MOSCOW - Moscow and Tajikistan have yet to agree
on the fate of Russian armed forces in the Central Asian
country, a situation that has the potential to create a
geopolitical vacuum - with a number of contenders
waiting to fill it.
Russia has been pushing to
establish a military base in Tajikistan to help prevent
the further decline of its regional clout. However,
Tajikistan has delayed its decision, arguably in an
attempt to explore closer ties with the United States.
Thus relations between Russia and Tajikistan are
undergoing a re-think of sorts, and a clear sign of that
shift came earlier this week.
Russia could
withdraw its 201st Division from Tajikistan, Mikhail
Marguelov, head of the international relations committee
of the Russian parliament's upper house, indicated
earlier this week in a surprise statement. "Russia is
able to open and close its military facilities abroad,
when necessary," he stated.
Tajikistan is a
strategically located country of 6 million people,
bordering China to the east, Kyrgyzstan to the north,
Uzbekistan to the west and Afghanistan on its southern
frontier. According to earlier agreements between Moscow
and Dushanbe, the Russian 201st Division was due to be
transformed into Russia's "fourth military base". The
withdrawal of the 201st Division from Tajikistan would
end Russian hopes to set up a permanent military base in
Tajikistan.
In the past, Russia and Tajikistan
have been close to agreeing on a Russian military
presence in Tajikistan. In April 1999, Russia and
Tajikistan signed a treaty of alliance and partnership.
They were understood to have agreed verbally to the
setting up of a Russian military base in Tajikistan,
while avoiding a formal military treaty. The
establishment of a Russian military base was designed
"to maintain security and safeguard the territorial
integrity" of Tajikistan, and is not aimed against other
nations, Tajik President Emomali Rakhmonov said five
years ago.
There was even talk of two Russian
bases, one near the capital Dushanbe, and the other at
Chkalovsk in northern Tajikistan's Sogd region. Now, the
Sogd region is no longer discussed, while the location
of the Russian base has yet to be decided. No date for
the final negotiations has been set yet.
During
the years of the Tajik civil war in the 1990s, many
Tajiks saw Russia as an indispensable ally in the battle
against Islamic militants. Rakhmonov's accession to
power was in large measure connected with Russian
military and political backing. Now, Tajikistan appears
to be questioning an "alliance and partnership" with
Russia.
Therefore it should not come as a
surprise that talks on the transfer of border patrol
responsibilities also proved difficult. In 2003, a
10-year bilateral agreement authorizing Russian troops
to guard the Tajik border expired and Tajikistan
refrained from renewing the deal. During discussions in
February with Russian officials, Tajik military
officials stated that Tajikistan was prepared to take
over the defense of the country's frontier with
Afghanistan. Tajikistan already holds responsibility for
patrolling its border with China. Tajik soldiers make up
about 80 percent of the 14,000-member Russian border
guard contingent in the country.
Russia was not
happy about Dushanbe's diplomatic shift and disputes
over debts ensued. Russia says Tajikistan owes more than
US$300 million to Moscow. Tajikistan, meanwhile, says
Russia owes Dushanbe $50 million for use of the military
observation post in Tajik mountains near Nurek.
Russian media have also reported an allegation
that Rakhmonov had been offered $1 billion in US aid in
exchange for refusing to set up a Russian military base
in Tajikistan. Tajik officials deny the allegation.
Moscow's displeasure also manifested itself in
the ongoing crackdown on Tajik illegal migrant workers
in Russia. In recent months, Tajik media have voiced
concerns about the alleged mistreatment of Tajiks in
Russia. A recent article in the independent weekly Ruzi
Nav characterized Russia's extradition of illegal Tajik
workers as a "genocide of the Tajik nation". Russian
ambassador Maksim Peshkov has demanded an official
apology.
Unofficial estimates indicate that
nearly a million illegal Tajik aliens send hundreds of
millions of dollars from Russia to Tajikistan every
year, a sum of money that by some accounts exceeds the
country's annual national budget of $300 million. The
loss of this cash inflow would be a blow to Tajikistan's
fragile economy.
Washington watches
carefully The US has been pushing to boost ties
with Tajikistan and Tajik authorities have been
receptive to Washington's overtures. Tajikistan's main
attraction for Washington is its strategic location
along Afghanistan's northern border.
Tajikistan's recent ratification of an agreement
that grants US soldiers immunity from prosecution in the
International Criminal Court (ICC) was seen as a sign of
possible expansion of the US presence in Tajikistan.
Under the so-called Article 98 accord, ratified on
October 9, 2003, Tajikistan will return to the US any
American military personnel charged with a crime rather
than extradite them to The Hague for trial at the ICC, a
court whose jurisdiction the Bush administration does
not recognize.
A report on US strategy in
Central Asia by the Institute for Foreign Policy
Analysis, a US-based think-tank, noted earlier this year
that Washington should consider diversifying its
military presence in Central Asia. On the other hand,
the report also urged the Bush administration to explore
the possible diplomatic benefits of engaging Russia and
China more actively in Central Asia, and suggested the
US not be overly suspicious or reactionary to Russian or
Chinese moves in Central Asia.
The US officials
sought to reassure Moscow that Washington's growing
strategic and economic presence in Tajikistan was not
aimed at reducing Russia's role. At a March 3 press
conference, US ambassador to Tajikistan Richard Hoagland
downplayed the Russian-American competition for regional
influence. He added that the possible establishment of a
Russian base in Tajikistan would not affect relations
between Washington and Moscow.
China's Tajik
interests Arguably, Beijing would also be
interested in boosting its clout in bordering
Tajikistan. For China, the chief vehicle for security
cooperation with Central Asia has been the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO). Last year, members of
the SCO, which groups China, Russia, Tajikistan,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, held joint
military exercises in Kazakhstan and China.
The
SCO anti-terrorism center, based in Kyrgyzstan, is
supposed to focus on containing Muslim radicals,
including Uighur separatists in China's Xinjiang
province. Hence Beijing has a chance of safe-guarding
its security interests in Central Asia by means of
multi-lateral anti-terrorist forces there.
It is
understood that by engaging China, Central Asian leaders
can gain additional leverage and balance the Russian and
US roles in the region. However, possible expansion of
Chinese influence in Central Asia could also undermine
US interests.
Meanwhile, other nations have also
indicated a measure of interest in Tajikistan. Last
year, India began repair-work on an air base at Ayni,
about six miles outside of Dushanbe. At a November 2003
meeting with Rakhmonov, Indian Prime Minister Atal
Bihari Vajpayee denied India planned to station aircraft
at the base. Joint military exercises have been held
with both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and, in November
2003, Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes announced
plans to enhance anti-terrorism cooperation with both
countries.
Tehran has been eyeing Tajik openings
as well. Iran has promised over $30 million in loans and
grants to Tajikistan to complete the five-kilometer
Anzab tunnel by 2006. The tunnel promises to connect
Tajikistan's capital with its second city, Khujand,
while bypassing an existing route via Uzbekistan. The
project is part of a broader Iranian regional transport
blueprint, in which Tajikistan plays a central role in a
transit route linking China to the Persian Gulf. Another
ambitious idea, carrying a price tag of $180 million,
involved construction of a road that would run from Iran
through the Afghani cities of Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif and
Sherkhan Bandar to Tajikistan and then to China.
It is understood that for both Beijing and
Tehran, promoting links with Central Asia could also
serve a geopolitical purpose, helping to alleviate
concerns about strategic encirclement by the United
States. However, with so many overlapping interests
involved, it remains to be seen whether Russia will opt
to withdraw its 201st Division from Tajikistan after
all.
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