Russian bear calls on gray
wolf By K Gajendra Singh
The
two-day state visit to Ankara starting next Thursday by
Russian President Vladimir Putin, three decades after
the last visit by the Soviet Union's president Nikolay
Podgorny in 1973, underlines the reshuffling of
strategic perceptions by major players in the region.
This comes after Turkish Prime Minister Recep
Tayyep Erdogan's recent visit to Tehran, which capped
warming relations between Turkey and Iran and their
efforts to put aside deep-rooted historical and
ideological differences, because of developments in the
region. Clearly, Turkey is moving away from its North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally the United
States, and its good regional friend, Israel.
Even the 1973 Podgorny visit, when the author
was first posted at Ankara, was Turkey's show of anger
at Washington's warnings that it not use US arms in its
dispute over Cyprus with Greece, also a NATO member. Of
course that was at the peak of the Cold War, and that
visit was an expression of frustration.
But now
we are in the post-Cold War era after the collapse of
the Soviet Union, the attacks of September 11, 2001, the
US-led invasion of Iraq and the deteriorating security
situation and daily bloodbath there. March last year was
a watershed when the Turkish parliament rejected a
government motion (with a two-thirds majority ) to allow
troops of its ally the US to open a second front against
Iraq from Turkish soil.
Perhaps for the first
time in history after centuries, after the collapse of
the Soviet Union, Turkey and Russia no longer shared a
border. But the strategic interests of Turkey and Russia
still overlap in "near abroads" - in the Caucasus and
Central Asia, where some degree of geopolitical
competition is inevitable.
As one expert put it,
"Turkish-Russian interactions highlight how the
relationship between key regional powers in the
post-Cold War context can be characterized by
significant cooperation and conflict at the same time."
In the short term, the security problems appear to be
manageable, but they will always remain a major
long-term concern. For the time being, the magnitude of
Turkish-Russian trade (based on large-scale energy
imports to Turkey ) and the need for co-existence at the
political level, works against more competitive
policies.
Growth of bilateral economic
relations Perhaps the most positive development
in Russian-Turkish relations in recent years has been
the 15-20% annual growth in trade. Bilateral trade,
which was just US$200 million 15 years ago, is expected
to reach $8 billion this year. In 2003, Turkey exported
$1.3 billion worth of goods to Russia, while its imports
were $5.4 billion. Until the early 1990s, trade was
balanced. Russia is now second only to Germany as
Turkey's main trading partner. The Turkish Vestel
company has invested $15 million and started production
of television sets in Russia. Koc and Enka Group's
Ramstore has opened more supermarket-chain stores, which
now total 20 in Russia. Turks are also very active in
the construction business.
While Turkish
entrepreneurs and traders are active in Russia, Russian
entrepreneurs are also involved in the privatization of
Turkish companies, specifically Tatneft, which won a
tender for Turkey's largest petrochemical company, and
Europe's fourth-largest. In February, Tatneft, Russia's
sixth-biggest oil producer, won final approval from the
Turkish government to buy a majority stake in state oil
refiner Tupras for $1.3 billion.
Russia also
wants to sell arms to Turkey. In the mid-1990s, Turkey
became the first NATO country to buy arms, rifles,
helicopters etc from Russia, for use against Kurdish
rebels, as Western nations refused to sell them. The
number of Russian tourists to Turkey is also on the
rise. In 2003, some 1.2 million Russians visited Turkey.
This number is expected to rise to 1.7 million by the
end of 2004.
The "Blue Stream" natural-gas
pipeline forms the basis of higher trade and closer
economic relations, increasing Turkish reliance on
Russia. In 1986, Turkey signed an agreement with Russia
(for 25 years) for 6 billion cubic meters of natural
gas. A similar agreement was signed in 1998 for 8
billion cubic meters of "Turusgaz". Moscow wants to
extend the pipeline to Israel. In 2003, the problems of
supply of Russian natural gas through the Blue Stream
were resolved during the visit of Erdogan to Russia, as
the leader of his Justice and Development Party (AK
Party). Russia's Gazprom company agreed to a lower gas
price and the amount of natural gas to be purchased by
Turkey.
