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Russia's war games demonstrating 'nuclear fist'?
By Sergei Blagov

MOSCOW - Russia's military has begun large-scale war games - its largest military maneuvers in two decades - involving the test-firing of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and the massive deployment of long-range strategic bombers. The exercises are intended to deter unnamed aggressors and they appear to reflect Russia's increasingly assertive foreign policy, what some call a "nuclear fist" - yet questions remain about Russia's first-strike capabilities.

The exercise is reminiscent of Soviet-era war games held back in 1982, dubbed the "seven-hour nuclear war". Russia recently indicated the possibility of a first-strike war, if necessary, to defend Russian interests. Yet military experts question whether Moscow could indeed strike first if it felt threatened, and if so, what would be the target. No potential aggressor was identified this time, but in previous maneuvers Russian generals said the obvious target was the United States.

Some observers and critics said the war games signaled the opening of Russia's election campaign, a charge vigorously denied. Some said the games already flopped when a missile failed to fire, another charge vigorously denied.

On the day of the apparent flop, President Vladimir Putin boarded the Northern Fleet Arkhangelsk submarine where he armed 20 ballistic missiles to observe first-hand the strategic drill on Tuesday. However, Putin's ride on a nuclear submarine turned a bit uncomfortable as another Akula-class submarine, the K-407 Novomoskovsk, did not launch its RSM-54 missile. It was supposed to be test-fired Tuesday morning and its dummy warhead was to hit its target at the Kura missile-receiving facility on the far eastern coast of the Kamchatka Peninsula.

Novomoskovsk's failure to launch the missile is likely a great disappointment to the military, as the submarine previously had a good record of missile launches - in 1998 it became one of the first submarines to launch a satellite into space.

Meanwhile, Russia's Northern Fleet command dismissed speculation there had been any incidents and denied that any ICBM launches had been planned for the day. Navy Commander Vladimir Kuroyedov claimed it was supposed to be a mock launch, involving just an electronic order to fire an ICBM, without the missile leaving its launch tube. Kuroyedov did not elaborate on the value of a mock launch or clarify why the Russian President was invited to witness it.

But some Russian media outlets did not subscribe to the official point of view. The influential Izvestia daily reported on Wednesday that the drill ended in failure. On Wednesday, daily Nezavisimaya Gazeta ridiculed the official version of the war games, suggesting that Russia basically "asked a potential aggressor to wait for another day" until the actual missile launch.

Retired admiral Eduard Baltin, former commander of the Northern Fleet's division of nuclear submarines, commented that Russia failed to demonstrate to a potential aggressor that its nuclear forces remain in full and constant combat readiness.

Yet despite the problems, the drill was clearly designed to send a message. The February war games scenario included the testing of the missile defense system protecting Moscow, ICBM test launches and launches of military satellites in a simulation of the replacement of those satellites lost in military action. Among other maneuvers, units of the Siberian Military District and the Volga-Urals Military District are being deployed westward, while airborne units are being dispatched by air and rail to unspecified destinations.

The maneuvers also involved Tupolev-195 and Tupolev-160 Blackjack long-range strategic bombers test-firing cruise missiles over Russia's Arctic regions. The supersonic Tu-160 is designed to strike distant targets with up to 12 missiles. In mid-January the Tu-160s flew again for the first time since the entire fleet was grounded after a crash last fall.

The strategic drill was designed "to forestall a forceful aggression against Russia", Colonel-General Yury Baluyevsky, first deputy head of general staff, has announced. The maneuvers "are not the opening of the election campaign or a demonstration of a nuclear fist", Baluyevsky said. Russia can not abandon test-firing ICBM, Baluyevsky said, although he conceded that each launch costs Russia 300-600 million rubles (US$10-20 million).

It is speculated the February war games are intended to further boost Putin's popularity as the March 14 presidential election approaches. The maneuvers may also serve to back up Russia's increasingly assertive foreign policy.

The drill was supposed to end in a victory that would repel potential "aggressors". Yet such talk of "aggressors" highlighted the Soviet-style of the war games. The drill demonstrated that a nuclear conflict with the United States is still seen as a possibility in Moscow, hence plans call for it.

But unlike Soviet-era war games, this time none of the 250 generals involved in the drill would reveal who the virtual enemy was. However, some of Russia's top military officials recently voiced concerns over US missile defense plans. The fact that units of the Siberian Military District were being deployed westward during the drill also indicates that Moscow still sees a threat in the West, and not in East Asia.

