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Reconstructing
Afghanistan
By Mark Sedra
(Posted with permission from Foreign Policy in Focus)
The internationally supported reconstruction and
nation-building effort in Afghanistan can boast many
successes in the period since the Taliban's collapse in
November 2001. Two million Afghan refugees have returned
to the country; 3 million Afghan children, particularly
girls, have resumed school; a new currency, the Afghani,
has been established; and a central government, chosen
on a democratic basis, has grown more assertive and
effective with each passing day.
In spite of
these achievements, which would have been the stuff of
fantasy three years ago under the repressive rule of the
Taliban, a security vacuum has emerged across the
country that threatens to undermine the entire
nation-building effort. The resurgence of warlordism and
the persistence of insurgency by remnants of the Taliban
and al-Qaeda have fostered insecurity and obstructed the
reconstruction process.
The fundamental dilemma
facing the international community is how to advance
reconstruction amid conditions of political and social
insecurity and a continuing low-intensity war. To solve
this dilemma, international support to the Afghan
Transitional Administration (ATA), whether it be
political, economic or military in nature, should be
devised and channeled with the clear objective of
addressing its causes: warlordism and spoiler groups.
Regrettably, donor action to confront these underlying
causes, most notably US military intervention, has in
many cases exacerbated insecurity.
Equally
disconcerting and detrimental has been donor inaction on
a number of critical areas, including security sector
reform, which has progressed slowly. Consequently, it is
important that donor support be redesigned and expanded
to make it more efficacious. By promoting
institution-building and dialogue among key
power-brokers at the political level; increasing and
more effectively disbursing aid at the economic level;
and assisting the reform of the ATA's national security
apparatus and deploying peacekeepers at the military
level, the international community can overcome the
present insecurity impasse.
This FPIF policy
report provides recommendations on how to refocus and
reinvigorate donor support in the political, economic
and military spheres, to better equip the ATA to
confront insecurity and its causes. It aims to offer
draft blueprint for the reform and revitalization of
international donor policy and practice in Afghanistan.
Political recommendations
Secure the adherence of neighboring states to a
strict policy of non-interference
Regional
actors must cease all support for sub-state actors -
individual parties, tribes and warlords - within
Afghanistan. A significant step toward achieving this
goal was taken with the signing of the Kabul Declaration
on Good-Neighborly Relations, a pledge of
non-interference by Afghanistan's immediate neighbors
Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, China and Iran on
December 22, 2002.
Despite previous assurances
from most states in the region that they would respect
Afghanistan's sovereignty following the Taliban's
collapse, external interference continued unabated in
2002. Russia pledged US$100 million in military aid to
the powerful warlord and Defense Minister, General
Mohammed Fahim; Iran continues to give cash and military
support to Ismail Khan, a powerful warlord who controls
most of western Afghanistan; and Uzbekistan provides
Uzbek strongman Rashid Dostum with aid and a close
protection unit. Alarmingly, India and Pakistan appear
to be using Afghanistan as a surrogate battlefield in
their continuing conflict over Kashmir. India provides
Afghanistan with military, economic and political
support and has opened consulates in several cities
around the country, including Kandahar and Jalalabad
near the Pakistani border. Many analysts argue that
India is attempting to open up a new front in its
conflict with Pakistan.
For its part, Pakistan's
Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) is said to be providing
sanctuary and arms to the Taliban, al-Qaeda and
Hekmatyar's Hizb-e-Islami party. According to US
military spokespersons, 90 percent of the attacks on US
forces emanate from Pakistan, despite Pakistan's pledge
to crack down on cross border insurgency activity under
the auspices of the war on terror. It appears that
Pakistan is playing a double game, which must be halted.
It is essential that the UN and the international
community monitor such developments and compel regional
states to uphold their pledges of non-interference.
Accelerate the security sector reform
process
The April 2002 Geneva conference on
security sector reform developed a comprehensive plan to
confront the imposing problems of instability and
insecurity that emerged after the fall of the Taliban.
