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The ghost of
Greater Afghanistan
By Jonathan
Feiser
The Durand Line, ratified in 1893 by Sir
Mortimer Durand, established the geopolitical
architecture that sought to stabilize a clear security
risk to British interests: the Pashtun tribes of the
Indian frontier. At the time, the Durand Line
represented the border between Afghanistan and British
India, and then later became the boundary between
Afghanistan and Pakistan after the partition of 1947.
Today, the United States finds itself in a similar
position to that of the British Empire before it: faced
with a situation in which military expansion is
necessary to establish national security. In this light,
the geopolitical as well as the symbolic value of the
Durand Line is not lost on the United States.
On
a strategic level, this artificial border tore the
tribal Pashtuns in half. Moreover, with the expansion of
great-power interests and the resulting conflicts, the
line eventually evolved into a politicized border
region, housing religious fundamentalists and secular
terrorist groups alike.
In light of recent
events in Afghanistan, it is probable that deeper roots
of friction are at work along wobbly ethnic, historical
and tribal fault lines. In truth, this friction and the
momentum it spurs ape Afghanistan's sacred history.
Hence, even on Afghanistan's overly speedy quest toward
a democracy envisaged by Western rulers, this
unremitting cycle of shifting tribal loyalties and
regional alignments generally continues unabated. In
hindsight, these various factions were quite helpful in
jettisoning the Taliban from power. But, in the
following vacuum, such tribal systems are clear agents
of decentralization when recuperation and centralization
are what is needed.
On a functional level,
Afghanistan cannot be subjectively examined under the
Western conception of either a state or a nation. The
country simply does not operate in any sense of either
definition at this time. Both a limited security
apparatus and stalled international support have done
little to cultivate ancient divisions based on ethnic
and religious elements. In regard to the US "war on
terror" and domestic efforts employed pursuant to
nation-building, these divisions continue to maintain
and harass internal efforts and strengthen critiques of
US policy.
Moreover, the very nature of the
resilient warlord system finds a continued modus
operandi uncannily similar to the support networks
that operated throughout the Soviet occupation. Thus, in
the very same historical pattern that kept change's
progress locked in reverse throughout the past three
decades, Afghanistan continues to resemble a
discombobulated chessboard based on a thesis of
revolving alignments and agendas and intrastate power
politics.
In this confusing quest for progress,
desperately needed foreign investment - not merely
subsidized aid from non-governmental organizations -
remains a critical and consistent requirement for
Afghanistan's future. Hence, if such aid is not
forthcoming, present conditions in Afghanistan will
continue to represent the combination of factors that
inhibit foreign investment and frustrate efficient
fiscal and monetary policies.
In this regard,
the recent violence toward the Pakistani Embassy more
accurately represents a symptom, rather than a cause, of
the contention that lies beneath the political borders
of Central and South Asia. On the ground, this pent-up
powder keg of human frustration directed toward Pakistan
may additionally represent a growing friction between
ethnic groups, specifically the Pashtuns and their
northern Tajik and Uzbek contemporaries.
Throughout the years, this trend has
consistently represented a plethora of security issues
that place the United States in an unenvied predicament
historically occupied by the Persians, Sikhs, Soviets
and British. Moreover, the near-war between Pakistan and
Afghanistan over the liberated incarnation of
"Pashtunistan" in 1961 exerts itself as a pre-September
11, 2001, reminder that ethical conflict remains a
historically accurate characteristic that has long
fueled regional contention.
In the modern global
context, while lacking any serious consideration for a
true security presence and cemented systems of checks
and balances, the historical marriage of internal
conflict and external support continues to reign as a
deadlocked default option. Consequently, the necessities
that compromise economic restructuring and a foreign
investment that fails to circumvent regional warlords
will continue to exist as standard operating procedure.
In sum, although the Taliban are no longer part
of the spectrum of threats, Afghanistan continues to
remain a country hopelessly tangled in a relentless war
against itself. Despite the early Pyrrhic efforts of
Ahmad Shad Durrani, Afghanistan evolved as a nation
forged by the security interests and defense mechanisms
of other powers. Thus, this birth contributed little
value to the concept or generational transfusion of
nationalism.
Today, the country remains infected
with competing interstate factions, with external
support bases, which continue to retain their holds on
power politically and militarily. In due course, the
consequences of these trajectories may ultimately
undermine both the conduit of Afghani nationalism, thus
denying its people both a plausible foundation of
infrastructure and the federalization to support it.
Finally, in terms of Afghanistan, the United States
faces a challenge that befell many world powers before
it: defining the formula that simultaneously balances
the often incorrectly perceived means of "colonialism"
with the often unnoticed means of national security.
It is in this challenge that the administration
of US President George W Bush must pivot while
concurrently and successfully selling this policy vision
to proponents and critics alike.
Published
with permission of the Power and
Interest News Report, an analysis-based
publication that seeks to provide insight into various
conflicts, regions and points of interest around the
globe. All comments should be directed to content@pinr.com
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