MOSCOW - As attempts to solve
differences on how to divide the Caspian Sea riches
between Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan go nowhere, the five littoral states remain
divided in decade-long negotiations. Meanwhile, some
evidence suggests that positions in the great Caspian
could be shifting.
Senior diplomats of the
littoral states are due to meet in Moscow next month to
discuss sharing the region's immense oil and gas
resources. Last week, Azerbaijanii Foreign Minister Yelmar
Mamediarov traveled to Moscow and told his Russian hosts
that "diplomatic efforts could yield a result like the
one we succeeded in achieving in the north of the
Caspian". He was referring to a deal among Russia,
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan to share the resources of the
north and center of the Caspian Sea.
Moscow believes that in the absence of an overall
agreement, bilateral agreements on the Caspian are needed. In
the wake of the flawed Caspian Sea summit in April
2002, Moscow pushed for a series of bilateral deals instead
of an overall agreement among all five littoral states.
Kazakhstan quickly agreed and clinched a separate deal
with Russia, while Azerbaijan eventually followed suit
by signing a similar agreement.
However, Iran
has said it will not recognize any bilateral or
trilateral deals on the Caspian division before an
overall Caspian convention is signed by all five states.
Seeking a larger share of the Caspian Sea, Turkmenistan
and Iran have disagreed with Russia's plan for splitting
the Caspian bottom along a "modified median line" while
keeping the waters in common. Turkmenistan has declined
to take part in any bilateral deals on the Caspian.
In April, the littoral states' chief diplomats
met in Moscow, and Russia had expected to give ongoing
negotiations on the Caspian division a much-needed
boost. Yet the meeting's outcome proved well below these
expectations.
The Caspian Convention has
been under discussion since 1991, and respective
special Caspian envoys have been meeting since 1996.
The convention was expected to be signed this year,
but these plans are still far from maturity. Prospects
of the Caspian summit, which was to have be convened in the second
half of this year in Tehran, also remain far from certain.
Moreover,
the Kremlin has just fired its special Caspian
envoy - Viktor Kalyuzhny, who used to be largely anti-American
and fiercely critical of the US-backed projects
in the region. He was replaced by former energy minister
Igor Yusufov, a less outspoken official who has been
supporting closer energy ties with the United States.
Kalyuzhny, who had served as Russia's special Caspian
envoy for the past four years, had become notorious
for his anti-US rhetoric. He lashed out at the United
States' perceived meddling and insisted regional security
issues should be tackled by the littoral states only, a
position close to Tehran's stance. Kalyuzhny also quoted
the presence of US bases in Central Asia as an argument
against demilitarization of the Caspian region.
As far as the Kremlin's goals in the region were
concerned, Russia's special Caspian envoy sounded
uncharacteristically blunt. "We have the Russian
president's instructions to ensure the maximum volume of
Caspian energy transit through Russia," Kalyuzhny
stated.
On the other hand, Russia's new special Caspian
envoy, Yusufov, in his previous capacity, has repeatedly
reiterated Russian readiness to supply oil and
gas to the United States, stating that Russia prioritizes
energy ties with the US. It remains to be seen whether
Kalyuzhny's replacement by Yusufov could indicate
changes in Moscow's position in the Caspian debate, a
step closer toward Washington.
Incidentally,
Yusufov's status was downgraded from presidential
special envoy and deputy foreign minister to the Foreign
Ministry's special envoy. Hence the move could also
reflect Moscow's disillusionment with prospects of
working out a viable Caspian solution in the foreseeable
future.
In the meantime, Tehran has been on its
diplomatic offensive to secure its Caspian interests. A
recent visit by Iranian President Mohammad Khatami to
Azerbaijan seems to have put bilateral relations on a
better footing. However, the Iranian leader's trip
failed to resolve differences over the Caspian division.
Until recently, the two countries
were divided by a variety of disagreements. Since the
early 1990s, Azerbaijani and Iranian presidents did not exchange
visits because of bilateral tensions. Yet the late president Heydar
Aliyev's trip to Iran in May 2002 served to improve
bilateral ties.
Khatami paid the first
official visit to Azerbaijan this August 5-7. Both presidents
hailed bilateral ties, although no political declaration
or agreement on the legal status of the Caspian Sea was
signed, as had been initially expected. Besides the
Caspian question, issues of geopolitics also surfaced:
Azerbaijan has been wary about Iran's strong economic
and political ties with Azerbaijan's erstwhile rival,
Armenia, while Tehran has been suspicious of Baku's
close relationship with the US.
Iran and
Azerbaijan have long been unable to agree on a formula
to divide the sea. During his Baku visit, Khatami tried
to improve prospects for a near-term breakthrough. Yet
no participants in the stalemated Caspian Sea talks have
given any indication of making a significant concession.
With Russia, Kazakhstan and
Azerbaijan supporting the median-line division principle, this
would leave Iran with the smallest part of the Caspian.
According to treaties in 1921, 1940 and 1970, Iran
controls just 13% of the Caspian sea and is poised to
benefit greatly from equal division. After 1991, Iran
suggested that the Caspian should be divided equally,
with the five littoral states each receiving 20% of the
sea.
Kazakhstan is set to become a
major beneficiary of the median principle, which would
leave it with the largest part of the Caspian. Iran
and Turkmenistan would be the losers. No big wonder
that Iran and Turkmenistan insist that each of the
five states bordering the Caspian Sea should own one-fifth of
its oil and gas reserves, estimated to be the
third-largest in the world.
In terms of the
great Caspian energy game, Moscow also seeks a pipeline
ban as part of a future convention on the Caspian Sea's
status. Such a ban would be detrimental to a US-backed
project to send Caspian oil to the Turkish port of
Ceyhan. Russian officials cited environmental reasons as
the main argument for banning pipelines.
Moscow
has been insisting that the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline is
not economically viable, indicating that Russia remains
wary of the US-backed project. Last February, Azerbaijani
President Ilham Aliyev came to Moscow to reassure Russia
that the BTC was not intended to damage Russia's
economic interests.
Coincidence or not,
Kalyuzhny happened to be the BTC's most zealous critic.
He threatened to undermine Kazakh crude oil supplies to
the BTC, accusing Washington of sponsoring the BTC
pipeline in order to bypass Russia. Following
Kalyuzhny's removal, it remains to be seen whether
Russia can remain opposed to the BTC, as well as the US
pursuit of the Caspian's hydrocarbon riches.
Sergei Blagov covers Russia and
post-Soviet states, with special attention to
Asia-related issues. He has contributed to Asia Times
Online since 1996. Between 1983 and 1997, he was based
in Southeast Asia. In 2001 and 2002, Nova Science
Publishers, NY, published two of his books on Vietnamese
history.
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