The war games are the latest in Moscow's series of recent moves designed to exhibit its strategic deterrent. Last December, the fourth regiment of Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missiles was put on combat duty in Tatischevo, central Russia. Topol-M has been described as a cornerstone of Russia missile-nuclear shield. The single-warhead RS-12M Topol-M, which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has nicknamed SS-X-27, can be fired from silos or from mobile launchers. Eventually, Topol-M mobile missiles are due to replace 270 silo-based missile complexes, according to one Russian expert, who conceded that the Russian army was recently receiving just six Topol-M missiles a year.

Russia has also moved to make dozens of previously stored multi-warhead SS-19 ICBMs combt-ready. Last October, President Putin stated that Russia has SS-19 ICBMs that had been stored without fuel and had never previously been deployed - and as such were not part of past disarmament negotiations. Russians believe that the UR-100N UTTH, also known as the SS-19 Stilleto, could function for up to 25 more years and gradually replace decommissioned missiles.

- When the START-I treaty was signed in 1991, the Soviet Union had a total of 300 SS-19 missiles. According to the START-II treaty, signed in 1993, Russia was to dismantle all ground-based ICBMs with multiple warheads. Under the treaty provisions, a total of 105 of the SS-19 missiles can be retained provided they are downloaded to carry only one warhead instead of six.

In May 2002, Putin and US President George W Bush signed the so-called Moscow Treaty that requires the two countries to cut the number of warheads on combat duty to between 1,700 and 2,200 on each side. It allows both countries to store, rather than dismantle the warheads. It is the scrapping of the START-II strategic arms reduction treaty, however, that has allowed Russia to keep SS-19s on combat duty.

Russia's RT-23UTTH or SS-24 rail missile systems were subject to elimination under the START-II. However, following the demise of START-II, after the US backed out, Russia has reportedly indicated plans to retain one division of the SS-24 rail mobile missiles. The SS-24 is cold-launched with 10 warheads each with a yield of 550 kilotons.

Russia now has three missile armies and 16 divisions that have a total of 735 ICBMs armed with 3,159 nuclear warheads, according to Russian media reports.

On October 9, 2003, Putin said that Russia "retains the right to launch a preemptive strike, if this practice continues to be used around the world." Defense Minister Ivanov said Moscow can use preventive military force in cases where a threat is growing and is "visible, clear, and unavoidable". Ivanov added a key detail, saying that military force can be used if there is an attempt to limit Russia's access to regions that are essential to its survival.

Russia also indicated it would act to defend regions beyond its own borders, encompassing large parts of the former Soviet Union, now the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Defense Minister Ivanov has said that, in case of "instability in the CIS" or a "direct threat" to Russian citizens, Russia can "hypothetically" use force if other means of coercion, like diplomatic and economic sanctions, fail.

In a practical demonstration of this approach, Moscow held naval maneuvers in the inland Caspian Sea August 8-15, 2002. Although Russia presented the war games as an important measure to safeguard regional stability, some littoral states remained wary. The coastal Caspian states were shown that Moscow retains the growing ability to order its fleet without notice into theirs waters.

However, East Asia has not disappeared from the radar screens of Russia's emerging doctrines of preemption. In July 2003, Russian media have been speculating about possible military involvement in North Korea should another war erupt. "Russia's best response to a possible nuclear conflict on the Korean peninsula would be a preemptive missile strike against North Korean nuclear facilities, carried out by the Russian Pacific Fleet," said an editorial in Izvestia. It quoted Pacific Fleet sources as saying the nuclear facilities could be destroyed using cruise missiles launched from a Russian cruiser.

Meanwhile, Russian officials have pledged that the country's doctrine differs from the American doctrine. Under no circumstances would Russia be the first to strike with nuclear weapons, according to Defense Minister Ivanov. Nonetheless, the West became concerned about the "Ivanov doctrine", in which the minister warns that Russia will be forced to change its nuclear strategy if NATO continued its "offensive" doctrine. Therefore, circumstantial evidence indicates that Russia is attempting to draft its own preemption concept.

The notion of preemption - the use of military and / or covert force to disarm an enemy before it can launch a strike of its own - has resurfaced since President Bush declared it a viable approach to the war on terrorism. Only the US has recently made use of first-strike military action, or "preemption", against emerging threats abroad - an explicit part of its foreign policy - in Iraq.

Russia now seems to follow the US' lead and reserve the same preemption rights. What remains to be seen is whether proliferation or the escalation of preemption could eventually ensue.

(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)
 
Feb 19, 2004



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