Saving Afghanistan from the killing
fields By Ehsan Ahrari
A major
lesson from the Iraqi debacle for the United States is
to focus on nation-building, an issue for which
President George W Bush has never found much enthusiasm.
However, considering the deteriorating security
environment in Afghanistan, with presidential elections
only two months away, the US administration has shifted
its attention to nation-building. US Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld visited Kabul last week and
spent some time with counter-drug forces, especially at
a time when increased poppy cultivation in the killing
fields of that country is reported to be helping the
insurgency forces finance their operations. America's
heightened focus on attempting to
salvage Afghanistan by escalating counter-drug operations
might turn out to be a necessary, but not a sufficient,
approach.
After the Taliban regime came to
power in 1996, it knew how to achieve one goal: put an end
to poppy cultivation. Most observers knew how much
that problem contributed to making Afghanistan a tinderbox.
The opium trade was the major source of income; it was
exported via Pakistan to the south, Iran to the west,
and Tajikistan to the east of Afghanistan to European
and Russian markets. Money thus earned bankrolled the
warlords and their chauvinistic aspirations to sustain
their fiefdoms. That reality also made a mockery of any
attempt to establish a national authority.
Since the Taliban were seeking some approval in
the international community, they concluded that one way
to do that was through demonstration of their resolve
to eradicate the opium trade. They issued a ban on
poppy cultivation in July 2000. Their endeavor worked so
well that in May 2001, US narcotics experts, returning
from a fact-finding trip, concluded that "the movement's
ban on opium-poppy cultivation appears to have wiped out
the world's largest crop in less than a year".
It is not possible to get a complete
understanding of the Taliban strategy to eradicate the
opium trade; however, US narcotics experts did mention
that the Taliban "used a system of consensus-building"
by couching the issue in an Islamic framework. They
asked religious scholars to emphasize Islamic
prohibitions against drugs, and backed up religious
edicts with the threat of imprisoning violators. Given
the Taliban's low tolerance for any disregard to their
decisions on all public issues, it is not an
exaggeration to suggest that the chief reason for their
success in at least temporarily eradicating the opium
trade was their reputation for the use of violence.
Those cheering the success of the Taliban regime in
banning the opium trade were mindful of the hardship that
Afghan farmers encountered when they could not grow poppies.
It was also known then that massive assistance to
Afghanistan should not only come in the form of cash assistance
to farmers, but, more important, to finance comprehensive
programs for clearing minefields and creating
a nationwide irrigation system and a massive education
program. Otherwise, the opium trade would spring back
into action at the first opportune moment.
The United
States' dismantlement of the Taliban regime in November
2001 turned out to be just such a moment. Afghan farmers
reportedly rushed to plant their poppy fields.
Afghanistan had a new sheriff (the US), whose priority
then was (as it is now) eradication of the remnants of
Taliban and al-Qaeda forces, not ensuring the
continuation of the ban on poppy cultivation. However,
being fully cognizant of the linkage between the opium
trade and the internal instability of Afghanistan, the
Bush administration maintained the public posturing
about its commitment to eradication of the drug trade.
Another US predilection that defeated
the objective of extermination of the drug trade was
its reliance on Afghan warlords to capture or kill
the al-Qaeda-Taliban leadership. Washington continued
that dependence, knowing that the very same warlords
were also part of the opium-trade problem. However, the
capture of the al-Qaeda-Taliban leadership was a goal of
considerably higher political value than tackling the
issue of the drug trade.
President Hamid Karzai
himself was aware of how the growing number of poppy
fields was contributing to his inability to expand the
authority of the central government. Yet he also made
his own contribution to the problem by continuing to
deal with some warlords, while attempting to assert the
authority of the central government vis-a-vis others.
Now, with presidential elections due
in October, the Afghan government and its US masters are
worried about the dangerous role of the growing poppy
trade for the evolution of democracy in Afghanistan.
According to a United Nations report, drug production
generated US$2.3 billion in Afghanistan in 2003, and the
3,600 tonnes of heroin produced last year accounted for
up to 95% of the heroin on Europe's streets. According
to a UN estimate, Afghanistan accounted for
three-quarters of the world's opium last year. About 1.7
million rural Afghans, 7% of the population, rely on
poppy cultivation. The Karzai government is unable to
entice poppy growers away from that crop by paying the
measly amount of $350 per hectare for the destruction of
their poppy fields, while those farmers can easily earn
$3,000 per hectare for growing it.
"Out of this
drug chest, some [Afghan] provincial administrators and
military commanders take a considerable share," the UN
report says. "The more they get used to this, the less
likely it becomes that they will respect the law, be
loyal to Kabul and support the legal economy."
Bush administration
officials have said that the crop this year will produce
5,400-7,200 tonnes of opium gum, an increase of 50-100% compared with
2003.
What are the
chances that Afghanistan may be saved from the killing fields of
poppy? Examining just one set of statistics may provide
a cursory answer. The world community of donor nations rallied
more than three months ago in Berlin at an
international conference on Afghanistan to pledge $11.5 billion for
reconstruction over three years. However, Afghanistan -
with a population of 25 million to 30
million - is estimated to be in need of at least
$39 billion just for the end of this decade. What nation is
willing to commit hard cash of that magnitude for the
long haul? Certainly not the US, which is already dumping
billions of dollars into the black hole of Iraq,
where political stability appears nothing more than a
mirage. Besides, after the presidential elections in the
US, America's own commitment to staying put in
Afghanistan - or Iraq - is likely to undergo a major
overhaul. Presidential hopeful John Kerry is already
using the euphemistic language of relying on the
international community, which has shown limited
interest in investing its own precious resources in
Afghanistan, where the emergence of law and order in the
near term appears minimal. If Bush is re-elected, then
even he has to start thinking more and more about his
legacy - as all presidents do during their second term.
And getting out of Afghanistan is likely to become part
of his thinking then.
In the interim, Afghanistan appears
to be as ungovernable now as it was when the
Soviet Union occupied it for a decade from 1979, with
a grand dream of enslaving it. The United States did
not enter with that kind of dream. However, by ousting
the Taliban regime, it became obligated - indeed
responsible - for the creation of a stable Afghanistan.
As the troubled country gets closer to electing a
president, its own destiny appears firmly entangled in
the death grip of opium traders. Unfortunately, while
the latter appear resolute about not letting go of the
country, no one in the international community is likely
to stay and fight with them over the long haul to
salvage Afghanistan from the killing fields.
Ehsan Ahrari, PhD, is an Alexandria,
Virginia, US-based independent strategic analyst.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All
rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for
information on our sales and syndication policies.)
heightened focus on attempting to
salvage Afghanistan by escalating counter-drug operations
might turn out to be a necessary, but not a sufficient,
approach. 
