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How the Taliban builds its
army
By Syed Saleem Shahzad
CHAMAN, Pakistan-Afghan border - Progress in
science and technology has a direct impact on
battlefields, where missile technology, supreme
aircraft, nuclear bombs, chemical weapons and the like
have changed the dynamics of fighting over the years.
However, despite such advancements in
technology, the human element, notably inspiration,
remains a decisive force in any struggle. The Taliban,
perhaps, realized this a long time ago, and in their
period in power in Afghanistan from 1996-2001 they
placed much emphasis on generating the human resources
that would be committed to their cause.
Immediately after entering the center of Chaman
city, located in Pakistan's Balochistan province in
southwest Pakistan right on the border with Afghanistan,
a road curves left into the dusty distance. It leads to
a chain of villages scattered along the border, some in
Pakistan, some in Afghanistan, some spread across both
countries, and all staunchly Pashtun - and tribal -
before anything else.
Chaman, although not a
particularly pretty city, especially at this time of the
year when the dust swirls down its streets from the
surrounding barren mountains and plains, is a busy one.
Its large markets are full of cheap, mostly smuggled,
electronic goods, ranging from lap-top computers to
satellite and mobile phones. The city has several
markets just for stolen cars, while the local Mafia
types ride around in style as if Chaman were the Las
Vegas of the East.
But the left curve from the
heart of Chaman takes one to a different world, the
world of dozens of tiny villages along the border,
which, according to one Akram of the Edhi Welfare Trust
Center in Chaman, are too numerous to be counted. Edhi
is one of Pakistan's largest non-government
organizations.
"I have been posted here for
several years. I roam all around the villages looking
for relief work, such as providing ambulances in the
case of accidents, first aid work, distribution for
charities and such things. I would simply say that there
may be hundreds of villages, but I cannot give you the
exact number as there are no records available.
Sometimes the villages are situated in the mountains,
and sometimes in the plains, half in Afghanistan, half
in Pakistan," says Akram.
Village life is
extremely traditional. However, the people of these
areas have a reputation for being clever operators in
trade and business, although their cultural life is
completely guided by what they are taught by their
mullahs.
Says Akram, "My experiences with the
Edhi Center in Chaman have been very bad. It is a
completely mullah-dominated society. If you live in
Karachi [from where Akram hails] you know that people
trust our [Edhi] services all over Pakistan, we give
most of the donations we receive to our trust. Here, our
experience is different. You will know that
fitrana for example, [a fee that all Muslims pay
to a needy person before saying their Eid, a major
Muslim festival, prayers] comes to 300 rupees [US$5].
Similarly, the number of sacrificial animal skins - cows
or goats - comes to seven. Here in Chaman, even these
seven skins and the 300 rupees are donated by army
officers posted in Chaman, not by the local people. And
then these entire donations go to the Islamic
seminaries. Here the people say that their lives and
deaths are with the mullahs, not with you people."
In this tribal society there is of course both
prosperity and poverty. The more children a family has,
the more the economic burden on the breadwinner, usually
just the head of the house. In this environment Islamic
seminaries (madrassas) provide an ideal way out
for providing education, especially when the ideology
they provide is already accepted in the community. These
institutions offer lodging, food, facilities and an
education, all for free, and in some cases even pay
their students a stipend for pocket money. No wonder
that they are popular.
Commented a local leader
of the Pashtunka Awami Party, who is doctor by
profession, on condition of anonymity, "Before the
Taliban emerged there used to be a few Islamic
seminaries, and they were unable to meet their
day-to-day expenditures. The mullahs used to send the
students from door to door to collect meals twice a day
for both the mullahs and the students.
"But
after the emergence of Taliban the situation changed
upside down. The Taliban heavily influenced the politics
of the area, and the people were influenced by their
Islamic ideologies. As a result, donations were showered
on the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam, [a Pakistani organization
ideologically associated with the Taliban movement],
which then established a network of Islamic schools and
which had huge funds to operate them. Now, some times in
a single village, there are two Islamic seminaries, and
I think the total number in Chaman and the villages
around it comes to 200, with at least 50 students in
each seminary."
The doctor adds, "This is the
real fuel for the Taliban [resistance] movement in
Afghanistan, and for the only fighters for the Taliban."
Maulana Noor Mohammed, the chief of the
Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam in Quetta, and a member of the
national assembly, confirms, "Yes! This is truly where
all the big Taliban leaders got their education, from
the seminaries in Chaman and in the madrassas
situated in nearby villages. Then they went to Akora
Khattack in North-West Frontier Province, where they
learnt higher religious education."
The Taliban
and their supporting parties in Pakistan have invested
everything in this region. At the time that the Taliban
faced the crunch in Afghanistan (driven out of power in
late 2001 and on the run thereafter) their
madrassas around Chaman remained well guarded
against ideological impurity and outside influences.
This investment has paid off, as now the seminaries that
dot both sides of the border provide the best fodder for
the resistance movement.
It has not always been
like this. In the initial days of the Taliban movement
in the late 1980s, it was not the border areas but the
seminaries situated in the cities that predominated.
These included key ones in Karachi - Binori Town and
Jamia Farooqia, and in Lahore - Jamia Ashrafia.
Similarly, there were important seminaries in Peshawar,
Akora Khattack and Quetta, which all played a pivotal
role in building up the Taliban movement until it was
strong enough to intervene in Afghanistan and seize
power in 1996. Even in the middle stages of the Taliban
movement, after the Taliban captured the capital Kabul
and fought for Mazar-i-Sharif in the north, leader
Mullah Omar appealed to the Pakistani Taliban (literally
students of Islamic seminaries) to join hands with their
Afghan counterparts.
Subsequently, though, after
Pakistan reversed its support of the Taliban at the
insistence of the United States and its "war on terror",
affairs in the city madrassas were closely
monitored and controlled, and it would be extremely
difficult now for any students to cross over into
Afghanistan to join in the Taliban's war of resistance
against foreign troops.
One can only believe
that the Taliban foresaw this development. Maybe not. In
any case, the seminaries that now flourish around Chaman
have more than adequately filled the void of their city
counterparts.
And, crucially, they have in their
advantage, because of their history and their remote
location, that they are well beyond the writ of either
the Pakistani or the Afghan governments. They will thus
continue to serve as feeders for the Taliban in
Afghanistan for a long time to come.
(Copyright
2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved.
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