The security sector reform agenda rests on five pillars,
each of which was assigned to a donor nation for
supervision: military reform (US); police reform
(Germany); disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
of ex-combatants (Japan); counter-narcotics (UK); and
judicial training (Italy). Progress on these areas in
2002 was generally much slower than expected. The
process must be reinvigorated, as it provides a means to
construct a sustainable and accountable security
apparatus, a prerequisite for peace and stability.
Military reform must be expanded, refined,
and accelerated. By the beginning of 2003, the
Afghan National Army (ANA) numbered 1,700-1,800. Hence,
for every trained soldier in the national army, there
are at least 100 armed men in local militia throughout
the country. At the current rate of graduation, it will
take up to 25 years for the ANA to meet its agreed force
size of 70,000. Further complicating the process is the
high rate of desertion, which is running at
approximately 40 percent. Low pay, poor food and living
conditions and confusion regarding the length and terms
of service impelled many graduates to return home
following basic training.
A professional and
effective national army is an essential element of
efforts to legitimize the central government across the
country and will be needed to maintain order when
elections are held in 2004. The ATA and the US estimate
that under favorable conditions, it will take at least
five years to establish a capable and functioning force.
It is advisable that this period be shortened
considerably. Accordingly, the US-coordinated training
program to build the ANA should be revised and expanded.
To achieve this objective, the international
commitment to training and equipping the ANA needs to be
increased significantly. The US$50 million contribution
made by the US to the process should be doubled; an
amount comparable to that spent by the US to train an
army in post-war Bosnia. The burden for this increase in
funding should not necessarily be borne entirely by the
US. Countries like France, who have assumed greater
responsibilities in the military reform process over the
past year, should defray part of the costs associated to
the program's expansion.
Police reform must
also be accelerated. The Kabul student riots of
November 2002, which resulted in the deaths of several
students at the hands of overzealous police officers,
illustrates the need to expand the police training
scheme currently being implemented. Karzai partially
attributed this incident to the police's lack of
training and professionalism. Many officers in
Afghanistan are illiterate and have only a primary
education. Also, the bulk of the police under government
salary remain in Kabul, leaving a security void outside
the capital. To firmly establish the state's monopoly
over the use of force, a centrally trained and
administered professional police force must be deployed
throughout the country.
Endeavoring to stimulate
reform, the German government has rehabilitated the
national police academy in Kabul, donated equipment and
contributed police instructors. The academy, whose
lecturers have received training overseas, has a
capacity of 1,500 full-time students and has set the
length of its standard training program at three years.
With the ATA setting a goal of providing training for
9,000 officers in Kabul and 75,000 nationwide, it will
take decades to professionalize the entire force.
Enlarging the program could expedite this process.
Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
plans must be implemented. An excellent proposal for
a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)
pilot program, entitled the Partnership for Peace
Program, was finalized by the United Nations Assistance
Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA) in consultation with the
ATA in August 2002. Although the program is fully
funded, it has yet to be operationalized. With the
exception of a few small-scale ad hoc projects, little
has been implemented on the DDR front. However,
developments in early 2003 indicate that the process may
acquire new momentum in 2003.
In January 2003,
the Afghan government announced the formation of four
commissions to oversee an accelerated process of
disarmament and demobilization that will be implemented
across the country. This decision came after a landmark
meeting attended by Rashid Dostum, Mohammad Atta, Ismail
Khan, Gul Agha Sherazi and Din Mohammed, all major
warlords. They agreed to disarm their forces to
facilitate the creation of a 70,000 strong national
army.
The plan aims to disarm and demobilize up
to 250,000 militiamen in exchange for cash, vocational
training and help in finding work. To launch the
process, the Japanese government announced in late
January that it would host an international conference
of Group of Eight Nations (G8) and Afghan leaders on the
issue of demobilization - the purpose of the meeting, to
outline plans and secure fresh pledges of support for
the initiative, may be what is needed to get the process
on track.
Disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration is a pivotal element of any effort to
sever the relationship of exploitation between the
warlords and the Afghan population. As long as the
principal factors motivating Afghans to take up arms -
poverty and a lack of viable employment opportunities -
exist, violence, insecurity and lawlessness will remain
the norm in Afghanistan.