Russian project for oil pipeline via
Turkey Now Russia is keen on a Trans-Thracian
pipeline, which would allow its oil to reach the
Mediterranean from the Black Sea without passing through
the congested Bosporus. Oil traffic through the strait
has risen by 30% to about 2.8 million barrels per day in
the past two years, mainly from the Black Sea port of
Novorossiisk. This figure will increase as exports to
the Black Sea via the Caspian pipeline from Kazakhstan
are set to grow to 67 million tons per year.
Increasing traffic through the strait has been a
bone of contention between Russia and Turkey for many
years. The Trans-Thracian pipeline, from Turkey's
western Black Sea coast, 193 kilometers south to
Ibrikbaba on Turkey's Aegean coast, would ease the
bottleneck in the strait. The proposed pipeline could
transport about 60 million tons per year directly to the
Mediterranean. The Turkish government supports the idea,
but does not want to finance it. London-based Center for
Global Energy Studies analyst Julian Lee told the Moscow
Times recently: "Turkey doesn't want to fall into the
trap which Ukraine did with the Odessa-Brody project, of
building a pipeline nobody wants to use. The [Turkish]
government would rather see an international consortium
take the project forward."
The Trans-Thracian
pipeline proposal is to overcome restrictions imposed by
Turkey on the passage of tankers carrying Russian and
Kazakhstan oil to the world markets through the
Bosporus. In 2003, more than 8,000 ships sailed through
the strait, compared with 4,000 in 1996, and carried
some 150 million tonnes of cargo. About 15 million
people live along the shores of the Bosporus. And there
have been some blazing accidents.
However, apart
from environmental and safety concerns for the
inhabitants of the region, the Turkish authorities want
to force oil companies and the governments of the
Caspian region to use the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline
(BTC), which is now being built. Oil from Azerbaijan is
hardly enough to fill the requirements of the new line,
whose chief backer is the United States. The shift from
tankers would fulfill the political and economic
objectives of the pipeline. There is also the problem of
an extra 9 million tons of oil per year that could flow
through from Ukraine's Druzhba pipeline to the Black
Sea. So Turkey remains advantageously placed for
transfer of energy from the Caspian basin to the
Mediterranean.
Turkey is also looking for
Russian support on the Northern Cyprus question during
Putin's visit. Russia, a permanent member of the United
Nations Security Council, is seen as a sympathizer of
Orthodox Greek Cypriots, who overwhelmingly voted
against a UN plan in April for reunification of the
island. Greek Cypriots oppose efforts at the UN and the
European Union to end the international isolation of
Turkish Cypriots. Turkey did note that Russian Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov met with Turkish Cypriot Prime
Minister Mehmet Ali Talat on the sidelines of the
mid-June foreign ministers' meeting of the Organization
of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in Istanbul.
Relations with the Russian Federation There was a flurry of visits between Russia and
Turkey soon after the collapse of the USSR. These
included the visit of foreign minister Hikmet Cetin to
Moscow on January 20-22, 1992, and a reciprocal visit to
Ankara by foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev the next
month. During prime minister Suleyman Demirel's official
visit to Moscow on May 25-26, 1992, the "Treaty on the
Principles of Relations between the Republic of Turkey
and the Russian Federation" was signed, replacing an
earlier but similar treaty bearing the same title. This
treaty established the legal basis of relations between
the two countries and also confirmed their willingness
to improve this relationship.
Russian president
Boris Yeltsin was in Istanbul on June 25, 1992, for the
first summit meeting of the Black Sea Economic
Cooperation (BSEC). Cetin paid another official visit to
Moscow on March 1, 1993, while prime minister Tansu
Ciller made an official visit on September 8-9, 1993.
During that visit, a joint transportation committee and
a working group in the fields of telecommunications,
industry and transfer of high technology were
established.
Russian first deputy prime minister
Oleg Soskovets paid an official visit to Ankara on July
15-20, 1994, and signed two protocols on bilateral
economic relations and debt rescheduling related to
Turkish Eximbank loans extended during the Soviet
period. Ciller, visiting Moscow on May 9, 1995, for the
ceremony to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the end
of World War II, held official talks with Russian
premier Viktor Chernomyrdin.
Chernomyrdin's
visit to Ankara on December 15-16, 1997, was the first
of a Russian premier since the collapse of the USSR in
1991. Premier Bulent Ecevit was in Moscow on November
4-6, 1999, during which a joint declaration on
cooperation in the "struggle against terrorism,
agreements on the abolition of visas for diplomatic
passports, cooperation in the veterinary field and a
protocol on cooperation in the field of information" was
signed. A protocol on a joint economic commission
provided the framework for bilateral economic
cooperation.
