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Day of reckoning for China-Central Asia
group
By Matthew Oresman
(Used by permission of the Pacific Forum CSIS)
Next Wednesday, the heads of state of the member
nations of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) -
China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan - will meet in Moscow to formally approve the
charter of the SCO and announce several new initiatives.
They include modalities for funding the SCO headquarters
in Beijing and counter-terrorism center in Bishkek, the
new secretary general of the organization, and plans for
security and economic cooperation. Still, much remains
unclear about the future of the SCO and the Moscow
summit should lay out the future shape of the
organization be a significant indicator of the future
viability of this group.
Last June, the SCO made
a big show of announcing its charter in St Petersburg
but, in reality, no finished document was published.
Apparently, there has been tough, behind-the-scenes
negotiation since then, with the Russians wanting more
explicit and binding language and the Central Asians
wanting a more flexible treaty with specific
requirements attached as an appendix. The Russians seem
to have won this battle, while the Chinese were rewarded
the headquarters and the secretary general. Despite its
name, it will be based in Beijing, since none of the
Central Asian states have consuls in Shanghai, and
Beijing and Moscow do not want to fund new ones.
Originally founded in 1996 (without Uzbekistan)
by China to settle border disputes between it and the
states of the former Soviet Union, demilitarize their
common frontiers, and establish confidence-building
measures (CBMs), the Shanghai Forum - as the group was
called - has evolved into a formal treaty organization
focused on issues well beyond border demarcation. The
goals of the SCO mirror those of China in Central Asia:
guaranteeing its sovereignty with secure and peaceful
borders, protecting its perceived national security by
cutting off external support for Uighur separatists,
building trade links with Central Asia and establishing
the region as a source of energy to feed China's growing
demand, and, lastly, using this relatively successful
diplomacy as a strategic lever in its relations with the
United States, Russia, and other global powers.
Over the past several years, the Shanghai Forum,
and later the SCO, has tried to coalesce into a more
active organization, but this process has frequently
stalled because of resource shortfalls, lack of common
vision, diplomatic rigidity, and interstate rivalries.
In 1999, the group moved beyond CBM and border issues
and attempted to create a counter-terrorism center in
Bishkek known as the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure
(with the unfortunate acronym RATS). This project has
stalled and no assets have been invested or resources
committed. In sum, the SCO is an ad hoc discussion forum
that wants to be more. It has no secretariat, permanent
personnel, hard assets, or formal mandate. This is
likely to come in the next months, along with the
eventual establishment of the RATS, in whichever form it
takes.
In the wake of the September 11, 2001,
terror attacks, the US deployment in the region achieved
more of the SCO goals in five months than the
organization had in five years, allowing the member
nations to seize on the momentum of significant military
successes against the Taliban, al-Qaeda, the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan, and other terrorist groups that
threatened regional security. Many believed that the US
deployment to bases in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan would undermine the need for
the SCO, but China and Russia have both invested serious
political capital in this project and are unwilling to
let it fade away. Even after the June 2002 summit, China
and Russia continued to solidify their commitment to
Central Asia, with China holding its first ever combined
military exercise with Kyrgyz border forces in October
and Russia committing new assets to the Kant air base in
Bishkek, which will serve as a forward base for the
Rapid Deployment Forces of the newly constituted
Collective Security Treaty Organization.
The
results of the upcoming summit will, in large part,
determine the fate of the SCO. While long-term regional
integration and cooperation will be determined more by
the relationship between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and
not China and Russia, the commitment these nations show
to the SCO in both political and monetary capital will
determine if this group joins the region's graveyard of
acronyms.
At the conclusion of the summit,
expect to see a final document detailing the
responsibilities of the SCO and the obligations of its
members. It is extremely unlikely that there will be any
sort of mutual defense clause. There will be a renewed
commitment to combat transnational threats and increased
economic cooperation. Priority will be given to security
over economics by focusing on building practical links
before attempting a larger, all encompassing strategic
union, a major fear for alarmists who see the SCO as
China's Warsaw Pact.
China will most likely have
forced the Central Asian states to continue to support
its position on Taiwan, the "three evils" of splitism,
extremism, and terrorism, and the need for a multipolar
world order, but some of this language, especially that
which could be considered anti-American, could be toned
down as a result of China's and Central Asia's improving
ties with the United States and the West (these include
a recent overture by China to initiate a strategic
dialogue with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;
for more on this issue, see PacNet No 50).
Also, expect
to see detailed funding and organizational modalities
committing China and Russia each to pay for roughly 30
percent of the organization's cost, with the Central
Asians each picking up a remaining 10 percent. It
remains to be seen whether RATS will be more than an
Interpol-like operation, but it is doubtful that these
nations will commit security forces to this center given
Russia's commitment to Kant and Tajikistan, China's
aversion to deploying troops abroad, and the Central
Asian unwillingness and inability to cooperate
militarily or even field forces in some cases.
Also left undecided will be the fate of those
seeking observer status and full membership in the SCO.
Indications are that the members are currently unable to
decide who should be given observer status and what that
entails. There is still fear that admitting India and
Pakistan will derail the organization and a US entry
will undermine Chinese and Russian strategic goals in
Central Asia.
These decisions and remaining
questions have serious implications for the entire
region and for US interests there. Despite achieving
independence more than a decade ago, the nations of
Central Asia are still struggling to fully establish
their sovereignty and national identities. Interstate
conflict is high and attempts at regional integration
have repeatedly failed, despite the common understanding
that almost every problem in the region - whether the
subject is terrorism and drug trafficking or water
resources and the spread of the human immunodeficiency
virus (HIV) and AIDS - is transnational in nature. There
is great hope that cooperation with outside powers will
allow these states to overcome their inability to engage
in collective action. However, there is considerable
worry that China and Russia will use their influence to
maintain a strategic environment suitable to them,
sacrificing long-term political reform for short-term
stability.
This underscores US concerns with the
SCO: that Russia and China will use their positions to
undermine US interests in the region. Very few people
seriously believe that China and Russia would join
forces with the Central Asians in full political and
military opposition to the United States, but some
policymakers are worried that a more robust and
institutionalized SCO will cut the US out of the
decision-making process in these countries. Given the
United States' overwhelming global influence, that is
unlikely. Moreover, any endeavor that teaches Central
Asian regimes to cooperate and to sacrifice short-term
insecurities for long-term gains should be supported. A
success for the SCO is not necessarily a loss for the
United States, especially since China, Russia, and the
US share the same basic interests in the region.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is on
track to becoming a formal international organization,
moving beyond its days as a talk shop. Still, many
obstacles remain, not least of which is internal rivalry
and a constant need to justify its existence in light of
a US presence in the region. If real resources are
brought to bear and political commitments to decrease
tension and increase cooperation are followed through in
earnest, the SCO will survive. This summit will
determine whether these nations are ready to break the
cycle of failure of Central Asia multilateral
institutions and embrace a brighter future.
Matthew Oresman is a research
assistant at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies. He can be reached at moresman@alumni.upenn.edu
. This article is used by
permission of the Pacific Forum CSIS.
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