MIRANSHAH, North Waziristan - Over the
past several decades of Afghanistan's tumultuous
history, the country's warlords have operated under a
simple maxim: today's enemy can be tomorrow's friend.
This was particularly true in the power vacuum
created following the withdrawal of Soviet troops after
their decade-long occupation in 1989. Ever-shifting
alliances between mujahideen commanders and warlords of
all political persuasions brought Afghanistan to a state
of bloody anarchy, a situation the Taliban exploited to
their full advantage by seizing power in 1996.
When the Taliban in turn threw in the towel in
the face of the US-led invasion in late 2001, once again
a political vacuum was created. Seemingly unmindful of
the lessons of history, the US turned to these same
fractious warlords to help shore up the administration
of Hamid Karzai that it had placed in Kabul.
True to form, the warlords resorted to their old
tricks, building up their spheres of influence in
pockets across the country, and at the expense of the
central government's writ in the countryside, and in
many cases at the expense of the US occupation: some
openly now support the resistance.
The US has
thus been forced to rethink its strategy, and came up
with the idea of creating a force it could use to
counter the recalcitrant warlords. This it is doing by
rebuilding the shattered network of old royalists.
Zahir Shah's rule as monarch ended in 1973 after
40 years on the throne. He was deposed in a coup by his
brother-in-law Mohammad Daud Khan, who proclaimed
Afghanistan a republic with himself as president.
Now, Hamid Karzai - he is from the Popolzai
clan, the Pashtun tribe to which the royal family
belongs - and Khalid Pashtun in Kandahar are
high-profile manifestations of the royalist trend. Yet
these are token rulers, and the real power is still in
the hands of former jihadi commanders.
Nevertheless, with many new US bases under
construction across southern Afghanistan, Washington
seems obsessed with installing ideologically and
politically pro-Western elements, a very rare breed in
today's Afghanistan. The plan is to increase the US
presence in troubled regions, and then extend maximum
support to these pro-Westerners, who essentially only
exist in the shape of the royalists.
The
Taliban, meanwhile, are looking to forge alliances and
partnerships with those warlords who are no longer
prepared to dance to the US tune.
Warlords at
war Afghanistan has been the playing field of
jihadi warlords since the Soviet invasion of 1979. To
put them under a single coherent strategy, Pakistan's
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) grouped them in 29
organizations, which was later reduced to six, and then
all six merged into one alliance.
When the
Soviet-sponsored communist regime in Kabul fell to the
mujahideen in the early 1990s, there was a feeding
frenzy between power-hungry commanders. The ISI, using
US-supplied money, tried to influence events, but all
that happened was Afghanistan became hopelessly divided
in warlord fiefdoms. They fought each other purely to
further their own ambitions and vested interests, to
which ideological and religious beliefs came secondary.
Thus the Hezb-i-Islami (HIA) led by Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar (who is still active in the resistance) was
locked into a fight with Ahmed Shah Masoud's
Jamiat-i-Islami (JIA) . Hekmatyar had an alliance with
the Hezb-i-Wahdat (a Shi'ite sect) , but Masoud's forces
eliminated the Shi'ite militia in Kabul.
In the
meantime, the Taliban movement emerged from Zabul, and
reached the HIA's stronghold in Kandahar in the south.
On the instructions of Masoud, the JIA commander there,
Mullah Naqeebullah, helped the Taliban against the HIA,
which was forced to hand over the city to the Taliban.
Then the JIA+Taliban alliance fought the warlords
belonging to the HIA and other parties in the south and
southeast until it reached Kabul. From there they issued
a religious ruling against all heads of warring
factions, including the JIA, as they were blamed for the
country's bloodletting.
This laid the
foundations for a union of nearly all warlords.
Hekmatyar's HIA and Masoud's JIA joined hands, along
with Professor Abdul Rasool Sayyaf's Ittahad-i-Islami
and many other former jihadi organizations to fight the
Taliban. But they were soon defeated and the Taliban
took over in 1996.
During the Taliban regime,
warlordism was completely suppressed in Afghanistan, and
most of the famous leaders went into exile in places
such as Iran, Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates.
