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 PART 11
Russia's 'liberal empire'
Part 1: The last frontier: China's far
west
Part 2: The king of the steppes
Part 3: In pursuit of the snow leopard
Part 4: Touching base
Part
5: A new learning experience
Part 6: Peaceful jihad
Part
7: The American
client
Part 8: The Sufi way
Part 9: The Samarkand circle
Part 10: Turkmenbashi, it's a gas, gas, gas
BAKU - The Soviet empire is no more,
but whatever the time zone and the socio-political and
economic environment, Russia still looms large over
Central Asia and the Caucasus. Over 2,300 years ago, in
his Oriental campaign, Alexander the Great was married
in Balkh (northern Afghanistan) and died in Babylon.
Now, as a consequence of United States President George
W Bush's adventures in both Afghanistan and Iraq, a
significant power shift is taking place: Russia is on
its way to re-forming a "liberal empire" in the Caucasus
and Central Asia.
The concept of a liberal
empire is the perfect ideological tool for the Kremlin
to exercise more power in what is defined in Moscow as
"the near abroad" - without ruffling any feathers, at
least not in the European Union: strategic competitor
America is another matter. But an important question
remains: Is democracy compatible with any form of
post-modern imperialism?
Russia's poster boy -
poster executive director, rather - for the concept of a
liberal empire is Anatoly Chubais, former privatization
tzar and current chairman of the energy conglomerate
Unified Energy Systems (UES), 52 percent state-owned.
This neo-liberal champion is also the head of the Union
of Right Forces political party which took a battering
in the recent Russian parliamentary elections, failing
to get any representation. Chubais vigorously defends
the release of imprisoned Yukos boss Mikhail
Khodorkovsky. And he routinely denounces Russian
President Vladimir Putin's authoritarian methods. A
paradox? Not really.
Three months ago, Chubais
published a piece in the Russian daily Nezavisimaya
Gazeta stating that Russia's top 21st century priority
is to develop "liberal capitalism" and to build up a
"liberal empire". In the words of his manifesto,
"Liberal imperialism should become Russia's ideology and
building up a liberal empire Russia's mission." This
means in practice a foreign policy driven by hardcore
market economics mixed with military muscle. Chubais
simply erases the tzarist and Soviet heritage in his
drive to paint new Russia as a liberal power. His model
of a liberal empire is none other than the US. He
believes Russia can become another model. A delighted
Kremlin seems to be applying the concept to the letter.
Chubais is also demonstrating in practice how a
liberal empire should work in the Caucasus and in
Central Asia. In Kyrgyzstan, Russia is combining the
opening of a new military base in Kant (see part 4 of
this series) with imminent massive investment by Russian
companies. And through a series of deals UES now
effectively controls Georgia's power market. This means
serious political leverage in Tbilisi - which the new
Georgian leader to be elected on January 4, bound to be
American-backed "Misha" Saakashvili, will have to
factor: when the contracts were signed, Saakashvili,
then part of the opposition, accused Eduard
Shevardnadze, then president, of selling Georgia to the
Russians.
The return of
Eurasianism
Chubais' offensive means that
Eurasianism is back. Eurasianism was a very popular
concept in the early 20th century, after the October
Revolution in Russia. It is, as James Joyce would put
it, a portmanteau word with myriad geographic and
geopolitical connotations. Most of all, it implies that
people living in Eurasia were already integrated into
the Russian and Soviet empires, thus legitimizing a new
Slavic-Turkic reintegration between Russia and Central
Asia. Crucially, instead of a neo-conservative clash of
civilizations, Eurasianists like scholar Nikita Moiseev
talk of a synthesis between two civilizations, Russia
and Islam.
Other Eurasianists, like Aleksandr
Panarin, go straight for naked power: "The key question
concerns the conditions under which the Muslim people of
Eurasia would like to become part of a unified Russian
state." Panarin's interpretation of the clash of
civilizations is very enlightening. He is sure that one
of America's strategic goals is to provoke trouble
between Russia and Islam: and the Trojan Horse in this
scheme is Turkey, used by America to "gain a foothold in
the Muslim regions of the former USSR" with the goal of
"weakening Russia".
