Over the
past several months, political discussion has centered
on the rumored deployment of up to 40,000 Russian troops
to either Iraq or Afghanistan to help the United States
fight the "war on terrorism" and to provide much-needed
relief to Washington's forces. While there are no final
details yet on whether or not the
deployment will actually
occur, the idea itself raises a number of strategic
concerns for the Russian Federation as it tries to
re-establish its influence in world affairs.
Positive effects of deployment The
potential deployment would have positive aspects to both
Moscow and Washington. For the US, a major deployment of
an international military force to either Iraq or
Afghanistan means a much-needed foreign policy victory
for President George W Bush in the closing months of the
presidential election campaign. Such a sizeable
deployment means much relief for the American forces
that have been fighting nonstop since the end of major
combat operations in the spring of 2003. Washington will
also be able to dilute a strong French-German-Russian
quasi-alliance that defied the US prior to and during
its war in Iraq.
For Russia, the future benefits
of such an overseas military deployment mean a greater
economic stake in Iraq, especially for its oil and gas
companies, and a possible membership in the World Trade
Organization. While the benefits of this possible
deployment are significant, questions still remain over
whether Russia will indeed be able to pull off such a
large deployment of men and materiel to major military
hotspots.
Moscow attempts to strengthen
regional Influence Since the end of the Cold
War, Moscow has tried to reassert its military weight in
world affairs, and is bent on regaining influence among
its former satellites, most notably in Central Asia. It
already maintains military bases in Kyrgyzstan and
restive Georgia, helps to protect the borders in
Tajikistan, and has a very strong military alliance with
Armenia. All signs point to the increase of such
activities in the years to come, as the Russian
Federation will compete with the US and China for
influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Over the
years, Moscow has been holding military exercises in
order to strengthen influence in its near abroad and to
re-orient its military towards the new challenges of the
21st century. Two such recent exercises are useful tests
of whether or not Russia will be able to successfully
deploy a large contingent and maintain its military edge
in the Middle East or Afghanistan.
This summer,
Russian, Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Tajik special forces and
marine detachments - comprising a thousand soldiers -
have engaged in a mock battle with a "terrorist"
contingent of several hundred fighters in the
"Frontier-2004" exercise, conducted on the border region
between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. On June 21-25, Russia
conducted the "Mobility-2004" exercise in the Far East
region, preparing for a possible deployment of a rapid
reaction force from one part of the country to the
other. As the coalition forces battled the "insurgents"
during "Frontier-2004", they had to first deploy the
troops around the suspected "rebels" via newest and
upgraded helicopters and under cover of close-support
aviation, and then fight their way into a village taken
over by the retreating "enemy". Coordinated actions of
this multinational force finished off the "insurgents"
in just several hours.
While this type of
operation might be exactly the kind of warfare Russian
troops will be experiencing in possible conflicts in
Central Asia, the Caucasus, and even Iraq or
Afghanistan, the success of the exercise was almost
guaranteed by the presence of Russia's Defense Minister
Sergei Ivanov, Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev and a large
number of Russian and Central Asian military and
political representatives. To hand a defeat to this
coalition force or to suffer a setback would have
embarrassed the generals and ministers present, all of
whom wanted a victory - even if somewhat scripted - in
order to declare preparedness to fight new types of wars
against terrorist and religious-fundamentalist
formations.
Russia's second exercise,
"Mobility-2004", involved 3,000 troops, several hundred
armored vehicles and artillery pieces and several dozen
support ships and aircraft. This particular exercise was
held in order to simulate the deployment of a
marine-type military formation to an unfamiliar
environment in order to conduct short and long-term
operations. To the Russian military, which has been
based for decades on the offensive-defensive Cold
War-style warfare, this type of deployment is a new and
untested territory. It will call its forces to act on
local conflicts happening either deep inside another
country or within its coastal regions, demanding
mobility and rapid reaction to the constantly changing
battlefield environment.
