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Warning shot for Turkey's
military
By K
Gajendra Singh
Turkish President Ahmet Necdet
Sezer, a former head of the Constitutional Court, signed
into law this week a harmonization package that was
passed by Turkey's parliament last week. It will help
bring the country closer to Europe Union (EU) norms in
preparation for an EU decision towards the end of next
year on Ankara being given an accession date to talk
about joining the body.
The package, on paper,
rolls back the hitherto decisive political role of the
Turkish armed forces, almost to the levels of the 1950s.
That move more than 50 years ago led in June 1960 to the
country's first military coup, undertaken to oust the
conservative Democrat Party government, whose
leadership, the army believed, had gone astray.
The armed forces consider themselves the
guardians of the secular republic and custodians of the
legacy of Kemal Ataturk, who forged the Turkish nation
in 1923 out of the ashes of the Ottoman empire.
Leaders and the media in European capitals have
praised the latest reforms, and the 15-nation EU
welcomed the changes, but said that it would closely
watch how they were implemented on the ground. Since
last year, many senior EU officials have openly demanded
that Turkish politics be freed from the military's
influence, and its laws aligned to match European
constitutions for it to qualify for entry into the
union.
The reforms reduce the military's hold
over the National Security Council (NSC), an influential
body of military and political leaders that is often
used by the army top brass to impose their will on the
government. The measures stress that the council will in
future be strictly an advisory body, with no executive
powers. The number of times that the council meets will
be limited, and a civilian will be allowed to head its
secretariat, rather than a general. Further, greater
parliamentary scrutiny of military expenses will be
introduced.
Not surprisingly, the armed forces
are unhappy with the reform package. The changes were
discussed a few days ago at a senior military meeting,
where top generals criticized Prime Minister Recep Tayep
Erdogan and his defense minister, Vecdi Gonul. Erdogan
has agreed to let a lieutenant-general continue to head
the NSC secretariat for a year.
Politicians from
the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), which
has Islamist roots, earlier challenged the dismissal of
18 military officers for their alleged Islamic
proclivities, but finally they backed off. However,
Erdogan did cancel the customary banquet in honor of the
generals as his bringing his wife, who would have worn a
Muslim headdress, could have caused another crisis.
This week, General Cetin Dogan, a top army
commander, accused Erdogan of undermining Turkey's armed
forces and trying to change the secular regime, the
daily Cumhuriyet reported. A military official, speaking
on condition of anonymity, confirmed the report. "Forces
that will not allow any change in the secular structure
of Turkey will act together," Dogan said, according to
Cumhuriyet. "If needed, the army and the nation will
achieve the result hand in hand. You are benefiting from
the Turkish people's love for the EU. One day, you will
pay for it," Cumhuriyet quoted Dogan as saying. "Don't
assume that this force will be a coup. This will be the
Turkish people."
Such sentiment shows that the
armed forces will not give in easily, although they will
have to walk a delicate line as joining the EU has
overwhelming support among Turks, and almost all
political parties, more so the secular parties. Thus, if
it is necessary to rein in the army as a condition to
joining the EU, people will accept it as a tradeoff for
being accepted into Europe. Further, accession to the EU
is also part of Ataturk's legacy that Turkey attain
contemporary (European) civilization.
Ironically, and perhaps dangerously, these
drastic changes in the Turkish political system have
been introduced by the AKP, a party whose leadership has
emerged from Turkey's openly Islamist parties, which
were banned in the past. For the first time in the
secular republic of Turkey, the AKP won a massive
two-thirds majority in last November's national
elections, receiving 34 percent of the votes cast.
Erdogan was jailed for several months in 1999
for reciting a poem at a political rally that said,
"Minarets are our bayonets, domes are our helmets,
mosques are our barracks, believers are our soldiers."
As a result of this conviction, he was barred from
taking a parliamentary seat, but managed to do so after
the constitution was changed.
Changing role
of the National Security Council
Following a coup
in 1960, the 1961 constitution transformed the earlier
innocuous National Defense High Council into the
National Security Council. The president of the
republic, instead of the prime minister, was made its
chairperson, and "representatives" of the army, navy,
air force and the police became its members, apart from
the prime minister and four other ministers. The council
became a constitutional body and offered "information"
to the Council of Ministers (cabinet) concerning the
internal and external security of the country. After
constitutional amendments following the 1971-1973
military intervention, it has submitted its
"recommendations" to the Council of Ministers.
The 1982 constitution, a less liberal product
and the result of the 1980-1983 military intervention,
further strengthened the NSC's role by obliging the
Council of Ministers to give priority to its
recommendations. Threats from military members of the
NSC made then premier Suleyman Demirel resign in 1971,
and the first-ever Islamist premier, Necmettin Erbakan,
then heading a coalition with a secular party, was
forced to leave in 1997 for not curbing increasing
fundamentalism in Turkey. Both times, direct military
takeovers were avoided. The military intervened directly
in 1960 and 1980 when politicians had brought the
country to an impasse. But after cleaning up the mess
and getting a new constitution in place, the armed
forces, as usual, returned to their barracks.