A more balanced
approach is needed for counter-narcotics. In 2002,
Afghanistan returned to its position as the world's
foremost producer of heroin. The 2002 crop reached an
estimated 3,400 metric tons (mt), a 540-percent increase
on the yield for 2001 and significantly higher than the
1,900-2,700 mt earlier predicted for 2002. According to
the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 50 heroin
refineries began operation in eastern Afghanistan alone
in 2002. This lucrative trade is a major source of
income for warlords and spoiler groups.
On
January 17, 2002, in an attempt to arrest control of
drug production, the Afghan Interim Administration (AIA)
banned poppy cultivation and the consumption of heroin
and introduced an aggressive poppy eradication program.
From the outset, the program has been plagued by
inefficiency and mismanagement. It offers US$350 for
each jirib (one fifth of a hectare) of poppies
destroyed; however, poppy growers can make double that
from growing their produce and selling it on the open
market. Compounding the problem, many farmers have
claimed that they have not been duly compensated for the
destruction of their crops.
It will be difficult
for the ATA to lower production if they cannot provide
alternative livelihoods for farmers. In drought-ridden
areas of the country, this is one of the only crops that
farmers can afford to produce - it is attractive because
it is drought resistant, easy to store and extremely
profitable. A farmer can make between 60 and 65 times
more money growing poppies than wheat. Therefore, the
key to counter-narcotics efforts will be the provision
of subsidies to farmers to grow alternative crops.
In terms of international support, the UK
government has implemented a pilot program to train a
drug enforcement unit of the Afghan police. Four
experienced British law enforcement officers have begun
training an initial batch of 16 recruits on advanced
drug enforcement techniques. The trainees will form the
core of a new drug law enforcement department of the
Afghan national police.
While this program is
beneficial, it fails to address the underlying cause of
drug production in Afghanistan: a lack of viable
alternative livelihoods for farmers. Resources and
energy must be invested in the design and implementation
of alternative-crop and rural infrastructure development
programs, to run parallel to eradication programs. The
government does not have the capacity, particularly in
remote drug-producing areas, to forcefully uphold the
poppy ban. It requires incentives to build public trust.
Judicial reform requires more attention and
support. Establishing the rule of law in
Afghanistan is a vital aspect of the peace-building and
reconstruction effort. The United Nations Development
Program's (UNDP) Deputy Country Director in Afghanistan,
Knut Ostby, aptly recognizes that "Afghanistan's
economic growth, political and social security depends
on a functioning legal system."
Judicial
reform also provides a vehicle to reintegrate Afghan
women into the country's political, economic and social
life. The international community has devoted a
significant amount of attention to re-empowering women
but, in spite of some progress made in restoring their
basic rights, such as health and education, there is
still a long way to go. Women remain disenfranchised and
in many areas barred from public life, thereby depriving
Afghanistan of a valuable resource for reconstruction:
the intellectual and creative potential of half its
population.
On November 28, 2002, a judicial
reform commission supported by the Italian government
and UNDP was inaugurated to initiate the reconstruction
of the country's legal framework. The founding of the
commission was followed by the convening of an
international conference entitled Reform of the Afghan
Justice System, held in Rome in December 2002.
Conference participants pledged US$30 million for the
judicial reform process.
The commission has a
difficult mandate: to develop a legal framework that
respects Islamic legal principles yet recognizes the
equality of women. Nonetheless the commission took a
major step toward achieving these goals on January 26,
when it and UNDP initiated a two-year project called
Rebuilding the Justice System in Afghanistan. The first
phase of the project will involve the reconstruction and
provision of equipment for courthouses across the
country; the training of judges and other law offices;
the increase of capacity of the administration of the
justice system; and the organization of seminars and
training for the staff of the system. Special attention
will be paid to ensuring gender equality in the system
and strengthening the teaching and research capacity of
Kabul University's Faculty of Law and Sharia. The
Italian government and UNDP should take steps to ensure
that judicial reform features more prominently in the
wider reconstruction agenda, that donor aid is delivered
in a timely fashion, and that technical assistance is
provided when and where it is required.
Address human rights
violations
The perception that certain
regional figures can act with impunity fuels grievances
and inter-ethnic tension; thus it is important to
enhance efforts to halt human rights abuses.
