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The forgotten first stop in the 'war on
terror'
By Mark Sedra
(Posted
with permission from Foreign Policy in Focus)
Less than an hour before the initial bombs and
cruise missiles rained down on Baghdad in the first
volleys of the Iraq war, the US military launched a
major attack in its other war in Afghanistan. Pentagon
spokespersons insisted that the timing of the attack was
"a coincidence" and that planning for the operation had
been going on for months.
However, it seems
clear that this escalation of US military activity
serves a dual purpose: to assuage the fears of those
concerned that the United States would lose interest in
Afghanistan after the onset of the war in Iraq and to
send a clear signal to anti-American forces in
Afghanistan and the wider region that the "war on
terror" would not lose momentum. More than anything,
though, the operation illustrates that the ongoing war
in Afghanistan - involving 11,000 coalition troops,
8,000 of which are American - is far from over.
"Sporadic acts of terror continue to occur all
too frequently," according to a report by United Nations
Secretary General Kofi Annan released on March 18. The
report went on to state that events "in the first months
of 2003 point to increased activity by elements hostile
to the government and to the international community in
Afghanistan."
Recent statistics bear out this
picture. In the past eight weeks, there have been more
than one rocket attack per day targeting coalition
forces, and 50 civilians and government soldiers have
been killed or wounded in insurgent violence in the
south of the country, where sympathy for spoiler groups
- including the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar's Hizb-I-Islami party - remains robust. Under
such conditions it hardly seems accurate to refer to
Afghanistan as a post-conflict society.
The
deterioration of security in Afghanistan, coupled with
the emerging reality that the war in Iraq and its
aftermath may last months, casts a shadow of uncertainty
on Washington's commitment to Afghanistan. With US
forces increasingly bogged down and overstretched, the
added strain of a continuing low-intensity war in
Afghanistan may become prohibitive in the months ahead.
Although US political and military figures have
vigorously reaffirmed a long-term commitment to
Afghanistan, the specter of disengagement haunts Afghan
policymakers, who recall similar assurances made during
their struggle against the Soviet Union. Those promises
proved hollow after the Soviet withdrawal, when the US
and the world turned their backs on Afghanistan. To
avoid a recurrence of this tragic and costly episode in
history, it is essential that the threat posed by
spoiler groups be confronted now, before it develops
into a movement capable of undermining the postwar
order. Contrary to the underlying premise driving US
planning and operations, a strategic shift in
Washington's approach rather than an intensification of
military operations is the most effective means to
achieve this goal.
US military
operations
On March 20, the Pentagon launched a
major operation with more than 1,000 coalition troops in
the villages and caves of southern Kandahar province,
where troops loyal to the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and
Hekmatyar's Hizb-I-Islami party were thought to be
operating. Coalition forces were acting on intelligence
reports that fighters in the area had communications
equipment, possessed considerable firepower, and were
highly organized. Lieutenant-General Dan K McNeil, the
commander of coalition forces in Afghanistan, affirmed
that one of the primary purposes of the operation,
dubbed Valiant Strike, was to disrupt the plans and
capability of spoiler groups to regroup and launch a
spring offensive.
What coalition forces found
when scouring the caves of this mountainous area was
sufficient to raise concern that anti-government
guerrilla activity may intensify significantly in coming
months. A large cache of weapons was seized, including
hundreds of mortars, rockets, land mines, and "too much
ammunition of all caliber to count", according to
Lieutenant Michael Shields, a senior operations officer
of the coalition task force. "In recent history, the
size of this find is significant," Shields added.
Five days after the beginning of Operation
Valiant Strike, coalition forces launched a parallel
operation, dubbed Desert Lion, in the Kohe Safi
Mountains of northeastern Afghanistan. During the early
stages of the offensive, coalition forces uncovered two
large arms caches, including rockets and ammunition for
mortars, recoilless rifles, and machine-guns. What the
initial results of the two operations show is that
Afghan spoiler groups are better equipped and organized
than most analysts and observers believed.
Afghan spoiler groups have responded to the
coalition offensive with a wave of rocket attacks, the
heaviest in more than a year. Although the rockets have
not caused any significant damage or injuries, they have
demonstrated the resiliency of these groups and their
capability to retaliate against coalition attacks. The
resistance groups have also intensified offensive
guerrilla activity against coalition forces, launching
several attacks in late March. On March 29, two US
soldiers were killed and one was wounded when their
convoy was ambushed in southwestern Afghanistan by
Taliban forces. This attack is typical of the
hit-and-run guerrilla tactics now being utilized by the
groups an approach coalition forces have had difficulty
combating in a decisive fashion.
