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Moscow's cosy Saudi
connection
By Stephen Blank
In early September Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah
made the first visit by a Saudi head of state to Moscow.
During this visit the two sides reached agreement on a
series of issues with important meaning for the Caucasus
and Central Asia. This visit clearly was something of a
watershed because Moscow had regularly blamed Saudi
Wahhabism for being one of the ideological and financial
sources of terrorism in these regions and had challenged
Saudi leadership in the oil market during 2002-03.
Therefore these agreements have significance
beyond the two governments' bilateral relationships.
Certainly they signal an attempt at rapprochement,
particularly from Riyadh. And they also show that Moscow
harvested the largest gains from this rapprochement,
whereby Saudi Arabia is essentially trying to cut its
real and potential losses in both the "war on terrorism"
and the global oil economy. These agreements duly point
to important changes in world affairs triggered by the
war in Iraq and the spread of Islamic fundamentalist
terrorism.
Abdullah's visit to Moscow,
therefore, represents more than just an unprecedented
visit by a Saudi leader to Moscow, the two sides'
rapprochement includes as well significant implications
for the Caucasus and Central Asia. Previously, both
sides had had bad relations. Moscow had regularly and
not without foundation charged Riyadh with being both an
ideological and financial sponsor of terrorism in
Chechnya and Central Asia. At the same time, the new
Russia-US entente looked like it was becoming a vehicle
for Russia to challenge Saudi leadership of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and OPEC's
power to set international oil prices.
This
visit represents the burial of these hatchets. And
Russia gained the most by far from this rapprochement.
Clearly the Saudis have learned from the earlier attacks
in May 2003 by al-Qaeda in Riyadh that their financial
sponsorship of organizations that covered for al-Qaeda
did not protect them from its fury. As a result they
have clamped down domestically on terrorist groups and
tried to return back to closer ties with Washington
regarding terrorism, at least insofar as it affects
Saudi rule at home.
Thus Abdullah denounced the
Chechens as acting in an un-Islamic fashion, probably
because of their ties to al-Qaeda and the visible costs
of antagonizing Russia where its vital interests are
concerned. Undoubtedly this action implies a termination
of financial and other aid to the Chechens. But what is
interesting here is that despite the concession to
Russia and the earlier attempts to curry favor with
Washington, Riyadh has not stopped the transfer of funds
to either the Taliban or to Palestinian terrorist
organizations. Riyadh has by no means abandoned its
support for foreign terrorism, rather it has limited its
exposure where al-Qaeda is concerned. Undoubtedly these
actions, like the concession to Russia, represents as
well both sides' unease over American policy in Iraq.
Thus both sides agreed that the United Nations
role in Iraq must be strengthened and that the
international community must actively participate in the
reconstruction of Iraq. They also want to see
accelerated progress toward a handover by US authorities
of political power to the Iraqi Governing Council.
Similarly, the two sides also endorsed the US roadmap
for peace between Israel and the Palestinians, which is
visibly dying, and earlier Saudi peace plans and UN
resolutions, all of which have remained a dead letter,
not least because of Saudi intransigence with regard to
continuing support of terrorism against Israel.
The energy issues discussed also reflect a
meeting of the minds. While Russia could not challenge
Saudi Arabia decisively, it could clearly wound it in
the short run with regard to oil prices and market
access. Thus both sides have now agreed to cooperate on
setting the international price of oil to promote
stability in the market, ie administered prices and at a
relatively high level. While both sides benefit, Russia
gains disproportionately because its power has been
recognized and acknowledged and its market power will be
enhanced, a factor of no small consequence as far as
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, Russia's potential rivals,
are concerned.
Russia also gains by winning
Saudi support for its membership of the Organization of
Islamic Countries (OIC). That membership would be an
unprecedented expansion of the OIC's membership to
countries that are predominantly non-Muslim even if
there is a large Muslim minority in Russia. By this
criterion Israel and France, for example, could also
become members, clearly an unlikely possibility. But
Saudi support for this membership and its subsequent
acknowledgment of Russian interests and primacy in the
Caucasus and Central Asia represents an effort to draw
closer to Moscow as the alliance with Washington erodes.
This also explains Saudi Arabia's decision to terminate
support for the Chechens and leave them to Moscow's
not-so-tender mercies.
But these decisions also
show that Russia's persistence and unrelenting
repression of the Chechens is paying increasing
international dividends and gaining unprecedented
support. Since President Vladimir Putin came to power on
the basis of pledges of victory against the Chechens,
these international achievements represent potentially
important gains that he can point to in his upcoming
election campaign in 2004. And clearly the gains Russia
has accrued through this rapprochement with Saudi Arabia
have important repercussions for Central Asia and the
Caucasus because they clearly strengthen Moscow's
military, political and economic position in those
areas.
Riyadh's acknowledgment of Russian power
and its concessions to Moscow represent Saudi Arabia's
attempt to balance its deteriorating relationship with
Washington with an improved tie to Moscow and to cut its
losses once the dangers of its support for al-Qaeda
became apparent. Thus it is ending support for the
Chechens, although it continues supporting Palestinian
and Taliban terrorism. Russia gains by helping to
stabilize the oil market at continually high prices for
its producers, thereby avoiding a price war which it
would clearly lose and the possibility of ensuing
rivalry from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. It also gains
most importantly by receiving support for its campaign
against the Chechens and for membership in the OIC.
Thus this is a perfectly cynical bargain, much
like countries all over the world do. In this case it
takes place at the expense of the Chechens, Central Asia
and the Caucasus. We should not be surprised at this
newest manifestation of the fact that rhetoric aside,
Islamic solidarity is a chimera compared to the hard
facts of reasons of state. Rather the questions we must
now consider are how long it will take for these new
partners to discard each other in pursuit of some other,
more important, and urgent interests and what will
happen in the meantime as a result of this clearly
Faustian bargain.
Stephen Blank is an
analyst of international security affairs residing in
Harrisburg, PA.
(Copyright 2003 Asia Times
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