Unfortunately, the ATA and the UN have chosen to
distance themselves from the issue of transitional
justice, viewing it as too explosive to address at such
a tenuous juncture in the nation-building process. They
have prioritized security ahead of pressing
accountability for past human rights abuses, an approach
that ignores the interrelations between human rights and
security. Addressing such crimes is a key element of
peace-building and reconciliation processes in
post-conflict settings, as seen in Rwanda, the former
Yugoslavia and South Africa. To halt cycles of violence
it is often necessary to prosecute blatant human rights
offenders, for they personify the "culture of impunity"
that must be dismantled to rehabilitate war-torn
societies.
The establishment of an Afghan Human
Rights Commission by the Bonn Agreement was a step in
the right direction. The commission made a significant
amount of progress in 2002, but human rights violations,
as well as evidence of past atrocities, continue to
emerge. Human Rights Watch has documented serious human
rights abuses in northern and western Afghanistan during
the past year. What is needed is a human rights policy
with teeth that will deter potential abusers. Only by
delving into the past crimes of the various warlords and
factions can a national catharsis take place and
reconciliation begin. To achieve these goals, the
nascent Afghan Human Rights Commission requires enhanced
political, economic and military support from the
international community.
Encourage the growth of civil
society
Local government and civil society
organizations, such as local councils or Shuras, could
provide an alternative source of authority to the
warlords during the transition period when the
government lacks the wherewithal to make its presence
felt throughout the country. Community-based approaches
to reconstruction should be pursued in parallel to
efforts to create robust state structures. Nation
building should not be thought of solely in terms of
creating and strengthening state institutions, but
rather as deepening the capacities of individual
communities to govern themselves.
It is
important that the ATA, NGOs and intergovernmental
institutions engage local communities and civil society.
The Herat Shura is a model example of an organization
that, if provided with international support and
emulated across the country, could help curb insecurity
and advance reconstruction. This professional
organization, borne entirely from local initiative, was
founded by a group of university-educated men and women
from Herat. According to Mohammed Rafiq Sahheer, the
Shura's elected president, the purpose of the
organization is "to develop civil society" in order "to
get it out of the clutches of the warlords and bring
Afghanistan into the modern era". The Shura consists of
10 separate associations, including associations of
lawyers, economists, teachers, engineers, painters,
calligraphers and poets. According to the Shura's
charter, the guilds are intended to "provide authorities
and international aid agencies with professional
consultations". Although few in number, organizations
such as this could serve as a conduit to promote
development and capacity-building across Afghanistan.
The revitalization of local civil society
structures, such as the Shura, could conceivably
circumscribe the authority of the warlords and expedite
reconstruction; however, the international community
must be cautious when identifying local cooperation
partners. The underlying goal of such endeavors should
be to encourage local initiative and foster the
establishment of sustainable structures. There have been
instances in Afghanistan where ad hoc, unsustainable
entities have been cobbled together in response to
international demand. The creation of such transitive,
artificial structures is counterproductive and should be
discouraged.
Economic recommendations
More donor aid must be funneled to the
ATA.
International donors must remove
the obstacles in the aid pipeline to Afghanistan. It is
crucial that the ATA and international organizations
implementing reconstruction programs receive the money
pledged to them on schedule. In addition to the need to
fund rehabilitation and reconstruction initiatives, the
ATA requires this money to pay the salaries of its
bureaucracy and security forces. One of the best ways to
deprive the regional warlords of their power base is to
entice the soldiers under their command with offers of
stable wages and benefits.
Salaries for pubic
servants in Afghanistan are conspicuously low. The
average salary earned by Afghan civil servants is US$22
per month; some cabinet ministers make no more than
US$40 per month. This induces corruption, makes it
difficult to attract qualified Afghans from the
diaspora, and fosters a brain drain, whereby skilled
Afghans leave the ATA for higher paying jobs with
international NGOs and UN agencies. Accordingly, the
international community must funnel more funds directly
to the ATA. Just 16 percent of funds for 2002, roughly
US$87 million, went directly to the ATA - the rest
flowed through UN agencies and NGOs. The ATA should be
the driving force behind reconstruction, not the myriad
of NGOs and international organizations that have
descended upon Kabul. If, as the World Bank asserts, the
ATA lacks the capacity to handle and distribute such a
high volume of funds, then it is the responsibility of
the UN and the donor community to build that capacity.
