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Azerbaijan: Rotten egg in the
basket
By Hooman Peimani
This
Monday, Azerbaijan's ruling party, Yeni Azerbaijan (New
Azerbaijan), declared President Haidar Aliyev as its
candidate for the October presidential elections despite
his well-known health problems and age (80), which raise
doubts about his ability to finish a new five-year term,
if not about his physical strength to begin it. Given
this situation, his decision to run reflects a fear
that, in the absence of a consensus among the ruling
elite over a successor with a degree of popular
acceptance, Azerbaijan could well find itself on a path
of instability - for which there are many strong
reasons.
Aliyev has been in power for almost the
entire post-Soviet history of Azerbaijan since 1991. He
replaced Abulfazal Elchibey in 1993 amid a devastating
war with neighboring Armenia over Azerbaijan's disputed
Armenian-dominated enclave of Nagorno Karabakh. Backed
by the Armenian government, the latter's secessionist
movement eventually took control of the entire enclave
along with areas connecting it to Armenia.
In
late 1992 Azerbaijan was in a very humiliating
situation. About 20 percent of its territory was under
Armenian control, which resulted in forcible
displacement of over a million Azeris now living as
refugees in other parts of the country. Aliyev's
ascension to power did not change the dismal situation,
although it led to a ceasefire in 1994 without
addressing the conflict's root causes. The ceasefire
left that large territory under Armenian occupation, a
reality lasting to this date. To avoid another round of
war, which will likely engage in one form or another
neighboring Iran, Russia and Turkey, the Kharabkhis who
rule over the territory have declined to unify it with
Armenia. This was the main reason for the initiation of
the dispute in 1988 when Azerbaijan and Armenia were
both Soviet republics.
Being militarily weaker,
Azerbaijan, whose population is about three times as
large as that of Armenia (about 2 million), has failed
to find a peaceful solution to end the dispute. There is
a growing call for a military solution to end the
no-war-no-peace situation mainly, but not exclusively,
by the Azeri refugees who have lost all their properties
and lived in a dismal situation for over a decade. Fear
of another probable humiliating defeat and the lack of
support for such drastic measure among the neighbors
concerned about its predicable destabilizing effect have
so far prevented a war. Yet this situation may not last,
given a growing impatience with the status quo in both
countries.
Unlike neighboring Armenia,
Azerbaijan is blessed with oil, which could help it
build a prosperous country. However, this is yet to be
achieved as Baku's annual oil exports are still limited.
The generated revenue is simply not adequate to meet the
numerous number of social, economic and infrastructural
problems created because of the sudden independence and
the transitional process from the Soviet state economy
to a form of free enterprise. Rampant corruption among
the ruling elite, including the Aliyev family, has
worsened the situation by limiting the available funds
to address various deficiencies. This has reflected in
lowering living standards, growing poverty, expanding
social problems and crimes and a decrease in
government-provided services, to name a few.
To
this picture, one should add the monopolization of
political and economic power in the hands of a small
circle of elite known as the Nakhjevanis. The latter and
their associates led by Aliyev have dominated just about
all aspects of life in the country. To maintain its
power, the ruling elite has resorted to authoritarianism
with all its in-built human rights abuses.
Against this background, growing dissatisfaction
among the Azeris is simply a logical consequence. This
has been evident in various forms of political dissent
(eg, anti-government media and demonstrations) and in
the rise of secular and religious opposition groups. The
Aliyevs' growing intolerance of dissent has only
contributed to its expansion.
The fragile
political and social situation, which is prone to
instability, has created grounds for concerns about
Aliyev's succession inside and outside the political
system. Led by Aliyev, the ruling party portrays him as
a necessity for stability because of his ability to put
the country together. Accordingly, the election of any
other candidate would result in chaos and war not only
in Azerbaijan, but also in the entire Caucasus. Of
course, this argument seems nothing more than a
self-serving ploy to ensure his re-election by securing
the allegiance of the elite concerned about the collapse
of the fragile political system whose legitimacy is
descending.
As an experienced high-ranking
Soviet politician, Aliyev has managed to remain in power
and to stabilize the country by creating a consensus
among the divided elite, while keeping the opposition
forces divided and weak through various legal and
illegal methods. However, this is a fragile stability
achieved not by eliminating sources of instability and
war, but by muting them. The ignored unresolved
economic, political and social problems have helped
foster opposition, which, in the absence of an
environment for peaceful expression of dissent, is
heading towards violence as the only available means to
achieve the desired political changes. Also, the
unresolved territorial dispute with Armenia has
frustrated both sides, a recipe for the resumption of
war as the seemingly only means to end the prolonged
conflict, one way or another.
Aliyev's decision
to run is controversial, though expected. Having served
two terms, he is disqualified for another term according
to Azerbaijan's constitution, a barrier removed through
constitutional juggling. It is also controversial as the
octogenarian president is in obvious poor health. This
spring he passed out twice during a televised speech.
His well-known efforts to make his son, Ilham, the new
president have not been very successful, given his lack
of credentials for the position. This failure has forced
Aliyev to run to maintain his power and influence.
When Aliyev is out of the political scene for
one reason or another, a succession crisis could well
serve as a trigger to destabilize the country. In the
absence of a candidate acceptable to all the contending
elite and to those growing forces challenging it from
outside, a vacuum of power caused by a weak president,
including Ilham, would likely let loose all social and
political grievances suppressed by the president.
Despite a predictable defeat, the frustration of
the Azeris with their country's partial occupation for
which no end is in sight and/or a desire to detract the
Azeris' attention from hard-to-address domestic problems
could result in a war with Armenia. This is an appealing
scenario among many Armenians equally frustrated with
the no-war-no-peace situation. Based on the existing
pattern of friendship of Azerbaijan (with Turkey and the
United States) and Armenia (with Iran and Russia), the
entire Caucasus and its neighbors could be pulled in
some form into a military conflict with the potential
for rapid escalation. This is a conceivable, but not
inevitable, scenario owing to a concern in Moscow and
Tehran about the growing American and Turkish presence
in that region and the rumor on an American plan to use
it for an attack on its "rogue" neighbor (Iran).
Dr Hooman Peimani works as an
independent consultant with international organizations
in Geneva and does research in international
relations.
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