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Time running out for
Afghanistan
By Arun Sahgal
NEW DELHI - In all fairness, it would be rather
inappropriate to judge the prevailing situation in
Afghanistan by norms relevant to more settled countries.
Despite sporadic violence, persistent terrorist
activities by the reorganized cadres of al-Qaeda and the
Taliban, operating mostly from safe sanctuaries in
Pakistan, and competing clashes among warlords, the
country is at peace by its own standards, though it is
hardly a haven of tranquility.
There is a
general feeling of deja vu among the drafters of the
Bonn Plan and the World Bank on the broad reconstruction
strategy and efforts at stimulating the private sector
in Afghanistan, which has been ravaged for so many years
by war. On the political front, interim President Hamid
Karzai has generally been able to ride the initial storm
- in Kabul at least - and has been successful in keeping
the disparate groups that constitute his government
together, and in laying down the framework for
infrastructural development. Kabul is slowly being
converted into a showpiece of modern Afghanistan.
However, behind these commendable achievements
exists a lurking fear of growing instability and chaos
characterized by the worsening security situation, the
failing economy and mounting angst of the people at the
lack of grassroots development and reforms. According to
cynics, things have not gotten better so much as less
bad.
Euphoria that came with the liberation from
the Taliban at the end of 2001 has more or less
evaporated, giving way to concern and a sense of
despondency. Karzai, who has a mandate to rule until
next June, is increasingly facing competing pressure
from various ethnic interests and hardliners within his
government. On the positive side, there is growing
recognition among different constituents within the
government that the maintenance of internal stability is
imperative for their own and the country's survival.
Extra-regional players such as Russia, China and
Iran and neighbors in Central Asia are also beginning to
acknowledge this need, with the sole exception of
Pakistan.
Consequently, the dominant Tajik
faction headed by Defense Minister Qaasim Faheem, with
Interior Minister Yunus Qanooni as the brains behind
him, is beginning to acknowledge the fact that even with
the support of other minorities such as the Hazaras and
Uzbeks, they can at best be "kingmakers", and that a
Pashtun should traditionally head the government.
It is in this perspective that moderate, urbane
and US-supported expatriate Hamid Karzai fits the bill
perfectly. The fact that he has no mass support base
enhances his attractiveness as a figurehead.
Consolidating various factions, and providing stability
to the country and uniting them under the banner of a
new "national front", has been initiated largely at the
instance of the Tajik faction led by Qanooni.
In
the process, an attempt is being made to sideline former
Afghan president Buhrranuddin Rabbani and obtain support
of the country's warlords. That some important warlords
have endorsed this political process lends credence to
some sort of accommodation in terms of functional
autonomy or acceptance of a loose federal structure
under the new constitution, scheduled to be adopted next
month at a loya jirga (grand council).
Impetus for the political process is also being
provided by an increasing realization of the need to
neutralize fundamentalist elements and give stability
and security a chance. Successes of these moves,
however, are contingent on the support of the Americans
and them forgetting their traditional suspicion of
Tajiks.
Political moves notwithstanding, at the
functional level, differences between moderate and
expatriate Pashtun elements led by Karzai and the
Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance remain, which is
relegating governance in Afghanistan to a power play
between competing regional warlords and their external
supporters. This is allowing a regrouping of the Taliban
and al-Qaeda after a substantial breakdown of law and
order, particularly in provincial areas. It is vitally
important that this premature jockeying for power among
various factions be avoided and conditions created for
upholding democratic practices that bring peace and
stability and which in turn strengthen Karzai's
position.
On the security front, the situation
is fast deteriorating. Pakistan is back at its old game
of causing instability through the Inter-Services
Intelligence. The regrouping of the Taliban and al-Qaeda
along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and the increasing
intensity of trans-border clashes exemplify this. Media
and other inputs point to close coordination and
orchestration by jihadi groups led by the
Jaish-e-Mohammad and operating out of madrassas
(religious schools) in Quetta and North-West Frontier
Province in Pakistan.
Another disturbing trend
is Pakistani attempts to dominate contiguous eastern and
southern provinces by making them dependent both
economically and in terms of security. Iran, too,
appears to be following this Pakistani practice on its
eastern borders.
The delay in fully raising the
Afghan National Army is exacerbating this situation. The
Americans, who have the overall responsibility, have
made a beginning by training a batch of 2,000-odd
soldiers. However, the situation is complicated by
delays in the assimilation of Northern Alliance troops
into the army, at US insistence. As a quid pro quo,
Faheem is unwilling to accept US-trained troops. This
situation is obviously affecting operations against the
Taliban.
The economic development and
reconstruction process, which could have provided the
impetus and acted as a socially stabilizing factor, has
remained generally non-existent. Almost all development
activity is centered on the capital Kabul. The
precariousness of the situation can be gauged from the
fact that three-quarters of the country's livestock have
died; large parts of the country remain inaccessible by
road. Different ministers want projects, resources and
money to flow to their areas to help their kinsmen.
Warlords such as General Rashid Dostum and Ismail Khan
are busy siphoning off customs revenue at source,
sending only a fraction to Kabul.
Narcotics are
back with a vengeance. Estimates indicate that opium
smuggling accounts for US$1.2 billion in illegal
exports. More than 2,000 tonnes of opium was reportedly
harvested in 2002, which is a 15-fold increase from
Taliban years. Sadly, a return to the 1970s when
Afghanistan grew enough staple crops to feed itself is
unlikely as long as high-yield poppies hold sway.
This overall situation, if not adequately
addressed, may come to a head during the loya
jirga in October. The whole exercise runs the risk
of becoming an unabashed attempt by various ethnic
groups and their supporters to jockey for power and
consolidate control over their respective regions, which
could result in the balkanization of Afghanistan.
This fast-deteriorating situation needs to be
addressed immediately. Failure could send Afghanistan
back into total instability and chaos. The shifting US
focus on the deteriorating situation in Iraq is further
aggravating the situation.
Afghanistan should
not be abandoned nor allowed to become a pawn in the
great game. An international consensus, by engaging all
regional players, on the collective need for stability
and security in Afghanistan is imperative. The dominant
message of a "hands-off approach" must emerge so that
neither regional interests nor external forces will be
allowed to destabilize the territorial integrity and
polity of Afghanistan.
Arun Sahgal is
the first director of Net Assessment, an office
responsible for long-term strategic assessments in
India's Joint Staff.
(Copyright 2003 Asia
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