The Turkish armed forces have traditionally
enjoyed total autonomy in their affairs. Their chief of
general Staff (CGS) ranks after only the prime minister,
and along with the president forms the troika that rules
the country. Up to now, that is.
Turkey's
Europe Union aspirations
Turkey signed a customs
union agreement with the EU in 1996. Prior to the latest
package, in its efforts to join the EU, Turkey has
carried out a series of constitutional amendments to
conform to EU norms, specially since the beginning of
last year to prepare for the EU's summit in December of
that year but which ended in disappointment for the
Turks as they were not even given a date for accession
talks.
Thus, many reforms were carried out
before the AKP was unexpectedly catapulted into power in
November. But the AKP has hastened the process, both to
assure Europeans and the US that it should be viewed as
a conservative party rather than an Islamic one, and
that it is as keen as other secular parties to take
Turkey into Europe and closer to the West.
But
with its Islamic antecedents, it is not fully trusted,
neither at home nor abroad. Since taking power the AKP
has tried to diminish the role of the military members
in the NSC by appointing many deputy prime ministers,
thus raising civilian numbers in the body. Deputy
premiers were traditionally appointed during coalition
regimes to give voices to all parties.
And now
the AKP has managed to further curb the military by
pushing the critical 6th and 7th harmonization packages
through parliament - and got away with it. Erbakan was
forced out of power by the armed forces and the
judiciary in 1997, and all Islamist parties banned.
The Turkish government has already passed a
string of laws that will improve prisoners' rights and
make it far less likely for Turks to be prosecuted for
crimes of self-expression, routinely deemed by judges
that they abet terrorism or undermine the secular state.
For instance, asking for the use of Kurdish language
rights has often been considered a breach of law as it
amounted to encouraging the breakup of the state. On
that account alone, thousands over the years, including
famous writers, have been jailed.
On August 5,
President Sezer approved an amnesty law for Kurdish
rebels who have been engaged in a vicious separatist war
in the southeast of the country. The law, adopted by
parliament, offers a pardon for Kurdish rebels who lay
down their arms and surrender and who have not committed
any violent crimes. It also envisages reducing the jail
sentences of those already imprisoned for violent acts,
provided that they give the authorities information
about their underground activities.
The amnesty
is aimed mainly at rebels of the Kurdistan Workers Party
(PKK) - now renamed Kadek - and is valid for six months.
Kurdish rebels have fought a bloody war in southeast
Turkey since 1984 in which more than 36,000 people have
been killed, including 5,000 soldiers. Though Kadek
announced a ceasefire in 1999 following the capture of
its leader Abdullah Ocalan, some 5,000 rebels are
believed to be still holed up in mountain bases in
northern Iraq. Ankara believes that around 2,000 rebels
will qualify for the amnesty. However, senior leaders
and commanders of Kadek have been excluded from it.
Turkey's human rights record has been equally
bad, especially torture in prisons and police stations.
Foreign and domestic human rights watchers are
cautiously hopeful that new laws already passed will
gradually reduce, and eventually eradicate, this
practice. But politicians, diplomats and human rights
campaigners admit that laws are one thing, their
implementation is quite another. So far, very few
officials involved in torture have actually been brought
to book and fundamental changes on the ground are not
yet evident.
Turks and the AKP government
believe that even if the European Union's monitors issue
a positive progress report this October, it will be even
more crucial for Turkey's chances of joining the union
that the clutch of new laws enacted in the past year are
seen to be fully implemented. Turkey believes that if
further progress can be shown, a date will finally be
given for formal negotiations to begin to join the EU,
possibly at the end of next year.
After that, if
all goes well, Turkey might realistically become a full
member in anything from three to eight years, given that
Spain took eight years. Even within this long timeframe,
though, a sea-change in the national psyche will have to
take place. More than that, a restructuring in the
attitude of the "Christian Club" called the EU will have
to take place as well.
What is happening now
between the AKP and the EU almost appears like a
charade, but in the worst-case scenario, any improvement
in the rule of law in Turkey will be a positive outcome.
The bottom line has been made very clear by the EU's
elder statesman and former president of France, Valery
Giscard d'Estaing, who has produced a conceptual
framework for the EU's constitution.
