| |
Pipelines: Conduits for
terrorism
By Stephen Blank
Since late 2002, competition for access to and
control over oil and gas pipelines in the Trans-Caspian
region has become more intense. But the struggle over
pipelines has apparently gone beyond tough political and
economic maneuvering to encompass sabotage and acts of
violence, even against governments. Recent incidents in
both Georgia and Turkmenistan suggest deliberate efforts
to torpedo various pipeline projects by force rather
than by economic and political means.
As
reported by Johns Hopkins Central Institute, on January
10 in the Gori district, a Baku-Batumi cargo train
transporting oil went up in flames as two tank wagons
were set on fire. Eight days later, also in the Gori
district, plotters tried to drill a hole in the Georgian
section of the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline to pump oil, but
failed. However, 130 cubic meters of oil was spilled.
Finally, on January 29, another, third incident took
place. As a 30-wagon train carrying Azerbaijani oil to
the Black Sea port of Supsa crossed a railway bridge
across the Hevisckali river in the Samtredia district of
Georgia, an explosion threw the train into the river.
Interestingly, these incidents also came at a
time of renewed Russian efforts to threaten Georgia and
portray it as a haven for terrorists and as a government
unable to control its own territory.
It is
noteworthy that both Georgian and Azerbaijani officials
do not rule out, and indeed positively suspect, planned
sabotage. Georgiy Chanturia, president of the Georgian
International Oil Company, charged that all these actions
aimed to put the oil pipeline out of action. He
expressed his conviction that the incident had all
"indications to be a diversion".
Azerbaijani
ambassador to Georgia Hajan Hajiyev also does not
exclude this interpretation. In his opinion, such
actions may pursue the aim to upset the building of the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline. While there are
many elements who oppose this pipeline; there is little
doubt that Russia is the big loser from it. And we also
know that Russia has been accused of participating in
numerous sabotage, and even assassination, attempts
against Georgian and earlier Azeri leaders and
interests. Georgia remains a place where Moscow has
shown no hesitation about threatening and even using
force.
Similarly, last November, Turkmenistan
charged that Russia was involved in a plot to overthrow
its sultanistic leader, Sapirmurad Niyazov.
Interestingly, this attempted coup came shortly before
the leaders of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan
were to meet in Ashgabat to initiate a gas pipeline
traversing these three countries and thereby giving
Turkmenistan an independent outlet to the sea for its
natural gas. Not only would this be a major factor in
the economic development of the latter two countries, it
would give Turkmenistan its long sought alternative to
the Russian pipeline and an outlet to the Indian Ocean
through Pakistan’s ports. That would help consolidate
Turkmenistan’s economic sovereignty and independence
from Russian threats, while shattering Russian hopes for
an OPEC-like organization under its auspices.
The presidents of all three states were to meet
on December 26-27, 2002 in Ashgabat to sign the contract
for the construction of this pipeline. As Niyazov had
not been killed, this meeting duly took place. But
clearly if Niyazov had been killed, this signing
ceremony would not have taken place and a chaotic
situation, if not a new government in Turkmenistan,
would have precluded the effective search for
alternatives to the current pipeline status quo.
Undoubtedly, the TAP project
(Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan) contradicted
Moscow's open efforts to bring about a Eurasian gas
alliance. In October, the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) summit announced such a plan, building upon
Russian President Vladimir Putin's January, 2002
initiative. According to Michael Denison, Gazprom, which
is clearly an arm of the Russian government, and itself
not squeamish about using force to get its way, has
reportedly concluded that it would be cheaper to import
Turkmen gas than to develop remote Arctic and Siberian
fields for the short to medium term and would take up to
50 billion cubic centimeters of gas annually if
Turkmenistan would join the gas alliance with Russia.
That would mean the effective abdication by
Turkmenistan of its sovereignty over its main export,
natural gas, and its corresponding subordination to
Moscow. The decision to move forward with TAP would
therefore constitute a rejection of that plan and of the
efforts to subordinate Turkmenistan to Russian economic
power.
This outcome is clearly unacceptable to
Moscow. Speaking in New York on September 18 last year,
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov mentioned the new Baku to
Ceyhan pipeline specifically, but his words have a
general significance. Ivanov stated that "we are willing
to cooperate but we won't accept any attempts to force
Russia out of regions where it has long-term interests".
Thus Moscow had every reason to work for a change of
regime in Ashgabat and to sabotage the BTC.
Edvard Shevarnadze in Georgia and Heidar Aliyev
in Azerbaijan have both been repeated targets of
assassination plots because of their defiance of Russian
interests. Those attempted assassinations have generally
been connected with their obstruction of Russian energy
and strategic interests. In both cases the SVR, Russia's
intelligence service, has clearly been implicated and it
continues to offer hospitality to their rivals, Igor
Georgadze of Georgia and Ayaz Mutalibov of Azerbaijan.
In addition, there is no doubt of the connection
between Russia's special services, energy companies and
attempts to buy or support foreign politicians. Beyond
support for emigres and for the removal of foreign
leaders who cause problems for Moscow, the Russian
government has fashioned a standard series of linked
instruments for the advancement of its objectives
throughout Eurasia that involves the SVR, energy firms
and foreign politicians who can be suborned by Russian
promises and cash.
Virtually every intelligence
service and government in Central and Eastern Europe has
reported the existence of such linkages among those
three elements to the point where it is clear that this
has become a standard modus operandi for Moscow.
Thus the linkage between intelligence services, Russian
energy corporations, (and often Russian criminal
elements) and corruptible political elites has become a
standard and pervasive instrument of Russian foreign
policy in Europe and the CIS.
Therefore, there
are good reasons for suspecting that the sabotage
efforts against Georgia and the BTC and in Turkmenistan
represent a tendency to resort to low-level violence or
even the facilitation of a coup d'etat on behalf of
foreign interests who have good reason to close down the
BTC and TAP projects. The net result of this pipeline
vulnerability has been to give pretexts for expanding
the Western and specifically American military presence
in Georgia and Azerbaijan. While Moscow is trying very
hard to get its hands on Turkmen gas stocks, it has not
yet consolidated that position. But the fact that
Ashgabat believes Moscow to have been involved in the
coup, plus the record of Russia's past policies
regarding coups and energy suggests that however erratic
the Turkmen regime is, it may not be far wrong in its
threat assessment.
And if we are in for another
round of black operations to gain control of energy
assets in Central Asia, that means a new opening for
terrorists and those who have a taste for violence and
such operations. A long record shows that such violence
is often not carried out only by and for terrorists but
for shadowy state agencies in the background. Thus, even
as one round of the great game ends, other, equally, if
not more sinister ones begin. And who can tell where,
when, and how they might end.
Stephen
Blank is an analyst of international security
affairs residing in Harrisburg, PA.
(©2003
Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact content@atimes.com
for information on our sales and syndication policies.)
|
| |
|
|
 |
|
