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Nation-building mental
blocks
B Matthew
Riemer
Though the wars fought in Afghanistan and
Iraq were tactically dissimilar and of varying levels of
intensity, the post-war social, cultural and political
factors at play are very similar. The most relevant and
foundational similarity between the two countries is
their creation: each was cobbled together from a
plethora of local, autonomous/tribal regions into
reluctant wholes in the form of what the conquering
country felt to be a modern nation-state. And for both,
since their involuntary birth, this fact has hampered
their development, as well as posing a deep, historical
puzzle for, first, Great Britain and now the United
States, in their efforts at "nation building".
This predicament - if only in the name of
thoroughness - must eventually elicit a series of
important questions from the concerned observer, some of
which might be:
What are the inherent weaknesses of the
"nation-state" model?
When Washington uses the phrase "nation building",
what does this really imply?
Is the so-called "nation-state" a viable model for
Afghanistan and Iraq?
The US may be uncovering a
troublesome truth in its latest global endeavors: the
fact that the nation-state is not a universal model for
all regions and peoples of the world, and, in some
cases, it may even obstruct the development of the very
stability and select economic development that the US is
seeking through its operations - especially in areas
with a concentration of ethnic diversity, like in the
Balkans, the Caucasus and much of Central Asia, where
state-sized regions more readily stabilize under a
sub-network of autonomous zones defined by some obvious
feature, whether it be ethnic, linguistic or
geographical. The dominant US polity has always
assumed that the keys to American success are the keys
to global success, that what works for them will work
for others. This belief has led many in the US
leadership to think that concepts like democracy and
free market capitalism can be smoothly exported to other
regions and environments and have the same effect that
they had in 18th and 19th century America. This widely
held belief is shared by the Bush administration and has
been explicitly stated in its 2002 National Security
Strategy.
However, unlike modern-day Afghanistan
and Iraq, America, at the time of its founding,
consisted of a single ruling class that came together to
codify the social and economic rules that others would
live by and best continue their prosperity. These
individuals were all wealthy, Caucasian, Christian males
who shared broad and overlapping interests. These
so-called "founding fathers" also decided on their
inherent and inevitable sovereignty and its announcement
at a time and place of their choosing.
This
picture, to even the most casual of observers, paints a
perfect contrast with the countries in which the US is
currently attempting nation building today. Both
countries represent a diverse array of languages,
religions and cultural traditions, while encompassing
regions that were never unified in the sense that a
modern day independent state is. This fact alone
complicates the democratic process to the point of
futility: the biggest obstacle being the interests of
minority groups within any given state.
But this
is a painful reality for Washington to accept as it
greatly affects the continuation of economic paradigms
so cherished throughout the centers of power in the
Western world. If the Bush administration, other
influential world leaders and future US administrations
were to accept a greater amount of regional autonomy in
distant lands - like by letting Iraq splinter into three
independent states or at least autonomous regions - this
would greatly affect the implementation of laws
concerning free trade and deregulation; such political
forms provide infrastructural barriers to the rather
organic growth of free market economies. By being
self-contained and, to a certain degree, self-reliant,
regions where such a process were to take place inhibit
the plans of Washington's economists.
There are
other concerns, however, when hypothetically imagining
the breakup of larger states into multiple smaller ones.
One of the biggest of these fears is the potential shift
in regional power balances. For example, if southern
Iraq were to become its own state completely dominated
by Shi'ites, this would undoubtedly portend some kind of
union with Iran, possibly to the point of annexation on
the part of Tehran. If the Kurds in the north were to
gain their independence, this would ruffle Turkey and
put diplomatic pressure on Washington. This is obviously
not in the interests of the US.
Further
east in Central Asia, reflections on Afghanistan produce
similar results. Though Afghanistan is different from
Iraq in that it has endured failed government after
failed government for decades with regular periods of
anarchy - warlords unconvincingly filling the power
vacuums - while Iraq was ruled consistently by
centralized power. If Afghanistan were to fragment, it
would be more difficult to predict what may happen -
virtually all the warlords have both fought and been
allied with one another at some point. Certainly, the
border between Afghanistan and Pakistan in the south and
east would completely blur if the Pashtuns were to
realize a long-awaited Pashtunistan; in the eyes of
Washington, this would provide an undesirable strategic
boost for Islamabad, despite their partnership in the US
"war on terror". And, like in Iraq, Iran could be
expected to curry favor with those along its border -
Iranian border patrols did skirmish with the Taliban
from time to time - such as the governor of Herat,
Ismail Khan.
Because of such potential for
unpredictable and dangerous events, such state
fragmentation will remain a non-starter for Washington -
market growth, acquisition and stability are just too
much at risk in that kind of environment.
So in
this categorical rejection of new, or perhaps old,
political forms, the US must realize what that rejection
brings to the table: the situation currently faced by
the occupying forces in both Afghanistan and Iraq today.
In both countries, diverse groups with overlapping
agendas are jockeying for position in a post-war context
that features low-intensity guerrilla warfare, an
occupying army, and the marginalization of large
percentages of the population.
It remains a
dubious proposition that both Afghanistan and Iraq can
be shaped into fully functioning and integrated (within
the globalized economic infrastructure) nation-states
capable of long periods of stability, relative peace and
economic growth. The US must decide what it
really wants. Does it want democracy? And if it does, it
must realize what democracy can actually mean in
volatile regions such as Afghanistan and Iraq.
Instability and democracy are not mutually exclusive
conditions - democracy does not equal stability - and
revolution - regardless of what one conceives it to be -
is a democratic expression. Given a true choice, many
people in many countries may feel no solidarity with a
colonially-created "nation".
And if the primary
interests of the US are ones of economic security
through expanded markets in new regions, the leadership
in Washington must expect the degree of resistance to
its efforts that it is now receiving in Eurasia.
Published with permission of the Power and
Interest News Report, an analysis-based
publication that seeks to provide insight into various
conflicts, regions and points of interest around the
globe. All comments should be directed to content@pinr.com
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