"It's a
challenge to pick out enemy forces that are made up of
local Afghans," US spokesperson Roger King admitted. In
their attempts to do so, US forces have alienated a
large portion of Afghanistan's Pashtuns who constitute a
majority of the population.
Pashtun
discontent
The Taliban as an ideological movement
is clearly on the wane in Afghanistan. It has survived
as a political and military entity, because it is
perceived in Pashtun areas as a symbol and vehicle for
Pashtun nationalism. The Taliban have grown adept at
feeding off the growing anger and resentment of the
Pashtun populace, providing an outlet for their
frustration. It is believed that the Taliban have formed
a consortium of spoiler groups, including al-Qaeda and
Hekmatyar's Hizb-I-Islami faction, that is collectively
trying to channel Pashtun disillusionment into an
organized campaign of resistance.
In a recent
interview with the Pashto-language service of the
British Broadcasting Corp (BBC), Mullah Dadullah, a
notorious Taliban commander, stated that the Taliban had
regrouped and that those opposed to them in the past,
most notably Hekmatyar, supported their campaign against
the "foreign occupation troops". He went on to declare a
jihad against US forces and vowed to drive all "Jews and
infidels" out of the country. "The ground became hot for
the Russians here, and so maybe the ground will also
become hot for the Americans," he added. Recent press
reports quote Taliban loyalists as saying that training
camps have been established in the mountains of
Afghanistan and that anti-US forces are united.
Pashtun discontent has been fueled by several
factors. Politically, Pashtuns feel under-represented,
even disfranchised. Although the president of the Afghan
Transitional Administration (ATA), Hamid Karzai, is a
Pashtun, it is widely believed that the Panjshiri Tajik
faction, led by Defense Minister Fahim, controls the
government. Two of the three power ministries, Defense
and Foreign Affairs, remain in the hands of the
Panjshiris, and the bulk of the military and
intelligence service is loyal to Fahim.
Fahim's
decision in February to replace 16 ethnic-Tajik generals
with individuals from other ethnic groups - a move due
in large part to concerted US pressure - was heralded as
a political breakthrough, yet the Pashtun populace
remains skeptical. The inability of the ATA to protect
Pashtuns from a wave of human-rights abuses perpetrated
against them since the fall of the Taliban has only
heightened Pashtun suspicions and mistrust of the
government. In northern Afghanistan, where Pashtuns
represent a minority of the population, they have been
attacked and driven out of their homes with impunity, in
apparent retribution for the crimes of the Pashtun-based
Taliban regime.
Another source of discontent
concerns US military operations. By their heavy-handed
tactics in Pashtun areas of the country, US troops have
alienated much of the populace. In particular, their
indiscriminate use of air power, which has killed scores
of civilians, and their lack of sensitivity to
indigenous laws and customs have been viewed with
seething resentment. According to recent reports in the
Afghan press, US Special Forces, during routine sweeps
of Afghan villages searching for weapons and members of
resistance groups, have physically abused villagers,
damaged personal property, and subjected women to body
searches, a major affront on a family's honor.
Threats to reconstruction
Growth of
both Pashtun disaffection and armed spoiler groups has
severely hindered the Afghan reconstruction process. The
surge of violence that has accompanied the beginning of
Operation Valiant Strike and the simultaneous onset of
hostilities in Iraq has created an inhospitable and
volatile environment for humanitarian and development
activities.
An illustration of the dangers that
face UN and non-governmental organization (NGO) workers
in Afghanistan came on March 28, when Taliban loyalists
executed an International Committee of the Red Cross
worker in southern Afghanistan. Ricardo Munguia, a
Salvadoran water engineer, was gunned down after being
singled out of a two-car ICRC convoy that had been
halted by 25 Taliban militiamen.
The act was
clearly intended to send a message to internationals
working in Afghanistan. This message was reinforced two
days later, on March 30, when two rockets were fired at
the headquarters of the International Security
Assistance Force, the UN-mandated peacekeeping force
based in Kabul. In the attack, one 122mm rocket fell
inside ISAF's compound, causing damage to a building,
and another rocket landed harmlessly outside the
capital. Although no injuries were reported, ISAF
spokesperson Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Lobbering
admitted that the attack was "far more sophisticated"
than anything previously seen by the peacekeepers.
These incidents have sent shock waves through
the aid community, prompting the ICRC and many other
organizations to curtail or halt operations across the
country, particularly in the turbulent south. Taken
together with the decisions of numerous UN agencies and
NGOs to suspend operations in the north of the country
due to continuing factional clashes between the militias
of General Rashid Dostum and General Atta Mohammed, the
reconstruction and development process has become
increasingly paralyzed in large parts of Afghanistan.
What can the US do?
