Afghanistan: Playing politics
again By Syed Saleem Shahzad
KARACHI - Even as military operations continue
on both sides of the border between Afghanistan and
Pakistan to flush out members of the Afghan resistance
and remnants of al-Qaeda, initiatives continue apace to
fill political vacuums that have the potential to derail
any permanent Afghan peace process.
In the first
phase of an extensive "hammer and anvil" military
campaign, with US-led forces on the Afghan side of the
border and Pakistani troops on the other side in the
tribal areas of South Waziristan, Pakistani officials
claim that they have arrested more than 20 foreigners.
These include Saudis, Egyptians and Yemenis. However,
officials refuse to comment on a February 26 Asia Times
Online report that Dr Khalid al-Zawahiri, the son of
Osama bin Laden's deputy, Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri, has been
apprehended ('Key capture'
tightens net on bin Laden).
Pakistani
troops have also managed to force many resistance
fighters from their havens in Pakistan back into
Afghanistan, and operations by US-led forces now
continue in the Afghan provinces of Paktia, Paktika,
Khost and the Kunar Valley.
On the
political front, meanwhile, interim Afghan President Hamid
Karzai revealed this week that he is considering a meeting
with "moderate" former Taliban leader Wakil Ahmed
Muttawakil, who was foreign minister in the regime of Mullah
Omar that was run out of office in late 2001 in the face of
a US invasion. Karzai said Muttawakil had written him
a "nice letter" and that he was considering talks in an
effort to reintegrate onetime Taliban supporters into
government. Muttawakil was released from US custody
several months ago and lives comfortably in a
"restricted" house in Kandahar.
Also this week,
an important meeting took place in Kandahar, headed by
the governor, Yusuf Pashtun, at which the idea of a
"greater Kandahar" was once again discussed. This
envisages, as first proposed by Abdul Ahad Karzai, Hamid
Karzai's father, that Kandahar act as the headquarters
(capital) of all of the Pashtun belt provinces in the
south and southeast of the country. The elder Karzai was
chief of the Popalzai tribe, a former government
minister and immensely respected among southern Pashtun
tribes.
But the Taliban murdered him in 1999 in
retaliation for his son trying to organize anti-Taliban
opposition in 1998, where the younger Karzai had found
some support among Pashtun tribal chiefs angry with the
Taliban for their close ties with Arab radicals, such as
al-Qaeda.
The overtures by Muttawakil (although
certainly under "advice" from US authorities) and the
sudden revival of the greater Kandahar concept are no
accident. The moves are clearly designed as part of the
process to find a counter-balance to the strong Northern
Alliance (mostly non-Pashtun) influence in the north of
the country, and more importantly, in the corridors of
power in Kabul. The moves are also aimed to blunt the
threat of the resurgent "non-moderate" Taliban in the
country, in alliance with the Hebz-i-Islami Afghanistan
of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Hekmatyar is bent on stirring
grassroots Pashtun feelings against foreigners in the
country, and on playing on feelings of deprivation among
Pashtuns, who, despite being the major ethnic grouping,
believe that they are politically marginalized.
Although Hamid Karzai is Pashtun, Northern
Alliance members dominate his cabinet, and they have
stationed about 20,000 of their armed supporters in
Kabul, where they have been given permanent residences.
Among the bureaucracy, Pashtu-speaking officials have
been replaced by Dari-speaking Tajiks, and Dari has
become the language of business, breaking many years of
tradition.
Now the Karzai-appointed
administration in Kandahar wants to address Pashtun
resentment by proposing greater authority and influence
for Pashtuns. Although this amounts to "opposition
within government", the moves have the backing of the
US, which is also concerned about the grip on power that
the Northern Alliance has in Kabul.
In this
context, ex-Taliban minister Muttawakil's involvement is
important, as the United States has for a long time attempted
to split the Taliban substantially - even before the
US attacked Afghanistan in late 2001. Muttawakil was one
of its earlier successes, as he surrendered soon after
the invasion began. With his release at this juncture,
US authorities believe (hope) that he will be able to
rally more "moderate" Taliban to his cause, away from
the cause of Taliban leader Mullah Omar and Hekmatyar.
In the two years since the demise of the
Taliban, Afghanistan remains nowhere closer to
establishing a viable political system. Elections are
scheduled for June, but already Karzai is talking of
postponing them because of the poor security situation.
Karzai's writ barely extends beyond the capital. Some
districts are ruled by the Taliban, some by Hekmatyar's
followers, some by opportunistic warlords, or a
combination of these.
When US Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld visited Kabul and Kandahar on
Thursday, most people connected the trip to the military
situation on the border and the much-publicized hunt for
bin Laden.
Simply defeating the resistance in
battle is not enough, if even that can be achieved. As
important is a strategy that will bring about a
political solution to allow the US to exit the country.
Roping in "moderate" Taliban and playing the Pashtun
card are continued endeavors in this regard.
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