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 PART
2
The king of the steppes
Part 1: The last frontier:
China's far west
ASTANA, Kazakhstan - His immense and basically empty republic (only 15 million
people) sits on at least 100 billion barrels of oil and 85 trillion cubic feet
of gas, and the country absorbs more than 70 percent of foreign direct
investment in Central Asia. He created his new capital by decree. Almost nine
centuries after nomadic Kazakh tribes, under their legendary founder Alasha
Khan, migrated from 
southern Siberia to the vast Kazakh steppes, Nursultan Nazarbayev, a peasant
descendant from the Great Horde, former wrestler, former apparatchick, first
secretary of the Communist Party in 1989, and Kazakhstan's first and only
president since 1991, dreams of Kazakhstan as the center of Eurasia, and of the
capital Astana as the jewel in his crown. The name "Kazak" means "steppes
roamer". And Nursultan Nazarbayev is the undisputed king of the steppes.
In late 1997, Nazarbayev ordered parliament and all government ministries to
relocate to Astana - literally "capital" in Kazakh - from the former
cosmopolitan capital Almaty, 1,300 kilometers southeast. The new city center
came to life in 1998. But still today, Astana's new urban design is essentially
virtual. Apart from a few towers of steel and glass and some
strategically-placed blue-tiled coupolas, a peek behind the new green, yellow
and cream facades reveals good old crumbling Soviet cement - remains from
Nikita Khruschev's idea, who in 1954 ordered the conquest of "virgin lands" by
the the proletarian masses.
Unlike Brasilia - the new capital built out of thin air in the Brazilian
grasslands in the late 1950s by modernist master architects Lucio Costa and
Oscar Niemeyer - Akmola, Astana's first incarnation (the next was a
virgin-land-inspired Tselinograd, in the early 1960s) was originally a cossack
fortress founded in 1830, a sleepy village close to a Kazakh northern belt
populated by Russian settlers.
After waves of settlers and proletarian masses, the bureaucrats arrived,
swelling Astana's population to 900,000. But they don't like it: they'd rather
stay in Almaty, the pleasant, tree-lined oasis with the dramatic backdrop of
the Tian Shan mountains, near the Chinese border, and Central Asia's most
cosmopolitan city. Foreign diplomats don't like it either: only 10 embassies
have left Almaty. Astana is considered pure desolation row - with its torrid
summers, intolerable winters and at the mercy of fierce winds which inevitably
turned the wheat fields of Khruschev's virgin lands back into steppes.
Nazarbayev is unfazed. The annual budget for beautifying Astana is as big as
the Ministry of Defense's. Soviet-style posters all over town swear that
"Astana's renaissance is Kazakhstan's renaissance". The bureaucrats drown their
sorrows in beer and keep dreaming of Almaty.
The new administrative center is still a work in progress. At its center, an
enormous sphere in golden glass rests over very tall metallic pillars: this is
the symbol of the traditional Kazakh yurt, or tent, abandoned a long
time ago by urbanized Kazakhs, but still an essential tool for semi-nomadic,
collective farmers who tend to melt into nature with their herds and yurts.
Inside the sphere there is a sort of marble altar over which is placed a golden
and platinum plaque with the imprint of a hand: Nazarbayev's hand - who else's?
A guide invites us to "put our hands over the hands of the great man". That's
the cue for the sounds of a patriotic anthem, with words composed by - you've
guessed it. The possibility that there might be another president - and so
another hand to be sculpted and another anthem to be composed - evades the
stony, solemn guide: "We only have one president."
Oil, drugs and 'Sinification'
The one and only president and his Foreign Ministry in Astana never cease to
remind everyone of their unrivalled ballet, or "multi-vectoral policy" in
Astanese diplomacy: how to accommodate, simultaneously, the powers of Russia,
China and the United States.
Nazarbayev wisely balances military cooperation with traditional ally Russia
(via a collective security pact which also includes Armenia, Belarus,
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) with a five-year military cooperation agreement with
the US. Kazakhstan is still establishing its own army, as well as a fleet to
patrol the Caspian sea, which in the view of the Ministry of Defense is
swarming with "weapons, drugs and illegal immigrants".
