Pakistan pushes for
Hekmatyar By Syed Saleem Shahzad
KARACHI - Afghanistan has a distinguished
culture and social and political order in which one of
the most prominent features is that whoever, from Mughal
rulers to former king Zahir Shah, leaves the country for
exile, has never been able to regain his writ. Legendary
Afghan resistance leader in the jihad against the
Soviets in the 1980s, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, is no
exception.
Those who know the
mujahideen commander closely affirm that the firebrand Hekmatyar
of the mid-1970s at Kabul University is no different
from the Hekmatyar of today. In one sense this is true -
he still vehemently believes in armed struggle
against foreign forces in the country, and he is
still intimately involved in political wheeling and
dealing, in cahoots with Pakistan's Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI), just like in the mid-1970s.
However, his
many years in exile in Iran - he left the country as
prime minister when the Taliban came to power in 1996 -
seriously undermined his command structure in
Afghanistan, and except for carrying out a few sporadic
attacks against US forces, his role at present in the
resistance is minimal.
Asia Times Online
contacts say that this situation has forced the
charismatic leader of the past to fully commit to the
ISI's agenda for Afghanistan by allowing the political
faction of his Hezb-i-Islami Afghanistan (HIA) to
participate in the central government in Kabul, and in
the meantime they will work to strengthen interim
President Hamid Karzai's position ahead of presidential
elections next month. Hekmatyar himself, though, at
this point is still committed to waging a guerrilla war
against US-led forces in Afghanistan.
Soon after
the Taliban consolidated their position, they denounced
all the top jihadi leaders, including Hekmatyar and
Ahmed Shah Masoud of the Northern Alliance, calling them
traitors to the jihadi cause as they had been involved
in a bitter, bloody civil war following the withdrawal
of Soviet troops in 1989.
The Taliban even
issued a religious edict justifying the death penalty
for all Afghan jihadi leaders - and refused to retract
it for Hekmatyar even after the HIA signed an agreement
with the Taliban to fight together against the US-led
invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001.
During his exile
in Tehran, Hekmatyar instructed his commanders not to
fight against the Taliban and ordered them to disarm. As
a result, the HIA's more than 100,000 fighters scattered,
some to Peshawar and the Pakistani tribal areas,
or into the population to live under Taliban rule.
A number even accepted Taliban head Mullah Omar as their
spiritual leader and became absorbed into the Taliban
structure. Others joined hands with the Northern Alliance
- which was bitterly anti-Taliban - yet they remained
in contact with Hekmatyar (such as present federal
minister Waheedullah Sabaoon).
Hekmatyar left
Iran for Afghanistan in February 2002, and started to
travel around the provinces with a handful of loyal
commanders, such as Kashmir Khan and Ustad Fareed, but
failed to organize any movement or base of note.
A year ago, Hekmatyar was in Miranshah, in
Pakistan's North Waziristan tribal area, with one of his
commanders, Haji Jameel. Within days the US proxy
network learned of this and informed the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, which in turn told Pakistani
authorities to take action. But by the time they
launched a raid, Hekmatyar had escaped.
For
a time Hekmatyar established a base in the Afghan
province of Kunar, from where he briefly terrorized US forces
in Asadabad (Kunar's capital) . But because of low support among
local commanders, and the heavy presence of the United
States' network, he could not make it a permanent base, and
began shuttling around the country and across the border
in Mohmand and Bajur tribal agencies.
It remains
a mystery exactly where he is based at present, but he
has not stopped his political maneuvering.
There
are good Taliban and there are bad Taliban, and both are
in Pakistan's favor. For the bad Taliban, Islamabad is
happy to see them marginalized yet continuing their
resistance in Afghanistan as Pakistan does not want them
back in the country, where their presence upsets the US,
and consequently the administration of President General
Pervez Musharraf comes under pressure.
The good
Taliban, meanwhile, can be used to bolster Karzai's
strength in Kabul, and once he is reelected president,
which he is expected to be next month, they will become
Pakistan's eyes and ears and help keep the anti-Pakistan
Northern Alliance away from Kabul.
Similarly
with the HIA, distinctions will be made. The political
wing, based in Peshawar, will receive a sizeable chunk
of ministerial portfolios in Karzai's next cabinet -
again, acting as Pakistan's eyes and ears. As for
Hekmatyar, insiders do not rule out the possibility that
once a political role for the HIA is assured after the
presidential elections and before the parliamentary
elections, and after an "honorable" deal is made to
reduce the presence of US forces in Afghanistan, the HIA
will give up its armed struggle. Even though its
influence within the resistance is limited at present,
such a development would be of some significance
politically.
Underpinning these developments is
a conviction in Kabul and Washington to alienate once and for
all the bad Taliban and their al-Qaeda allies so
that the US can rid itself of the Afghan mess. Equally
determined, though, the hardcore Taliban are not going
to give up without a fight.
Syed Saleem
Shahzad, is bureau chief, Pakistan, Asia Times Online.
He can be reached at saleem_shahzad2002@yahoo.com.
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