During Russian prime minister
Mikhail Kasyanov's visit on October 23-25, 2000, when he
was accompanied by the ministers of energy, public
property and industry, and science and technology as
well as other high-ranking officials, agreements
including the formation of a joint committee on
cooperation in the defense industry were signed. During
foreign minister Igor Ivanov's visit to Ankara on June
7-8, 2001, a cultural exchange program for 2001-03 was
signed. Ivanov and his counterpart also held
consultations on possible areas of cooperation in
Eurasia.
In early 2004, Foreign Minister
Abdullah Gul visited Moscow after a gap of eight years.
The two sides discussed accusations of harboring hostile
and terrorist groups, such as Chechen and other groups,
by Turkey and Kurdish groups by Russia. The Kurdistan
Workers Party (PKK) , a Marxist Kurdish rebel group, had
support from the USSR and its proxy, Syria, but Syria
was forced to shut down its operations in 1999.
But Chechen-led violence in Moscow and elsewhere
in Russia and terrorist acts in Istanbul have brought
realism to the two nations' view on international
terrorism. This is a major problem worrying Moscow and
Ankara. But any agreement after Gul's visit remained
unknown. Many Chechen leaders, including Akhmed Zakayev,
a representative of the so-called president of Ichkeria,
Aslan Maskhadov, once lived in Turkey. Russians complain
that while the activities of the followers of the
pan-Islamic, pan-Turkic Nurcular organization are banned
in Turkey, they carry out a wide variety of
intelligence-related tasks in Russia.
At a press
conference, Gul responded that Moscow had supplied
Turkey with "a list of Turkish citizens involved in
terrorist activity" and that it would be thoroughly
studied. He agreed that some of the fighters killed in
Chechnya might be Turkish citizens and declared,
"Terrorist acts have occurred in Istanbul, and their
perpetrators also hold Turkish passports." As for funds
collected for humanitarian purposes in Chechnya, they
are handled by the Turkish Red Crescent, he added. Gul
said Turkey had demanded that Russia declare the PKK,
now called Kong La, a terrorist group. "The Russians had
promised to study the question," the minister said.
Contacts at the military level have also been
established after the signing of a framework agreement
on "cooperation in the military field and agreement on
cooperation of training of military personnel" in
January 2002 during the visit of General Anatoly
Kvashnin, chief of staff of the Russian Federation, to
Ankara. Turkish chief of staff General Huseyin
Kivrikoglu returned the visit in June 2002. The first
meeting of the joint military-technical cooperation
commission was held in September 2002 in Ankara and a
second meeting in November 2003 in Moscow.
Relations have also been established at the
level of the parliaments. During the visit of the
Speaker of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA),
Mustafa Kalemli, to Moscow on July 14-18, 1996, a
"protocol on cooperation between the TGNA and the
Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation" was signed.
Competition in Central Asia Muslim
tribes around the Black and Caspian seas and the
mountainous Caucasian region that separates Russia and
the Middle East and Anatolia migrated to the Ottoman
Empire and are now spread all over the region and
beyond, and have long-established roots. The region has
complex linkages and relationships between the people of
Turkey and the people of the Caucasian region, which
were established when the empire was shrinking. Contacts
between citizens of the Turkish Republic and the
republics of Central Asia are also abiding.
But
after World War I, the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia
and the creation of the Turkish Republic in Anatolia by
Kemal Ataturk, contacts with Muslim people of not only
Central Asia but the Caucasian region ceased almost
altogether. A pan-Turkic leader, Col Turkesh, told this
writer that he met Turks from Central Asia for the first
time in New Delhi, when invited by Indira Gandhi to meet
delegations from the USSR. Even relations with Arabs
were limited, who, according to the Turks, had revolted
against the Sultan Caliph. Ataturk jettisoned the Arab
and Ottoman religious heritage and Islamic and Central
Asian baggage. He turned Turks around to look at the
West and become Westernized, modern and secular citizens
to reach the level of contemporary European
civilization.