The new regime will be unable to solidify its
position in the country if the people perceive it to be
an impotent bystander in the reconstruction effort. A
peace dividend must be provided to gain the confidence
of the populace. The dissolution of the Afghan Support
Group (ASG), a loose organization established by donor
states to coordinate the distribution of aid, was a
positive step in this regard. The ASG has handed over
its responsibilities to a streamlined consultative group
based in Kabul and led by Afghan Finance Minister Ashraf
Ghani. This will give the ATA a stronger voice in the
aid disbursement process.
In terms of aid
allocation, the United States has been one of the most
generous and efficient donor states, delivering more
than $350 million in aid during 2002, 17 percent more
than what it pledged at the Tokyo donors conference. In
response to the ardent appeals of the ATA and
international relief agencies, the US has indicated that
it will increase this nonmilitary spending to over $400
million in 2003. However, the gross disparity between US
military and nonmilitary spending illustrates that it
can do much more to advance reconstruction. Each month
the United States spends an estimated $1 billion on
military operations and an average of $25 million in
aid. The US should take steps to narrow this
considerable gap for development and reconstruction
rather than military force is the key to stabilizing
Afghanistan.
More, and longer term, aid
is needed
Even if the donor community
fulfills its aid pledges, more international assistance
to Afghanistan will be required to stimulate the
country's rehabilitation. At the January 2002 Tokyo
donors conference, donors pledged $5.25 billion for
Afghan reconstruction between 2002-2006; however, the
World Bank estimates that $10-12 billion will be needed
for this effort during the same five-year span. A
comparison of the average per capita level of aid
distribution in several post-conflict settings further
illustrates the discrepancy between the needs of
Afghanistan and the response of the international
community. In Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor, an
average of $250 per person, per year of aid, was
donated. In contrast, the international community has
pledged $42 per person, per year of aid, to Afghanistan
over a period of five years.
There are
indications that the aid community may be willing to
rectify this glaring funding inequity. At a December
2002 donor conference in Oslo, donors pledged $1.2
billion in fresh aid for 2003 and another $800 million
is expected. If all the pledges materialize, the flow of
aid will exceed last year's flow by one third.
Peace-building and reconstruction is a long-term
process that could take generations to complete.
Accordingly, long-term aid commitments from donors are
essential. In spite of this reality, only six donors
have committed to five years or more. There is no
short-term remedy or panacea for Afghanistan; the
psychological and physical scars left from 23 years of
civil war will take decades to heal. The international
community must recognize this fact and commit to
long-term investments in the country's future.
The reconstruction strategy must shift from
short-term relief to long-term infrastructure
development
Job creation is the key to
removing the dependence of Afghans on the warlords.
Serving in a militia has, in the case of many Afghans,
been the only option for employment. An increase in
donor-supported investment projects would have an
enormous impact in creating employment for the
multitudes of unemployed Afghans, among them
ex-combatants. However, the delivery of major investment
projects, such as road construction and agricultural
rehabilitation, has thus far been slow. Eventually,
increased economic opportunities will make it difficult
for warlords to keep their forces together. Attractive
alternatives for those under arms will undermine the
armies of the warlords. Therefore it is imperative the
international community promote the establishment of
large-scale labor-intensive reconstruction projects to
create these jobs.
Military
recommendations
Expand the ISAF
The International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) was inaugurated on December 20, 2001, by UN
Security Council Resolution 1386. Composed of
approximately 4,800 troops drawn from 19 different
countries, ISAF has the mandate to provide security for
Kabul and its immediate environs. The success of ISAF in
stabilizing Kabul has fostered the view that the
security environment across Afghanistan would be greatly
improved if ISAF were expanded outside the capital.
Policymakers and observers have offered numerous
plans for ISAF's expansion. One scenario would see it
deployed to major urban centers outside the capital;
forces in these regional hubs could maintain law and
order, safeguard aid workers, facilitate the delivery of
humanitarian aid and carry out reconstruction. There are
varying estimates as to how many additional troops would
be required for this expanded mission, ranging from
5,000 to 30,000. A deployment of approximately 1,000
troops to each major population center would likely be
sufficient.
