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US turns to the
Taliban
By Syed Saleem Shahzad
KARACHI - Such is the deteriorating security
situation in Afghanistan, compounded by the return to
the country of a large number of former Afghan communist
refugees, that United States and Pakistani intelligence
officials have met with Taliban leaders in an effort to
devise a political solution to prevent the country from
being further ripped apart.
According to a
Pakistani jihadi leader who played a role in setting up
the communication, the meeting took place recently
between representatives of Pakistan's Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI), the US Federal Bureau of
Investigation and Taliban leaders at the Pakistan Air
Force base of Samungli, near Quetta.
The source
told Asia Times Online that four conditions were put to
the Taliban before any form of reconciliation can take
place that could potentially lead to them having a role
in the Kabul government, whose present authority is in
essence limited to the capital:
Mullah Omar must be removed as supreme leader of the
Taliban.
All Pakistani, Arab and other foreign fighters
currently engaged in operations against international
troops in Afghanistan must be thrown out of the country.
Any US or allied soldiers held captive must be
released.
Afghans currently living abroad, notably in the
United States and England, must be given a part in the
government - through being allowed to contest elections
- even though many do not even speak their mother
tongue, such as Dari or Pashtu.
Apparently, the
Taliban refused the first condition point blank, but
showed some flexibility on the other terms. As such,
this first preliminary contact made little headway. It
is not known whether there will be further meetings, but
given the fact that the reason for staging the talks in
the first place remains unchanged, more contact can be
expected.
The channels for the contact have been
set up by Taliban who defected when the government
collapsed in Kabul, and fled to Pakistan, where they
were sheltered in ISI safe houses. Now these defectors,
working with Pakistani jihadis who know how to approach
the Taliban leadership, are acting as go-betweens.
The backdrop to the first meeting is an
ever-increasing escalation in the guerrilla war being
waged against foreign troops in Afghanistan. Small
hit-and-run attacks are a daily feature in most parts of
the country, while face-to-face skirmishes are common in
the former Taliban stronghold around Kandahar in the
south.
According to people familiar with Afghan
resistance movements, the one that has emerged over the
past year and a half since the fall of the Taliban is
about four times as strong as the movement that opposed
Soviet invaders for nearly a decade starting in 1979.
The key reason for this is that the previous
Taliban government - which is dispersed almost intact in
the country after capitulating to advancing Northern
Alliance forces without a fight - is backed by the most
powerful force in Afghanistan: clerics and religious
students.
For centuries, these people were the
most respected segment of Afghan society, and before
1979 they never participated in politics. On the
contrary, their role was one of reconciliation in
conflicts. During the Afghan resistance movement against
the USSR, things changed, and clerics threw their weight
behind the mujahideen struggle, but, with a few
exceptions, such as Maulana Yunus Khalis, they were not
in command.
With the withdrawal of the Soviets
and the emergence of the Taliban in the early 1990s,
though, the situation once again changed. The Taliban,
taking advantage of the power struggles among bitterly
divided militias in Kabul, consolidated themselves into
an effective political movement led by clerics and in
1996 seized power in Kabul. A part of their success also
lay in the fact that initially Afghans, especially
Pashtuns who make up the majority of the country, were
reluctant to take up the gun against clerics.
Now, in the renewed guerrilla war against
foreign troops, it is the clerics who are calling the
shots. For instance, Hafiz Rahim is the most respected
cleric in the Kandahar region, and he commands all
military operations from the sanctuary of the
mountainous terrain.
The US forces have employed
maximum air support and advanced technology in an
attempt to curtail attacks, but without the help of
local Afghan forces they are unable to track down Hafiz
Rahim, who to date has targeted US convoys scores of
times. The United States has admitted a few deaths,
while the Taliban claim they have killed many more than
the official numbers state. For funds, the Taliban use
money looted from the central bank before they abandoned
Kabul, estimated in excess of US$110 million, in
addition to money received from Osama bin Laden's
al-Qaeda.
At the same time, famed warlord
Gulbbudin Hekmatyar has joined the resistance after
returning from exile in Iran. His Hezb-i-Islami
Afghanistan (HIA) is the most organized force in
Afghanistan, and its participation has added real muscle
to the resistance. Many top slots in the Kabul
administration are occupied by former HIA members who,
although they were once anti-Taliban, are loyal to the
Islamic cause and anti-US. Also, several provincial
governors and top officials are former HIA commanders.
They are suspect in the eyes of the Americans, but
because of their huge political clout it is impossible
to remove them.
With this groundswell of support
- even if in places it is only passive - and with
Kabul's influence restricted to the capital, the
Americans and their allies will remain vulnerable
targets, let alone be in a position to restore any form
of law and order. It is in situations like this, argue
most experts on Afghanistan, that traditionally
insurrections begin in the Afghan army against foreign
administrators.
This is not the end of the
problems. More than 2 million Afghan refugees, according
to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
have returned to Afghanistan from countries all over the
world, including India, Russia, Cambodia, Malaysia,
Zimbabwe and Central Asian countries. Many of them
belonged to communist factions during and after the
Soviet invasion, while a number of their counterparts
remained and now hold positions in Kabul.
At
present, Kabul is divided into two main factions. The
first is pro-US, which is represented by the US and
allied troops and those loyal to President Hamid Karzai.
The second is pro-Russian and pro-Iranian, represented
by Defense Minister General Qasim Fahim and his Northern
Alliance forces. Although the camps are cooperating at
present, they are silently building their support bases
to make a grab for full power once the present interim
administration runs its course, a process that is due to
begin in October with a loya jirga (grand
council).
In this respect, every returned or
returning former "communist comrade" is important, for
should the Northern Alliance faction develop sufficient
critical mass, it would come as no surprise if its
leaders openly forged an alliance with the resistance
movement.
(Copyright 2003 Asia Times Online Co,
Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for
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policies.)
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