "pointedly" accusing Iraq "of
ties to Chechen rebels involved in terrorism".
Undoubtedly, the purpose underlying such a strategic
choreography is to signal that Iraq under Saddam is not
really a friend of Russia.
The Bush
administration's own estimation is that, sooner or
later, Putin will come around to the US views regarding
the issue of regime change in Iraq. Putin would not
necessarily disagree with such an assessment. The most
important part of his choice is that he wants to leave
the door open so that if something happens to the United
States, he can return to cooperating with Europe. Being
in a win-win position might turn out to be the best
bargain for Vladimir Putin.
Ehsan
Ahrari, PhD, is an Alexandria, Virginia, US-based
independent strategic analyst.
(©2003 Asia
Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact content@atimes.com
for information on our sales and syndication policies.)
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