He
expressed his view (and perhaps that of many others in
the EU), that Turkey is not in Europe, its culture is
different and Turkey's entry would be the end of EU. But
on the other hand, the EU does not want the Islamists to
become stronger at the expense of a million well-trained
armed forces, which are a stabilizing factor in the
region. If and when Europe develops an independent
military strike force, it will need the Turkish armed
forces and a secular Turkey between itself and the
boiling cauldrons of Islamic fundamentalism in the
Middle East, further stirred by the US invasion of Iraq.
Tensions in Turkish polity
The Turkish
armed forces and many in the secular establishment
consider Islamic revivalism and the Kurdish rebellion
the two major threats to the security, stability and
integrity of the state. But many reports and studies
since 1990 indicate that neither Kurdish nationalism nor
Islamic fundamentalism pose a threat to the republican
order.
Rather, vested interests among the elite
are at the root of the problem, with the excuses of
Islamism and Kurdish rebellion used for perpetuating
these interests, while also citing the need to protect
Ataturk's unitary and secular state.
Most Kurds
simply want respect for their identity, the use of the
Kurdish language for education and television and in
cultural matters. The Kurdish rebellion has been under
control since the 1999 ceasefire and the commuting of
the death sentence to life imprisonment on Abdullah
Ocalan. But during this period, when reforms were being
debated, many instances of attacks by residual Kurdish
rebels were exaggerated and commented on in sympathetic
media.
Simmering tensions between Turkey's
secular elite and the AKP started building immediately
after the latter's electoral triumph last November.
These were kept under check because of Turkey's
preoccupation with other important matters - an
admission date into the EU, a United Nations-led attempt
to resolve the Cyprus problem between Turkey and Greece,
and differences with the US over Turkey joining in the
war against Iraq.
When Turkey refused its ally
use of bases in southeast Turkey to open a second front
against Iraq, there was much public exchange of
differences and admonitions between Washington and
Ankara. And the dust had barely settled when Turkish
soldiers were seized by US forces in Sulaimaniya in
northern Iraq, taking US-Turkish relations to rock
bottom levels.
After the AKP's electoral
victory, the armed forces kept quiet for some time, but
they did make it clear that they would safeguard the
secular republic. The first battlelines were drawn at
the end of April when President Sezer and the top
military brass led by Chief of General Staff General
Hilmi Ozkok refused to attend a reception at parliament
given by its speaker, Bulent Arinc of the AKP, as
hostess Munnever Arinc would wear Muslim headgear.
The opposition, left of center Republican
People's Party (RPP) also boycotted the reception. Since
the establishment of the secular republic in 1923,
Ottoman and Islamic dresses have been forbidden in
public places. Many an Islamist woman has lost her job
or place in university, and some women their seats in
parliament, for defying this provision.
The
importance of fights over Islamic symbols cannot be
underestimated. The military and secular elite take note
of attempts by AKP members to use Islamic symbols. The
wives of AKP leaders like Erdogan (even when he was the
mayor of Istanbul), Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul and
others avoid attending state functions as they would
have to do so with uncovered heads. The daughter of
Erdogan and a few others study in the US, where they can
wear scarves.
On April 30, a statement issued
after a meeting of the National Security Council
underlined secularism as one of the basic pillars of the
Turkish republic. Reiterating that its vigilant
protection cannot be over-emphasized, it urged the AKP
government to protect the secular state.
Apart
from the clash over scarves, other differences have
cropped up: the appointment of AKP cadres with Islamic
leanings to official positions; a plan to amend the law
governing higher education and proposals for radical
changes in the constitution. A few months ago, the
Foreign Ministry sent a circular to its embassies abroad
to support schools that have Islamist agendas.
The AKP also wants to consolidate and expand its
vote. Its backers are upwardly mobile conservative
trading and industrial classes from central Anatolian
towns such as Kayseri, Konya and beyond, and they want a
share in the economic cake. This clashes with the vested
interests of the supporters of the secular
establishment. The AKP has also established commissions
to probe corruption among politicians, which is likely
to trap many of them and weaken political parties other
than the AKP, which has a clean slate and an untarnished
reputation to date.
Last year, some AKP leaders
publicly criticized the armed forces for its dismissal
during its annual reshuffle of officers with Islamic
proclivities and connections, a practice that has been
in place since the establishment of the secular
republic. The armed forces enjoy autonomy in their
internal matters and are very sensitive about it. The
AKP, like all political parties, has attempted to
strengthen its position in the establishment and help
its supporters, and will continue to do so.
Turkey and US bases
One subject on
which the AKP government (if not the party and the
people) and the armed forces agreed was to allow the US
bases for its troops in southeast Turkey. But a motion
to this effect, even with the full support of the
government, but with 90 percent of Turks opposing war on
Muslim Iraq and huge crowds protesting outside
parliament and elsewhere, failed to pass muster in the
House.