While "Mobility-2004"
was a worthy attempt at simulating this type of warfare,
the exercise was handicapped by a small number of troops
and materiel present. Essentially, Russia was capable of
"deploying" only several battalions into the
"unfamiliar" territory - while the real battle scenario
might call for thousands more troops. The total number
of marines in Russia is currently a fraction of its
equivalent force in the US - the country Russia tries to
imitate through its military reforms. Nor does Russia
have enough equipment to support a deployment in excess
of its recently conducted exercise.
Negative
effects of deployment The proposed deployment of
Russian forces to either Iraq or Afghanistan will expose
them once again to the very environment that is
painfully familiar to the entire country. From 1994 to
1996, and from the fall of 1999 to the present day,
Russian forces are fighting a bloody and difficult war
in its restive republic of Chechnya. Officially, the
Kremlin keeps assuring its people and the international
community that it has full control over the republic and
only a few pockets of resistance remain. Thousands of
Russian soldiers have lost their lives in quelling the
Chechen rebellion, and thousands more have been wounded.
Russia has expended enormous resources in order to
sustain its military operations there, and nearly all of
its combat-ready troops are located there or in the
surrounding territory.
Chechen warfare is eerily
similar to what is happening in Iraq at the moment,
especially in Najaf and the Sunni triangle. Even as
Russian forces brought overwhelming military superiority
to bear on the rebels, no clear end is in sight for this
war that is straining Russia's patience and is a
constant source of embarrassment for the government. And
while in "Frontier-2004" Russian and allied forces have
been able to successfully defeat the enemy troops that
resemble Chechen fighters, the unscripted reality is a
much darker and bloodier picture.
In June of
this year, for example, a large rebel formation of
between several hundred to more than a thousand men
attacked Russian military positions and installations in
Ingushetia, Chechnya's neighboring republic. Russian
forces were caught by surprise, and nearly a hundred
perished in one night of fighting. The Russian military
was not able to mobilize close support in time to beat
back the attack - the insurgents simply melted away,
either retreating back into Chechnya or disappearing
among the local Ingushetian population. To this day, no
perpetrators or ringleaders have been found, prompting a
government shake-up at the highest levels of power,
including the dismissal of the chief of staff Anatoly
Kvashnin and head of the interior ministry forces
Vyachesalv Tikhomirov.
This latest round of
violence resulted in more troops to be stationed in
Chechnya. As the Russian military continues its long
campaign in the republic, major questions remain if the
country will be able to sustain a second Chechnya-style
war conducted overseas. Even well-equipped,
well-motivated and well-trained American forces have not
been able to put an end to the insurrections in both
Iraq and Afghanistan. While Russian and American troops
have a lot in common as they counter guerrilla-style
warfare, Russian forces display their combat inability
to win this type of war in Chechnya, and offer only a
limited level of success in their military exercises
designed for combating possible Iraqi and Afghan-style
warfare.
In addition, Russia's deployment to
either Iraq or Afghanistan has profound consequences for
its relationship with Arab and Muslim countries. Long a
patron of Middle Eastern and South Asian states, it
might find its support slipping in exactly the area
where Russia still can exercise some international
clout. The Soviet Union, and later, Russia, have been
able to provide support to a wide range of countries,
from Algeria to Indonesia, acquiring favor among the
millions of Muslims around the world.
Russian
companies have been active in Iraq all the way prior to
the US invasion. Even during the Iraq-Iran war in the
1980s, Russia was able to sell weapons to both
countries. Russia currently is one of the strongest
supporters of the Iranian nuclear program, long a source
of agitation and discomfort in Washington. Furthermore,
Russia is often perceived as a counter-balance to US
influence in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
Thus, the military deployment to the areas which remain
an active source of discussion and unrest in the Muslim
world can turn the "Arab street", long the tacit
supporter of Moscow's policies, against Russia proper.