The New Silk Road is, among other things, the preferred drug route from Asia to
Russia and Eastern Europe. Although Kazakhstan is basically drug-free, and
shares no border with Afghanistan, General Mukhtar Altynbayev, the Minister of
Defense in Astana, is extremely worried about opium production in Afghanistan,
which shot up from 185 tons in 2001 to 3,400 tons in 2002, and even more in
2003, according to United Nations data. The bulk of drug trafficking runs south
of Kazakhstan's borders - through Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.
Astana is eager to patrol all of its porous 400 kilometers of desert border
with Turkmenistan, with access to the Caspian Sea, as well as the 670
kilometers of mountainous border with Kyrgyzstan. Astana officials admit that
little more than 10 percent of the drugs running through Kazakhstan are
apprehended.
From Washington, Astana gets only a fistful of dollars (US$5 million in 2002),
assistance to train military officials in the US and a promise to be able to
buy planes, helicopters and ships. But the Pentagon couldn't miss the
opportunity of helping Kazakhstan to finally build its first military base on
the Caspian, at the booming port of Atyrau. Atyrau is practically in the middle
of nowhwere: no less than 2,700 kilometers west of Almaty, and 350 kilometers
southeast of Astrakhan in Russia, the nearest decent city. But its strategic
position is unmatched: by the Ural river, on the northern shore of the Caspian,
literally on the border between Asia and Europe. Atyrau, linked to Almaty by
daily flights crammed with oil executives, is Oil City by definition: the base
camp for the monster Tenghizchevroil joint venture, 350 kilometers south, as
well as a cluster of other oil and gas fields, not to mention the offshore
Caspian reserves. The official position of the US embassy in Almaty regarding
the military base is as crystal clear as Caspian waters: "The oil riches of the
Caspian should be under reliable protection."
In terms of economic development, Astana's line is very pragmatic - and totally
apolitical. Kazakh ministers and diplomats insist theirs is a landlocked
country, which wants as many markets as possible to export its natural wealth,
but also wants to diversify beyond oil and gas. The doors are open to foreign
investment: Kazakhstan is bound to join the World Trade Organization in 2004
(more in Part 3).
Nazarbayev was in favor of the invasion of Iraq. But now Kazakhstan is in favor
of a stronger UN presence. Washington most of all wants Astana to deliver lots
of oil to the controversial Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. But Nazarbayev
seems to have other ideas in mind: alternative oil transit itineraries towards
Russia, China and the Mediterranean. The BTC project is a $2.9 billion
investment to exploit a vast store of energy from the Caspian Sea by providing
a new crude oil pipeline from Azerbaijan, through Georgia, to Turkey for onward
delivery to world markets.
Officially, it's all smiles between Kazakhstan and both China and Russia. But
privately Kazakhs worry about some crucial facts. They know many
ultra-nationalists in Russia will never accept Kazakhstan's independence, and
they know Ural cossacks - who were assigned to Kazakhstan by the Soviets -
still demand that northern and eastern Kazakhstan be given back to Russia
(these cossacks have the support of a fifth column, the 40 percent of Slavs who
live in Kazakhstan).
Simultaneously, Kazakh are suspicious of China's motives - not to mention the
frightening possibility of the immense and empty steppes being swamped by
frenetic, immigrating Han Chinese multitudes. A great deal of Central Asia in
fact was part of imperial China in the 19th century: according to the Chinese
People's Liberation Army, "The region to the west of Xinjiang" (eastern
Kazakhstan), "Lake Balkhash" (in central Kazakhstan) and why not, the fertile
Fergana Valley as well. Astana has classified statistics on the influx of Han
Chinese - a kind of "peaceful Sinification" which in the popular mind acquires
truly apocalyptic dimensions. Nazarbayev had to re-introduce Kazakh visas for
Chinese because of popular pressure.