A Central Asian diplomat
confirms that not only those addicted to Soviet
nostalgia, but crucially the cream of Russia's
intellectual elite, are enthusiastic Eurasianists. But
what about the Kremlin itself? One of Putin's most
famous quotes is: "Russia always felt itself an Eurasian
country." The most important factor, says another
diplomat, is that the cream of the FSB - the successor
of the KGB - has also thrown its weight behind the
concept.
Eurasianism is a powerful concept
capable of oiling the Kremlin machine for ages. It
appeals to educated nationalists, and most of all it
appeals to the underprivileged, the vast majority of
them Putin voters who want nothing but law and order,
security, some prosperity and the sense of belonging to
a great world power (all themes of Putin's platform).
Eurasianism appeals because it is not xenophobic: it is
inclusive. It is not anti-Islamic. It is not
anti-Semitic. And coming from a culture that played a
large part in defeating Adolf Hitler, it is definitely
anti-fascist.
Putin is certainly clever enough
not to pose overtly as an Eurasianist - so he cannot be
accused of naked imperialism by people like
ultra-sensitive Uzbek leader Islam Karimov. But the fact
is the Putin circle is actively incorporating the
Eurasianist worldview to his platform. Something really
big is happening: Central Asian diplomats are convinced
that Eurasianism is fast becoming the ideology of the
Russian ruling class. The ultimate objective is clear:
the Russian empire should be reintegrated around Moscow.
Could a "Eurasia confederation" actually happen?
In the case of the Baltic republics, it's out of the
question: they are practically integrated to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In the case of
Caucasian states Georgia and Azerbaijan, it's fair to
talk about economic leverage, but not of integration. In
the case of Belarus, Moldova and Armenia, the
perspectives are much better. And in the case of Central
Asia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are
certainly potential members. Kazakh President Nursultan
Nazarbayev is a big fan of the idea of an "Eurasian
Union". Kyrgyzstan, small and with no oil, needs Russia
badly. And Tajikistan is a de facto Russian satellite.
But Uzbekistan - ruled by ultra-independentist Karimov -
and Turkmenistan - ruled by ultra-isolationist
Saparmurat Niyazov - are totally out of the equation.
Does an Eurasia confederation makes sense in
economic terms? Not much. Russia matters to these
countries basically because it is equated with Mother
Subsidy. Russian exports to the "near abroad" cost
nothing compared to exports to countries outside the
Commonwealth of the Independent States (CIS). They owe
fortunes to Moscow. According to analyst Yuri Shishkov,
this is "payment to preserve Russia's political
influence, to avoid the breakup of the post-Soviet
military-strategic space, and to use the installations
of its infrastructure". Most of all, Russia's bear hug
is applied via sales of military hardware at unbeatable
prices.
Eurasianists sustain that nation-states
are doomed one way or another: they will inevitably be
victims of a takeover - by a global empire
(American-led) or by regional empires. So the
Eurasianist proposal to the CIS countries is a benign
Eurasian Union, where they can live under the splendid
label of "collective imperial sovereignty". The missing
crucial point is what Washington will do about it. A
liberal imperialist like Chubais firmly believes that
liberal empires don't fight each other. But realist
Eurasianists know that according to Washington's
National Security Strategy, there are no holds barred
when it comes to preventing the emergence of any rival
power in Eurasia.
For the moment, Eurasianists
are more than glad that Putin's foreign policy has
enshrined two central goals: to restore Russian
supremacy in the "near abroad", and to balance
international relations by an Eurasian perspective,
following the prescription by renowned old diplomatic
fox and former prime minister Yevgeny Primakov, much
admired by Putin. This means closer relations with
China, India and Iran, and a more incisive Russian
presence in the Middle East.
Meanwhile, UES and
Russian gas export monopoly Gazprom are out in full
force to reconquer the role of Moscow as provider to the
whole periphery of the empire. The Kremlin's relations
with the "near abroad" could be summarized in one word:
Pipelineistan (more on this in the next, and last, part
of this series). Vladimir Lenin used to say that
"communism is the Soviets plus electricity". Now
Putinism relies basically on electricity. UES is
involved in projects in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. It
controls 80 percent of the Armenian power market:
Armenian power could soon be exported to neighboring
Azerbaijan. Chubais wants nothing less than to create a
"unified energy system" in Transcaucasia - Georgia,
Armenia and Azerbaijan. UES also wants to export to
Turkey, and is even on the verge of exporting to Poland.