The prospect of major fighting in Iraq or
Afghanistan would mean that Russian troops will be equal
to the American forces in the eyes of the world's
Muslims, who perceive US actions in both countries as
unjustified and detrimental to the region. The turning
of the Arab tide against Moscow itself might exacerbate
the volatile situation in Chechnya, where most of the
rebel fighters come from Arab countries and are known to
have connections to al-Qaeda.
Russia's return to
Afghanistan or Iraq might give more strength to
al-Qaeda, which has been negatively affected by US
counter-terrorism operations. The return of a
once-vanquished "infidel" power to the old battlegrounds
of Afghanistan might generate a new wave of enlistment
to the ranks of the mujahideen, in turn leading to
renewed attacks on Russian territory and worldwide
targets.
Russia's war in Chechnya and American
efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated that
this type of warfare couldn't be achieved without
significant battlefield losses. The Russian public has
been angered by the military losses in Chechnya,
prompting a rise of powerful grassroots movements that
even advise Russians to avoid military service. Even if
the tightly-controlled Russian media carefully filters
information about its overseas deployments, news of the
combat losses - which inevitably will be in the hundreds
and thousands - will reach the Russian people who see
Iraq and Afghanistan as America's war, and not their
own.
The fact that the Russian government did
not expressly rule out such deployments might indicate
that Moscow, for the time being, has largely conceded to
Washington its once formidable influence in the Muslim
world. With an American military presence in Iraq and
Afghanistan, with Egypt and Jordan in the US sphere of
influence, with Libya re-establishing diplomatic
relations with Washington, with the American Pan-Sahel
initiative achieving success in the Western Saharan
countries, and with US forces present in Somalia and
Central Asia, Russia might see its deployment as an
attempt to regain trust with its former Muslim clients.
However, it is wrong for Russian policymakers to think
that the presence of their soldiers in Iraq or
Afghanistan will be met with less resistance than given
to the American forces. The rebels in both countries
will meet Russian troops with just as much antagonism as
is currently directed at US soldiers.
Russia's
deployment can also be perceived as an attempt to catch
up to its former satellites, who now receive significant
favors from Washington. Poland has sent thousands of
troops to Iraq. Tiny Georgia, locked in an antagonistic
and currently escalating relationship with Russia, will
be sending a battalion of its US-trained forces to Iraq.
In light of its former clients receiving benefits for
their support of US military operations, Russia might
want to gain even more from its evolving relationship
with Washington by also sending its military
contingents.
Conclusion As the
military exercises discussed earlier have shown, Russia
is capable of deploying and maintaining a limited
military force - not the 40,000 troops discussed in
previous months - in order to properly manage its combat
operations. Furthermore, given the Russian government's
insensitivity to combat losses in order to achieve
objectives, a military force might indeed be sent to
either Iraq or Afghanistan. Russia has been trying to
build its relations with the US on an equal footing,
especially after the September 11 terrorist attacks. One
of the ways America might concede a greater role in
world affairs to Russia is to ask it to step up to the
plate - to deliver a military force in order to assist
Washington in its endeavors. To do so would mean a
greater role for Russia, with which it is possible for
the US to agree on many issues - in contrast to the
current deadlock in relations with France and Germany.
Yet there has not been a single major overseas
deployment of Russian forces since the fall of the
Soviet Union. Throughout the Cold War, only Korea and
Afghanistan were the major arenas of fighting for Soviet
forces - its troops acted mostly in an advisory capacity
in the world's other hotspots. The proposed military
deployment is truly an untested territory for the
Russian armed forces that are currently taxed to the
limit by lack of funds and necessary reforms, as well as
by the war in Chechnya. Russia's possible deployment to
either Iraq or Afghanistan is fraught with consequences,
which will shape its position in world affairs for
decades to come.
Published with permission of
thePower and Interest News Report,
an analysis-based publication that seeks to provide
insight into various conflicts, regions and points of
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deployment will actually
occur, the idea itself raises a number of strategic
concerns for the Russian Federation as it tries to
re-establish its influence in world affairs.