Kazakhstan maintains strong ties with Russia. Most Kazakhs speak Russian, watch
Russian TV and read the Russian press. Kazakhstan's major trading partner is,
inevitably, Russia. The Slavs, predominant in northern and eastern Kazakhstan,
assure a strong business connection between Kazakhstan and Siberia. Apart from
being the most "Russified" of all the peoples of Central Asia, the Kazakhs
don't have a strong sense of ethnic identity. They converted to Islam only in
the 17th century, via mullahs from Tartary. Until Soviet times, they have been
essentially nomadic horseback roamers. These are reasons to explain the absence
of radical Islam: support for radical Islam is basically confined to a few
Uzbeks living in the south. Nazarbayev and the Kazakhs definitely do not share
the American and Chinese obsession, some would say paranoia, about Islamic
terrorism.
In 1996 in Istanbul, the World Uighur Kurultai sanctioned the need for armed
struggle for the creation of an Eastern Turkestan. The most active group in the
Uighur armed struggle is the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), nowadays
estimated to have roughly 600 members. A dozen supposed ETIM members were
arrested in Almaty in July. This led to wide speculation in Central Asia
regarding a possible strategic alliance of ETIM, the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan - intimately connected with the Taliban - and the Hizb Ut-Tahrir,
the ultra-secretive, pan-Islamic underground movement founded in Saudi Arabia
in 1953 and extremely popular in the Fergana Valley shared by Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan.
ETIM, based in Xinjiang, gained notoriety because it was the first Uighur
liberation group added to Washington's long list of terrorist organizations,
basically on the suspicion they had planned to attack the American embassy in
Kyrgyzstan in 2001. Uighurs as a whole were startled, angry and saddened,
because they knew this decision was a de facto green light from Washington for
Beijing to be even fiercer in its concerted crackdown.
Most Uighur groups - inside Xinjiang, in Central Asia and in Turkey - stress
their independence struggle in contrast to Beijing's interpretation of
terrorism and a threat to international security. Enver Can, the president of
the East Turkestan National Congress, based in Munich, has always stressed
Uighurs have never been religious extremists. But as far as Kazakhstan is
concerned, the Uighurs once more are the victims: Beijing is essentially
offering financial and logistic assistance for Astana to track and capture
Uighurs.
Shanghai rules
The Shanghai Five, founded in 1996 basically to solve Central Asian border
problems, became the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001, in
Shanghai. That's when the presidents of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan and new member Uzbekistan pledged to fight against "terrorism,
separatism and extremism". The SCO's raison detre is now to fight against
radical Islam and the drug trade, very much in line with Astana's official
position, via Minister of Defense Altynbayev, according to whom "terrorism and
drug-trafficking are necessarily linked".
Everyone seems to be happy with the arrangement. Russia not only is able to
fight its radical Islam nightmare, but also to sort of formalize its
newly-regained influence in Central Asia. China is able to institutionalize its
widespread repression of Uighurs. And for the Central Asian states, a strategic
alliance with both Russia and China couldn't be more seductive. None of the
players - not exactly paragons of democracy - are bothered by accusations that
this supposed anti-terrorist organization is just a cover up for more
repression of civil liberties and political opposition.
China wants no turbulence in its economic campaign to profit from Xinjiang's
huge oil and mineral wealth, as well as from the myriad transport routes to
Pakistan (via the Karakoram highway), Afghanistan and Central Asia (via its
borders with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan). China needs plenty of and oil and gas
from Kazakhstan. The collective leadership in Beijing attaches immense
strategic importance to political stability and economic cooperation in Central
Asia. China, in its west and northwest, is face-to-face with the Muslim world,
via its borders with Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and
Kazakhstan. So China will never allow a Chechnya situation in its backyard in
the shape of a fierce, effective, Uighur independence movement.