Putin's 'controlled democracy'
At the center
of the "liberal empire", things nowadays are not too
liberal, but both Washington and Brussels are reacting
as cold as cucumbers. Putin is getting his way all the
way: in his recent visit to Rome - hosted by his great
friend, Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi - and then to
Paris, nobody said a word about Chechnya, Moldova or the
Yukos affair. Enraged European democrats are asking
themselves if "Soviet values" are now the norm in the
West.
The staged Chechen presidential elections
"functioned as a model" to the Russian parliamentary
elections two months later, according to political
scientist, Dimitri Furman. He is alarmed: "We have
entered a spiral leading to a logic of power without
alternative." This means a replay of Soviet times. And
this logic is inbuilt in Putinesque concepts such as
"dictatorship of the law", "verticality of power" and
"controlled democracy". Some Russians are alarmed -
talking of a new form of "Russian fascism" that an
apathetic society is duly accepting.
Putin has
installed FSB agents and military officers in all the
key nodes of the state bureaucracy: the FSB are his
former colleagues, and the military behind the second
Chechen war in fact elected Putin in March 2000.
According to one sociological study, what Russians call
"structures of force" now represent 25 percent of the
managerial elite, compared to only 4 percent under
Mikhail Gorbachev.
Putin has always tried to
strike a balance between competing Russian power groups:
the siloviki (security services people); the
oligarchs close to the Boris Yeltsin family; the
privatization tzars like Chubais; and a few powerful
regional governors. But the Yukos affair has been the
turning point. By attacking the oil oligarch
Khodorkovsky, Putin has signaled that the
siloviki are really in control. Their tough
stance answers to the widespread, popular Russian call
for "order" after the 1990s Wild West and the anger felt
by millions of poor Russians at the enormous fortunes
amassed by the handful of oligarchs.
The acute
social problems we find in any Central Asian republic -
provoked by the collapse of communism and the rush to
salvage capitalism - may be even worse in Russia.
Meanwhile, the industrial-military complex is being
reinforced and the defense budget is on the increase.
According to the Sipri Institute in Stockholm, Russia is
the number one world exporter of weapons. This economic
bonanza benefits only the industrial-military complex.
Following elections earlier this month, the
Russian Duma is now little more than a rubber-stamp
parliament for Putin. The elite in the big cities do not
give a damn to politics and only think about conspicuous
consumption and travel, a pattern replicated by the
elite in Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan. The regional
disparities between Moscow and the provinces are so big
- as well as between Tashkent or Almaty and the Uzbek or
Kazakh periphery - that soon "they won't be speaking the
same language", a common Russian joke.
The press
is not free any more. The judiciary is under severe
constraints. The rule of siloviki and the army
means no democracy. For the sociologist Olga
Krystanovskaia, Russia today is a "militocracy".
The battle for hearts and minds
It's
enlightening to examine how this militocracy, the heart
of a possible new "liberal empire", fares in Central
Asia when compared to the "original" liberal empire, the
United States.
Travelling around Central Asia
and talking to the people, urban and rural, Sunni and
Shi'ite, educated and illiterate, civil servants and
private entrepreneurs, familiar or unfamiliar with
Western lifestyle and institutions, and giving little
credence to the official propaganda in these
heavily-censored countries, an informal inquiry produces
some unshakeable trends.
Virtually everybody follows what is happening in
Iraq, even though Internet access in some countries like
Turkmenistan is problematic, and is invariably slow
everywhere else. When they surf the net for information,
they get it in Russian. Everybody watches TV - and the
bulk of the coverage is on Russian channels, RTR, ORT,
NTV. Practically nobody watches CNN or the BBC.
There's an overwhelming perception that Washington's
"war on terror" is a war against Islam. And we are not
talking only about conservative Fergana Valley clerics
and madrassa (religious school) students, but
students and teachers at the American University in
Bishkek, the KIMEP in Almaty or the economics faculty in
Samarkand.
Most people equate the conditions - and the possible
outcome - of the American invasion of Iraq with the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. And they expect America
to get really burned in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and
to be out of Central Asia sooner rather than later.
There's severe, widespread criticism of the
arrogance, belligerence and cultural ignorance of the
Bush administration; thus the fear that Central Asia
could sooner or later be attacked on some flimsy
pretext. University students in Almaty, Bishkek,
Tashkent and Samarkand invariably think that the Iraqi
occupation will lead to more wars, more terrorism and
more problems in Central Asia. The future educated elite
invariably criticize American support of corrupt regimes
completely divorced from the plight of their own
populations. In Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, if such
complaints are even barely articulated in public, they
may lead to summary execution.