Germany, which assumed joint command
of ISAF with the Dutch on February 10, 2003, proposed at
a February 8, 2003, international security conference in
Munich that the command of ISAF be handed over to NATO.
Although German Defense Minister Peter Struck did not
express a desire to see the force expanded beyond Kabul,
under the NATO framework this option would surely become
more credible and feasible. ISAF's expansion could give
the ATA flexibility and room for maneuver to confront
recalcitrant warlords and extend the writ of the ATA
into the provinces. While this would entail a
considerable cost for international donors -- one they
have shown an unwillingness to incur -- it increasingly
appears that such an investment is essential.
The US should adjust its military strategy
in Afghanistan while continuing to apply pressure on
spoiler groups
The military strategy adopted
by the United States in post-Taliban Afghanistan has
been problematic in a number of areas. In particular,
its solicitation of military support from certain
warlords has adversely impacted the ATA and the
reconstruction process. US engagement is crucial for the
success of the nation-building effort; however, US
military strategy must be harmonized with the
peace-building and development objectives of the ATA to
ensure that the long-term interests of the Afghan people
are not sacrificed for short-term military expediency in
the war on terror.
The United States must cease
providing unconditional support to Afghan warlords. This
policy has prompted many warlords to openly defy the
ATA. In particular, they must cease training and
equipping anti-al-Qaeda units, utilized as US proxies in
the war against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The government
in Kabul has not been involved or consulted in the
establishment and operation of these units, which remain
loyal to regional warlords.
Developments in
early 2003 demonstrate that the cessation of US support
to certain warlords could compel them to acquiesce to
the central government. Padsha Khan Zadran, one of the
few warlords who refused to recognize the legitimacy of
the Karzai government, has been among the most
destabilizing figures in Afghanistan during the past
year. He was emboldened by the patronage and support he
received from the US; his militia was trained, equipped
and utilized by the US military in joint operations.
However, late in 2002 the US ceased all material support
to Zadran and members of his militia were excluded from
US-led operations.
The US subsequently detained
many of Zadran's subcommanders, including his nephew,
who was allegedly under the employ of the CIA. Deprived
of his superpower patron, the ATA was able to overrun
Zadran's forces in his strongholds of Gardez and Khost,
capturing the two cities. Zadran's men, who now number
no more than 500, have been relegated to manning
roadblocks outside these cities. The emasculated Zadran,
who cannot pay his troops without US aid, has allegedly
entered talks with the government about a rapprochement
that could bring him to Kabul as a member of the
government. This is a stunning breakthrough for a
government that has been struggling to forge a policy to
deal with the warlords. The key to its success was US
pressure; it clearly demonstrates that concerted US
military and political pressure could bring the warlords
to heel.
Over 8,000 US troops remain in
Afghanistan under the auspices of the war on terrorism.
The resiliency of the Taliban and al-Qaeda poses a
significant dilemma to the US military and the
international community: how do you advance
reconstruction while a war, albeit a low-intensity one,
continues? With US military operations appearing
increasingly ineffective, the intensity of spoiler
insurgency activity intensifying, and the reconstruction
process faltering, the US has sought to modify its
overall strategy, fusing military and development
objectives.
They have developed a plan to
station 40-60 soldiers in as many as eight cities
outside Kabul to provide security and support
reconstruction. Dubbed Provisional Reconstruction Teams
(PRT), they will include Special Forces soldiers, Army
Civil Affairs Officers, conventional ground troops,
officials from USAID and representatives from the US
State Department. In addition to initiating and
assisting development projects, these teams are supposed
to provide safe enclaves for the ATA, international NGOs
and the UN to operate. The Bush administration plans to
ask members of NATO to provide small numbers of troops
for these teams. The first Civil-Military Operations
Center (CMOC) was opened in Gardez in late January 2003;
an additional center will be established in Bamian
[SPELLING CQ]in central Afghanistan in the coming
months.
While it is encouraging that the US
military has recognized the limitations of its previous
strategy and has sought to remedy them, its new policy
fails to meet the unique exigencies of the situation. A
great deal of criticism, primarily from relief agencies
in the field, has been leveled at the new policy.