The sudden collapse in 1991 of the
Soviet Union, Turkey's historical enemy, pleased Turks
no end. It opened the floodgates of exchanges and
relations between the Turks of Anatolia and the Turkic
peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus. There were
delegations galore, with the two "lost peoples" hugging
each other, with many Central Asian leaders bending down
to touch the soil of Turkey with their foreheads on
first arrival. The Iranians and the Russians had cut off
exchanges and relations between the Ottomans and their
ethnic kin in the Caucasus and Central Asia, known as
Turkestan.
The author remembers the romantic
vision sold to former communist states by Western
leadership and media that with democracy and capitalism,
prosperity was around the corner. Soon the reality
dawned, how Western leadership trifled with the
ex-communist leadership, making them reliant on Western
capitalism and institutions. Billions of dollars were
transferred from Russia to Western banks and
institutions under the charade of globalization.
Many Central Asian leaders to whom power fell
like manna from heaven in 1991 were confused and
rudderless. They were cautious and wanted good relations
with all. The United States encouraged Turkey's efforts
as it was afraid that Russia would try to wrest back
control of its "near abroad", which it tried in many
ways, but the horse had already bolted from the stable.
Fears that Iran would export its version of
fanatic Islam and support anti-US regimes in Central
Asia also proved far-fetched. After a debilitating
eight-year-long war with Iraq in the 1980s, in which
Iran lost a million young people, there was little
energy or money left to spread the message of Shi'ite
revolution.
Except for the Azeris and some other
pockets, most people in Central Asia are Sunni Muslims,
closer to the more mystic Sufi way of life. They have a
very high level of education and a lifestyle of drinking
and good living. With deep-grained nomadic habits, they
could not easily be led to Islamic fundamentalism. It
was the ill-conceived US, Saudi and Pakistani policies
that brought Wahhabi Islam to Central Asia. It was
further aggravated by former communists, now rulers,
using the fear of Islamic fundamentalism to crush all
forms of opposition to their dictatorial rule, based on
clan and regional linkages only.
Except for the
Caspian basin, because of its energy resources, and in
Kyrgyzstan, the US leadership soon lost interest (except
after September 11, 2001). The Caspian basin has between
100 billion and 200 billion barrels of oil. The US
courted Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev, touting him as a
democrat, and helped his country join the World Trade
Organization in 1998. The reason was to have a friendly
regime with freedom to base personnel and sensing
equipment to monitor China, next door. Akayev has proved
no different than leaders of other Central Asian
republics in terms of his record on democracy, though.
The early 1990s were an opportune moment for
Turkey, which under the dynamic leadership of Turgut
Ozal had successfully undergone a decade of economic
reforms, opening its economy to the West, especially
Europe. The country had many trained managers and
experts who, because of ethnic, linguistic and religious
similarity, became advisers and even ministers in the
new Turkic republics in Central Asia (CARs). Both at
state level and in the private sector, Turkey made large
investments in Central Asia and Azerbaijan. The Turkish
government provided loans amounting to $750 million to
Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and
Tajikistan. Turkish private investment runs into
billions of dollars. Turks have established successful
industries and run hotels and textile and other
businesses.
Turkey also arranged to train 10,000
students and teachers from the new republics. Turkish as
spoken in Turkey has been purified by excluding many
Arabic and Persian words. Many European words,
especially from French, have been added. The Azeri
language is quite similar to Turkish, as well as the
Turkmen language. The languages spoken by Uzbeks, by
Kyrgyz and in Kazakhstan are somewhat different.
Originally, Soviet Russians prescribed Latin script for
the Central Asian languages, but when Ataturk changed to
Latin script from Arabic, the Russians changed to
Cyrillic. Many Turks have opened schools in Central
Asia, too. Turkey also started beaming Avrasia TV
programs to Central Asia, but with uneven results.
The initiative to bring the new Central Asian
Turkic countries together was taken by Ozal, but
unfortunately he died in 1993. But Turkey's efforts to
create an area of influence in Central Asia were opposed
by the newly independent leadership. A loose
organization of Turkic states exists without having
achieved much. The Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)
was reorganized, with the CARs joining in to create the
new Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). To soothe
the Russians, a Black Sea organization was also created,
but it remains equally ineffective. Many Turkish leaders
complained in the mid-1990s that the Central Asian
governments did not repay Turkish loans, while they paid
back Western ones. The author was told that the new
CARs' leadership would like to establish authoritarian
political regimes and try to follow the capitalist
system of East Asia. They have certainly succeeded
rather well in the first objective.