The armed forces, with a half century of
association with the US defense establishment, left the
decision to the politicians at the time of the vote, but
later publicly extended their full support to the
government motion. General Ozkok explained that any
expression of preference by the military on the motion,
which was narrowly defeated by three votes, would have
been construed as interference in the working of
parliament. Many AKP supporters in the media then
circulated rumors that while the AKP was in favor (of
granting bases) the military did not pull its full
weight. A second vote was never tabled, for reasons that
are still unclear. The Byzantine tradition of intrigue
and conspiracy tends to seep up during such critical
times.
Rise of Islamic
parties
Turkey's constitution describes the
country as a laic (secular) state, which,
according to many, is more Jacobin than genuinely
secular. It is based on the nationalist philosophy of
Zia Gokalp, a Kurd, who unfortunately used for
laic the words la din (anti-religion).
After the founding of the republic in 1923, the
Christian minorities were exchanged with Turks from
Greece and the remaining squeezed out later; the few
left in the southeast are leaving now. So the concept of
secularism in Turkey has somehow become anti-religion
and negative, and tends to become anti this or anti that
and intolerant. The Sunni-dominated police establishment
has regularly harassed the Shi'ite Alevis and the Kurds,
who normally vote for leftist secular parties.
Veteran politician Erbakan established the first
"Islamist" party in Turkey in 1969. It was called the
National Order Party, hinting at Islamic order. When it
was closed in 1971 after the military intervention, he
named its successor the National Salvation Party (like
the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria). When it, too,
was banned, along with other parties after the 1980
military takeover, Erbakan named the next one the
Welfare Party (Zakat for welfare). After it was closed
by law, Erbakan founded the Virtue Party, which was also
closed and a ban put on Erbakan himself from politics in
2001.
Then Erdogan, Abdullah Gul and other
younger leaders set up a new party, the Justice and
Development Party (AKP). With a clean image, Erdogan,
who was a very successful and popular mayor of Istanbul,
has stressed that they have nothing to do now with
Erbakan or his policies. He has not seen Erbakan for
many years. He even avoids any mention of Islam. He has
promised that he will do all he could to facilitate
Turkey's entry into the EU, and has also expressed his
backing for Turkey's relationship with the International
Monetary Fund.
Senior leaders have repeatedly
claimed that the AKP is not a religious party. But a
large number of new and inexperienced AKP deputies have
entered parliament, many friends and officials when
Erdogan was the mayor of Istanbul. This inexperience,
impatience and sudden rise to power shows in the AKP
leadership, including even Erdogan.
There is a
sombre reminder here. The AKP leadership should not let
power go to its head. Premier Adnan Menderes and two of
his colleagues were hanged after their overthrow by the
armed forces in 1960.
Conclusions
Turkey, even 80 years
after Ataturk's sweeping reforms put a secular
constitution in place in 1923, is still vulnerable
politically. The ramifications of the latest
constitutional amendments carry with them the seeds of
deep political turmoil, although, should the AKP and the
armed forces not take extreme positions, there are signs
that democracy can further evolve in the country.
This is obviously of importance to Turkey, but
also to other countries, especially Sunni Islamic ones
struggling to establish democracy on Western models. The
crux of Turkey's challenge is whether it can really
institutionalize its secular constitution when the
ruling political party has Islamic antecedents.
And this against the backdrop of an
ever-vigilant - and somewhat marginalized - armed
forces. Simply putting into place a "democratic"
constitution in a Muslim country does not usher in
democracy and at one swipe banish the soldiers to their
barracks. Indonesia, the world's largest Muslim country,
is an example where the military continues to exert
influence beyond traditional democratic processes.
Pakistan, too, cannot shake the influence of the
military, despite the apparent return to democratic
elections in October last year. Indeed, Pakistan's army
chief, General Pervez Musharraf, also the president, has
created a national security council on the Turkish
model, and which is now enshrined in the constitution.
Religious parties fared exceptionally well in October's
elections, and effectively control two provinces and
constitute the main opposition in the national
parliament. The are agitating for Musharraf to quit as
chief of the armed forces.
So, like Turkey, the
military in Pakistan is under pressure to stay out of
the political arena - although in Pakistan's case the
drive comes from the opposition religious parties, an
increasingly potent force, rather than from the party in
power.
It is common in the West to glibly
recommend that democracy should be adopted in Muslim
cases, the recent example being Iraq. This is perhaps
true, but the long tortuous road to democracy in Islamic
politics should never be underestimated, especially when
a country's armed forces are involved.
K
Gajendra Singh, Indian ambassador (retired), served
as ambassador to Turkey from August 1992 to April 1996.
Prior to that, he served terms as ambassador to Jordan,
Romania and Senegal. He is currently chairman of the
Foundation for Indo-Turkic Studies. Email
Gajendrak@hotmail.com
(Copyright 2003 Asia
Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
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