For Russia and China, the SCO is a de facto response to American military bases
in Central Asia. Beijing's solid investment in the SCO wants to prove the point
that American strategic presence in Central Asia - through military bases in
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan - is pointless. Russia for its part wants to use the
SCO to dissuade Uzbekistan from deepening its cosy strategic arrangement with
Washington. There were SCO joint military exercises in August, first in eastern
Kazakhstan and then in western China: tellingly, this one was above all an
operation to track and capture "separatist" fighters. Later, in September,
foreign ministers of SCO member countries met in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. They
decided that the SCO secretariat will be based in Beijing, and the
anti-terrorism center will start operating in Tashkent next January. The center
was initially supposed to be based in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.
Altynbayev, the Kazakh Minister of Defense, would like the joint military
exercises to take place twice a year. The exercise in August solidified the key
relationship to watch, between Altynbayev and General Li Qianyuan, the
commander of the Xinjiang military district. The leadership in Beijing is
concerned of the possibility of being subjected to geopolitical encirclement by
Washington. Chinese political scientist Zhao Huashen has been one among many to
stress that American interference in Central Asia can be extremely dangerous.
Nazarbayev, with his "multi-vectoral policy", certainly agrees.
The relocation of the anti-terrorism center from Bishkek to Tashkent may be a
concerted SCO move to mollify Uzbek President Islam Karimov, who is not very
enthusiastic with the idea of a military bloc in Central Asia. Nazarbayev has
had a tumultuous relationship with Karimov, who envies Kazakhstan's oil wealth,
but dreams of being Central Asia's dominant power. As much as Nazarbayev
juggles with Russia, China and the US, Karimov is being courted by the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to keep its close ties with the West even
while being a member of SCO.
The SCO is bound to secure Russia's southern flank and China's western flank.
But proclamations of "eternal friendship" aside, the billion-dollar question is
how Russia and China will share power in Central Asia. This is the ultimate
game of chess. China more or less recognizes a predominant Russian role for the
moment, while the tectonic plates are slowly shifting towards Beijing,
according to one of its key strategies: "silent expansion". And of course in
this Russo-Chinese interplay, the US - with its military bases and avid oil
interests - is much more than a curious spectator.
Russian President Vladimir Putin will not be a junior partner of the US nor a
vassal to China. Russia won't surrender its predominant role in its former
backyard. In terms of foreign policy, China never makes any alliances. It only
encouraged the Shanghai Five, later the SCO joint venture, because it is the de
facto predominant power. Its ambitious objectives are also very clear: to
isolate Xinjiang from the rest of the Muslim world; to undermine the new
American influence in Central Asia; and to replace Russia as the predominant
player in Central Asia. China needs Kazakhstan to contain radical Islam in
Central Asia - and to counterbalance American encroachment. Nazarbayev for his
part knows that Kazakhstan is slowly being attracted - economically and
politically - to the Chinese orbit. But he wants the process to develop under
his own terms.
After the implosion of the USSR in 1991, Nazarbayev was a big hit in Washington
because he became the sole proprietor of 104 SS-19 ballistic missiles with more
than 1,000 nuclear warheads - as well as the famous Baikonur cosmodrome - the
oldest space launch facility in the world for which the Russians still pay the
rent. Wily Nazarbayev used American interest to build solid bilateral
relations, and also a relationship with NATO. Kazakhstan became a non-nuclear
state: the missiles were dismantled in 1995.
As the largest unexplored source of oil wealth in the world, Kazakhstan
basically means two things to Washington: freedom for American corporations to
exploit Kazakh oil, and lots of oil supplying the BTC pipeline (and
consequently skirting both Russia and Iran). Nazarbayev steered Kazakhstan
through a Washington-approved tight monetary policy, adhered to strict
International Monetary Fund prescriptions, but then relations cooled down,
essentially because there are no realistic prospects for Kazakh democracy on
the horizon - not a problem at all for either Russia or China. Both Russia and
China are willing to pull out all stops to establish a protectorate over
Central Asia. What about the US? As the king of the steppes, whichever way
Nazarbayev sways will be crucial to decide the outcome of this New Great Game.
(Copyright 2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact
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