September 11 changed all this. As the US's
bombers began their business in Afghanistan in
retaliation for the Taliban harboring Osama bin Laden
and al-Qaeda, apart from Hekmatyar, the warlords began
returning to place themselves at the service of the new
invaders of their country.
The result is that
today many federal cabinet positions are held by former
jihadi commanders or hardline Islamic zealots. Many
local administrations of provinces and districts are in
the hands of commanders associated with the HIA.
Afghanistan's loya jirga (grand council of
elders) is dominated by HIA members, at 25 percent of
the total representation.
On the one hand the US
reasoning cannot be faulted. Who better to replace the
Taliban than their former arch enemies? Unfortunately,
the US overlooked the warlords' dictum: today's enemy
can be tomorrow's friend.
Royalists to the
rescue? So having been let down by the warlords,
the royalists are now being given a run. The US is
pushing people loyal to former monarch Zahir Shah in the
regions around Herat, Kandahar and Khost. But in
Kandahar, the former stronghold of the Taliban, major
arm wrestling is under way between former HIA commanders
and royalist forces supported by the US, apart from
Taliban attacks on pro-government and US targets. In
Herat, several royalists have been hanged following the
murder of governor Ismail Khan's son, and a major
tug-of-war is going on between royalists and former
jihadi commanders.
Badshah Khan Zadran, a former
truck driver, was installed as governor of Khost, Gardez
and Paktia when the Taliban retreated. However, a
loya jirga for these provinces dominated by
jihadi commanders refused to accept the appointment of a
"royalist" and Badshah Khan was kicked out by the local
warlords.
Hakim Taniwal, an anthropology
professor at Kabul University before going into exile
two decades ago, was then installed as governor.
However, he was unable to curb growing insurgency and
the US is once again promoting Badshah Khan to replace
him (in the absence of anyone else sufficiently
pro-Western, it would appear).
Badshah Khan
retains a mansion near Miranshah, equipped with all the
luxuries of life, including the latest DVDs, VCRs,
air-conditioners, double-cabin jeeps, and a huge
stockpile of ammunition.
Badshah Khan's son
informed him by satellite telephone that Asia Times
Online would like an interview, at 9pm. Right at 9pm,
Badshah Khan called back.
Asia Times
Online:The governor of Khost has been removed.
You are once again being considered to fill the vacuum.
Badshah Khan: I am not interested
in being governor of Khost. I want to be the governor of
all three neighboring provinces - Khost, Gardez and
Paktia. Since Kabul has not agreed to this proposal, I
have put forward the name of my brother, and a committee
has chosen him, Amanullah Khan Zadran, as governor of
Khost. I aim to contest in the next elections, and then
nobody can stop me from becoming governor of all three
provinces.
ATol: Since your
brother and your forces will be in power in Khost, which
is the main playing field of the Taliban, will your
forces be able to contain them?
Badshah
Khan: I have mass support. I do not want to
speak about the Taliban. I would say that if they want
to be in power, they should take part in elections. If
they do not want to, it's up to them, but we will not
allow them to destabilize Khost. I do not see any future
for the Taliban.
ATol: You sound
very optimistic about the next elections [due in
September] , but so far there has been minimal
registration of voters in south and eastern Afghanistan.
Badshah Khan: That's true. Because
of the poor law and order situation, work for the
registration of voters has been delayed, but now fresh
committees represented by local influentials have been
established and I hope this task will be achieved well
before the elections.
ATol: What
future do you foresee for the forces loyal to former
king Zahir Shah.
Badshah Khan: The
king has returned to Afghanistan, and the elections will
determine who keeps the real strength.
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Part 4: Return of the
royalists
Badshah Khan: I am not interested
in being governor of Khost. I want to be the governor of
all three neighboring provinces - Khost, Gardez and
Paktia. Since Kabul has not agreed to this proposal, I
have put forward the name of my brother, and a committee
has chosen him, Amanullah Khan Zadran, as governor of
Khost. I aim to contest in the next elections, and then
nobody can stop me from becoming governor of all three
provinces. 