In spite of the
steady deterioration of security conditions since the
beginning of the year, the ATA has remained remarkably
stable. At present, spoiler groups are not in a position
to overthrow the post-Taliban order, only to destabilize
it. It is thus imperative that the threat these groups
pose be confronted now, before the resistance expands
into something unmanageable. To confront this dilemma,
Washington should take steps to ameliorate Pashtun
resentment and bolster the influence of the central
government in southern and eastern Afghanistan, where
the bulk of US forces are concentrated.
First,
US troops should exercise more caution and restraint in
their use of air power in civilian areas and should be
more respectful of tribal laws and customs in their
interactions with the Afghan people. Such measures are
essential to reestablishing a modicum of trust between
the Pashtun community and coalition military forces.
Second, the United States should cease providing
political and material support for Afghan warlords under
the auspices of the "war on terror". With the demise of
the Taliban regime, the Pentagon formed various
strategic alliances with military strongmen across the
country. In exchange for money, equipment, and training,
warlord militias were placed at the disposal of US
commanders for use in anti-al-Qaeda operations. Although
the US has scaled down its reliance on and support of
warlords openly opposed to the Karzai regime, its ties
with less troublesome and disruptive figures remain
intact, emboldening them to defy the ATA. The two
objectives pursued by the United States in Afghanistan,
the eradication of the Taliban and al-Qaeda and the
establishment of a robust central government, have often
worked at cross-purposes. It is essential that
Washington reconcile these two objectives. To do so, it
should pressure regional warlords to submit to the writ
of the central government and should direct US forces to
expand their current level of consultation and
coordination with the ATA regarding military planning
and operations.
Third, the US should expend more
resources to provide a secure environment for civilian
agencies and the ATA to deliver relief and implement
reconstruction projects. The Pentagon's current policy
of contributing directly to the reconstruction process
through the establishment of provisional reconstruction
teams (PRTs), which consist primarily of Special
Operations soldiers and Army Civil Affairs officers, has
enjoyed only mixed success. Such a policy blurs the
distinction between civilian and military personnel,
endangering civilian workers, and it diverts the
military from its raison d'etre - to provide
security. Instead of delivering relief, PRTs should
facilitate security-sector reform - a role already being
considered - most notably, the disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of
ex-combatants. Security-sector reform, comprising
elements such as military reform, police reform, and
DDR, is the key to establishing security and stability
in a sustainable fashion. It has progressed at an
alarmingly slow rate and should receive more attention
and resources.
Last, Washington must exert more
pressure to persuade regional states - most notably
Pakistan - both to refrain from interfering in Afghan
internal affairs and to crack down on spoiler groups
that have sought refuge in their territories. It can
hardly be viewed as a coincidence that the majority of
al-Qaeda leadership figures currently in custody have
been apprehended in Pakistan. US military officials
contend that 90 percent of attacks on US forces
originate in Pakistan. Although Pakistani authorities
have vigorously denied such claims, it is believed that
Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence is aiding the
remnants of the Taliban in an effort to fuel Pashtun
radicalism and retain some influence in southern
Afghanistan. The ATA has pleaded with the United States
to take a harder line with the Pakistani government,
which appears to be playing both sides of the ongoing
conflict, to the overall detriment of Afghanistan.
A US military presence in Afghanistan is crucial
for the country's long-term security and stability. That
presence has reassured the Afghan civilian population
that the world will not forget about Afghanistan, and it
has deterred spoiler groups and other would-be
aggressors from mounting a major challenge to the new
regime. So it is not the presence of US forces but
rather their strategy and tactics that should be
questioned.
Growing military fatigue in
Afghanistan, spurred by rising violence and insecurity
combined with the burden of a costly war and prolonged
occupation in Iraq, could conceivably force Washington
to re-evaluate its military commitments to Afghanistan.
Any softening of the US commitment, however, would have
disastrous implications for the stability of the
country. As one official in the ATA remarked in January,
if the US withdraws, there will be a "bloodbath". With
the consequences of failure so dire and ubiquitous, it
is important that the US re-evaluate and reassess its
strategic approach.
Victory in the war on terror
hinges on the establishment of a stable and secure
Afghanistan; the two goals cannot be pursued in
isolation. Accordingly, US military strategy should be
remolded to embrace the interconnected nature of these
twin objectives. The current surge of violence in
Afghanistan and the onset of the Iraq war only highlight
the urgent need for this shift in strategy. Though force
may be the only language that Afghanistan's spoiler
groups understand, they can only survive as long as they
have a fountain of discontent from which to draw
support. Remove this support base, and these groups will
succumb to pressure and fade away.
Mark
Sedra (e-mail sedra@bicc.de) is a
research associate at the Bonn International Center for
Conversion and writes regularly for Foreign Policy in Focus.
This article is posted with permission from
FPIF.
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