Problems
in the Caucasus The Russians might have plotted
the borders of the Soviet republics in such a way that
there are territorial disputes among almost all
neighboring states that became independent after the
collapse of the USSR, eg between Armenia and Azerbaijan,
between Ossetias in Russia and Georgia, and among
Uzbeks, Kyrgyz and Tajiks in the Ferghana Valley, to
name only a few. But Russia, too, was caught in the
sudden denouement. This writer recalls the Russian
ambassador in Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan, forced to
operate his mission from a suite of rooms in a rundown
Intourist hotel, while the US, United Kingdom and even
Israel occupied prime property.
To avoid loss of
control in the Muslim North Caucasus, ie Chechnya and
Dagestan, which would result in the disintegration of
the Russian Federation itself, Russian objectives remain
that it maintain military bases and influence in
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, deploy Russian troops
to guard the external frontiers of the three
Trans-Caucasian states, use exclusive Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS - ie Russian) peacekeeping
troops in the region and station more Russian tanks and
armored vehicles in the North Caucasus, even though this
violates the terms of regional treaties.
Russia
also wants Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan to
route their oil and gas exports via Russia. It is thus
clear that Russian and Turkish interests (or rather of
the US as well) are bound to clash in the Caucasus.
Therefore, soon after the collapse of the USSR,
nationalist Russian politicians, ex-communist cadres,
ambitious Russian generals, local mafia, Turkish groups
and international oil executives all entered the fray to
play their part for personal or national gains on the
Caucasian chessboard.
Ten million inhabitants of
Turkey come from families that originate in the North
Caucasus and the Trans-Caucasus, which were once parts
of the Ottoman Empire. It is estimated that there are
25,000 Turkish citizens of Chechen decent alone. About
50 official Caucasian solidarity associations are active
in Turkey. These groups invariably pressure the Turkish
government to oppose Russian involvement in the
Trans-Caucasus and against Russian military operations
in Chechnya. Even Turkey was put in an embarrassing
situation when the late Azerbaijani president Heydar
Aliyev accused a Turkish group in 1995 of trying to
overthrow him with the help of his opponents in Baku.
Turkey remains wary of Russian military bases in
Georgia and Armenia as a potential threat. Ankara would
also like CIS peacekeeping forces in the South Caucasus
to be replaced by international forces, since these
peacekeeping troops are mostly Russian.
At the
same time, Russia is also unhappy with Turkish military
and security officials' cooperation with their
counterparts in Georgia and Azerbaijan. In January 2002
in Ankara, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey concluded a
tripartite agreement on regional security. Moscow is
especially unhappy with Turkish assistance in
modernizing the Marneuli Air Base near Tbilisi in
Georgia. In October 2002, a Turkish military delegation
attended the formal opening of the United Military
Academy in Tbilisi, set up and co-staffed by the Turkish
armed forces. Speaking at the opening ceremony, Georgian
Lieutenant-General David Tevzadze stressed that
instructions would comply with NATO standards.
Zeyno Baran, director of the Caucasus Project at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
pointed out recently, "In the past, Georgia had asked
the Russians for help against the Ottomans, but today
Georgia receives military, economic and political
assistance from Turkey." Turkey has become Georgia's
main trading partner, with a flourishing border trade.
There has been talk of improving railway connection
between the two countries, but no concrete steps have
been taken. But as long as Georgia has problems with
Russia, it will need Turkey and the US. Apart from
strategic reasons, Turkey also needs Georgia for its
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.
It appears that
everyone is coming to Georgia's aid. "For example, the
boots of our soldiers are from Turkey, and their
uniforms, worth 9 million euros [$10.8 million], are
from Italy. The UK, Romania, Bulgaria, Israel and the US
also help. We do not conceal this," said a Georgian
press report. The Georgian army will be equipped with
Israeli-made Tavors instead of the classic Kalashnikov
(AK-47).
But the US remains the main actor and
has successfully replaced an aging Eduard Shevardnadze
with a more pliable Georgian leader. The skirmishes, or
the Great Game, despite the US being embroiled in Iraq,
go on.
K Gajendra Singh, Indian
ambassador (retired), served as ambassador to Turkey
from August 1992 to April 1996. Prior to that, he served
terms as ambassador to Jordan, Romania and Senegal. He
is currently chairman of the Foundation for Indo-Turkic
Studies. E-mailGajendrak@hotmail.com.
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