Critics affirm that the PRTs will be dependent on the
warlords for security, strengthening these figures;
their presence will blur the distinction between
military and humanitarian operations, thereby
endangering humanitarian workers in the field; they will
politicize the development process by gravitating to
pro-government communities, as opposed to areas believed
to have pro-al-Qaeda sympathies; and their lack of
female staff will render them unable to address the
unique needs of Afghan women.
US forces should
leave the coordination of reconstruction to the Afghan
government, the UN and other civilian aid agencies. The
goal of restoring security in the country would be
better served by the US military adopting a peacekeeping
role and providing assistance to disarmament and
demobilization efforts, objectives more in tune with the
military's modus operandi. If the US were to commit a
significant proportion of its troops to peacekeeping
duties, other states, particularly in Europe, would
surely follow suit. The primary reason for the
reluctance of European governments to support an
expansion of ISAF is their lack of military capacity to
undertake such a large operation without US support.
With US leadership, and under the auspices of NATO, they
would likely reevaluate their objections to supporting a
comprehensive peacekeeping operation.
Even if
ISAF is expanded, it is critical that US-led coalition
and ATA forces continue to exert sustained pressure on
total spoilers. With the Taliban, al-Qaeda and Hekmatyar
massing their forces in the south of the country, steps
must be taken to neutralize the threat they pose.
Attacks on US and ATA forces, which have gradually
increased in intensity since November 2002, will likely
intensify further if war breaks out in Iraq.
Foreshadowing this eventuality, on January 27, 2002, US,
European and Afghan forces engaged in what has been
described as the fiercest fighting in eight months with
80 rebels believed to be loyal to Hekmatyar in the
mountainous area of southeastern Afghanistan near the
town of Spin Boldak. Rising violence in the southeast,
which resulted in the deaths of at least 30 Afghan
civilians and soldiers between January 29 and February
8, threatens to curtail all humanitarian aid to this
impoverished region. The ATA recently deployed 5,000
troops and police to the nearby town of Spin Boldak to
confront the growing threat, an encouraging display of
resolve and assertiveness. Total spoilers will only
respond to pressure, thus the international community
and the ATA should take an aggressive and proactive
stance toward them.
Conclusion: Critical
phase of nation-building
The nation-building
process in Afghanistan is entering a critical phase. The
ATA, in its second year of power, must deliver on its
promise of a better life for the Afghan people in 2003
or risk losing their allegiance. The window of
opportunity for Afghan reconstruction and peace-building
is closing. It is incumbent on the international
community to help Afghanistan seize this unprecedented
opportunity for renewal. Helping the Afghan government
to ameliorate adverse security conditions is key to
achieving this overarching objective. The continuing war
in Afghanistan makes this task problematic, for a
minimum level of physical security is required for
nation-building to proceed. Thus particular attention
must be paid to reconciling the oft-incompatible aims of
the war on terror and the reconstruction process.
Capacity-building must be a core element of all
donor policies in Afghanistan; the international
community must remain cognizant of the danger of
fostering Afghan dependence on the international
community. The sudden and dramatic increase in
international aid and support threatens to create
dependency on international assistance and undermine
Afghan efforts to assume ownership of the reconstruction
program. One of the strengths of Afghan society is its
strong spirit of independence and entrepreneurship; this
must be nurtured. To ensure that Afghan initiative is
encouraged, not stifled, the international community
should endeavor to leave a light footprint but with a
wide impression. By expanding its involvement with a
focus on fostering the creation of sustainable policies
and structures, the donor community can help the ATA
confront the omnipresent problem of warlordism,
integrating partial spoilers into the new polity while
purging the country of total spoilers. This will be a
long-term and multi-faceted process that could take
generations to complete; thus it is essential that the
donor community resist the inevitable pressures to shift
spending and attention to other trouble spots before
this mammoth task is completed.
Mark
Sedra is a research associate at the Bonn
International Center for Conversion. He is the author of
a report entitled Challenging the Warlord Culture:
Security Sector Reform in Post-Taliban Afghanistan
(November 2002). He can be reached at sedra@bicc.de.
(Posted with permission from Foreign Policy in
Focus)
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