Many kids may wear baggy jeans and fake Chinese-made
sports shoes, eat burgers in imitation McDonald's,
listen to Britney Spears and Eminem and spend most of
their free time on Sony Playstation booths. But they
make a sharp distinction when it comes to American
militarism. And especially in rural areas, they say that
while they may like the trappings, they don't want to
live an American lifestyle.
Most people, especially above 30, consider the
collapse of the USSR as a monumental disaster. And
virtually everybody blames the US for it. They say that
they had freedom of movement over 25 percent of the
Earth's surface, and they had a standard of living much,
much higher than in the subsequent emerging - or
submerging - republics. Any gypsy cab driver - that
means virtually anybody with a car - in his battered
Volgas or Ladas, says that the Americans destroyed their
way of life and now are after the natural resources,
especially oil, gas and minerals. The thirty-something
generation had just finished university and started out
in a good job when the USSR began to crumble. Most of
these young men and women with a family to support now
have to juggle three or even four jobs, and also drive
their cars as taxis to make ends meet. At least
sometimes they can vent their anger - unlike the silent
armies of elderly people begging in the streets of every
Central Asian capital.
Americans are not welcomed, even when they pay for
prostitution. There are strip bars in Bishkek and
Tashkent - American soldiers are regular visitors. The
hostess of a bar in Bishkek, owned by a Han Chinese,
says that the dancers, most of then classical dancers or
teachers, are appalled, but there's no other way to make
money fast. Freelance sirens in five-star hotels in
Almaty, Tashkent and Ashgabat prefer to deal with
Europeans or the loaded Russian mafia.
Central Asia's secret love story is definitely with
Europe. When a foreign visitor mentions he's from
Europe, he's always more than welcomed. People
instinctively attribute to Europe a non-belligerent
status and the capacity to treat local people with
respect. France and Italy especially enjoy a very
positive image - synonymous with fashion, good food,
high aesthetic standards. A great deal of the Uzbek
elite studied in Germany. For most people, the ideal of
a good life is "European".
Russia is in the hearts and minds of virtually
everybody. Every Central Asian capital has been dealing
for decades with their Russian residents. The new
Central Asian generations have been educated in Russian,
and a great deal finished their studies in Russia
itself. Moreover, Putin has been a chess master in
dealing with Central Asian governments, in both his
pronouncements and official visits.
Russia is
also not inert militarily. There's a new Russian
military doctrine in place, adopted by the Kremlin last
October, according to which all post-Soviet airspace may
be subjected to "preventive" attack by Russia. Russian
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov made that very clear in a
meeting with NATO in Brussels last October. Putin
reserves himself "the right to the use of force in a
preventive manner if the interests of Russia or its
allies are threatened and all other means are revealed
to be ineffectual". When Putin and Ivanov went to
Kyrgyzstan to open the new airbase in Kant, Ivanov said
that NATO military bases - "and not from the United
States" - in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan concern only the
duration of operations in Afghanistan and the United
Nations mandate there, "and not a further period of
time".
As Russia advances the new Eurasian game
of recolonization - economic and cultural - of the whole
former socialist space, from the former Yugoslavia to
western China, Central Asian diplomats fear the clash
with Washington will be inevitable, according to the
recipe of "grand chessboard" master Zbigniew Brzezinski.
Washington considers Central Asia and Transcaucasia (the
southern Caucasus), including the Caspian basin, as
zones of "strategic interest". If we add Ukraine, this
means all the southern half of the former USSR, or
Moscow's current "near abroad". The American strategy
also relies on Pipelineistan, coupled with influence
acquired via myriad "foundations", in the media,
academia, through historic revisionism, television
programs, private radios, Hollywood, videos, in fact any
tool that may help in cultural colonization.
But
even with all this firepower, America seems to be losing
the battle for hearts and minds in Central Asia, while
Eurasianists may revel in the fact that at least at the
level of the general population, the hearts and minds in
the "near abroad" are already fine-tuned in Russian.
(Copyright 2003 Asia Times Online Ltd. All
rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for
information on our sales and syndication policies.)
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