On September 7 the Afghan
presidential election campaign officially started,
scheduled to last a month, ending 48 hours before this
Saturday when polls will be open from 7am to 4pm and the
10.5 million registered Afghan voters will choose from
18 candidates.
In the capital city of Kabul, if
one were to judge purely based on whose visage dominates
the election posters, billboards and car windshields,
then the most popular candidate is Ahmad Shah Masoud,
the ethnic-Tajik leader of the Northern Alliance who fought
the Soviets and then the Taliban. Yet he was assassinated
on September 9, 2001, by two Arabs posing as journalists,
masterminded by al-Qaeda, in part as a "thank
you" for the Taliban allowing Osama bin Laden to
stay in Afghanistan. That date is now an official day of
mourning.
Though Masoud, known as the "Lion
of Panjshir", had been a hero in the jihad against the
Soviet occupation in the 1980s, in the civil war that
followed the fall of the communist regime in Kabul he
and other warlords turned their guns on one another and
on Kabul,
killing tens of thousands and causing much
of the city still to look like excavated
archeological ruins. Many Afghans blame Masoud and the other
warlords for their past quarter-century of poverty, oppression
and war.
The end of the Taliban regime in late
2001, they hoped, would usher in a new era that would
sweep the old leaders away. They were disappointed first
by the 2001 Bonn Accords, held under United Nations
auspices, which saw many of the warlords who had caused
havoc on their country for so long returned to power and
then legitimized by a loya jirga, or grand
assembly, which appointed many of these warlords to
official positions in the government of US-backed Hamid
Karzai.
And with the numerous posters festooning
their city walls, for many Afghans it must feel like
deja vu as the same faces compete for power.
According to Shinkai Zahine, a medical doctor
and women's activist and head of the Afghan Women's
Education center, "Elections are a good opportunity to
get rid of these people," meaning the warlords. Shinkai
does not think the warlords have support. "The Taliban
removed the warlords very easily," she reminded.
"Everybody thought they were strong, but they fled. In
the beginning everybody was ready to welcome the
Americans, and they were disappointed when the Americans
brought back the warlords."
Her husband
Shahir, a former medical student, then mujahideen
fighter against the Soviets, then aid worker, now runs the
Kilid media group, which boasts a radio station and
the country's only national newsmagazine and national
women's magazine, recalled, "I was so emotional the day I
went to register. I fought for my country and for a
better future. For us it's the chance to practice
something we have never done. I see a chance even if I
know that most of the game is fake and most people are
unaware of their rights. But this is the first step in
the process. Our warlords will see how much they are
'cherished' by the people."
According to
New York University's Barnett Rubin, an expert
on Afghanistan who has consulted the UN and was
interviewed in September, "Elections are the most complex
operation a government carries out in peacetime. Almost all the
adult population is registered with the state for the
first time. There has never been a census. The elections
are costing $100 million, or 20% of the budget or half
of the government's revenue."
And actually
holding the elections themselves will cost an additional
US$100 million. According to Rubin, the obstacles are
daunting in a country with "no roads, no electronic
communication except for the military commanders. The
one technology in abundance is weapons. There will be no
international observers flooding the country because of
security issues. The Taliban want to stop the elections
from happening and they operate in Pashtun areas and in
Pakistan. They are killing voters and election officials
and police. There are localities of whose existence the
government doesn't know. And there are three different
distinct sets defined by three different agencies."
Andrew Wilder runs the Afghanistan Research and
Evaluation Unit, a think-tank intended to provide policy
advice to the Afghan government and the international
community. Wilder has been working in Afghanistan and
Pakistan since 1986 and lives with his wife and two
children in Kabul. He is one of the few experts or
non-governmental organization experts willing to
criticize the elections on the record. Most Westerners
do not want to criticize the elections they pushed for
and undermine Karzai's campaign, since he is the
candidate they want to win.
Interviewed in early September,
Wilder maintained that "it's pretty clear that
this is not an ideal time to be holding elections in
Afghanistan. Elections should not be equated with democracy.
Afghanistan is not yet in a post-conflict phase,
and pushing for presidential and parliamentary elections
prematurely in a deteriorating security environment
and before warlords have been disarmed could end
up with very undemocratic results. Externally imposed
elections according to an artificial and unrealistically
short time frame have been an incredible
distraction from the more important issues of
re-establishing security and the rule of law and
rebuilding state institutions."
Like many of
the expatriates in Kabul, and Yunus Qanooni, Karzai's
main rival in the elections, Wilder sees the election
timing as dictated by US election politics, adding, "The
elections at this time are a Republican Party agenda
rather than a US government interest." Qanooni, a
prominent Tajik in the Northern Alliance - which helped
US forces overthrow the Taliban in 2001 - has the
backing of Defense Minister Mohammed Fahim, who was
dropped by Karzai as his running mate.
Wilder said, "Afghans have high hopes - in some ways
dangerously high - that the elections are going to
result in positive political change. They had high hopes
for the Bonn agreement, but these hopes were crushed
when they saw many of the most powerful positions in the
newly formed government handed over to representatives
of the warring factions who they held accountable for
much of the tragedy of the last two decades in
Afghanistan. Their hopes were raised again during the
election of delegates for the emergency loya
jirga when many of the candidates of the warlords
were defeated by candidates calling for disarmament and
political change. At the loya jirga
, however, they were only given the opportunity
to re-elect President Karzai, whom most delegates supported,
but then saw nearly all the same old faces reappointed
to cabinet positions. Many Afghans see the upcoming elections
- the parliamentary elections [next year] in particular
- as their last opportunity to reject the status quo
and the politics of the past, which is why it is
so important that these elections not be a third-rate rush-job
election."
Wilder thinks the underlying
problem was the failure early on to recognize that the
warlords were part of the problem and not part of the
solution. "The American strategy was to use these
warlords who were terrorizing the Afghan people to fight
the US-led war on terror in Afghanistan. In return they
were offered most of the most powerful positions in the
new government apart from the presidency. But by keeping
the troublemakers inside the tent - factional leaders
with a vested interest in keeping the central government
weak and ineffective and their regional fiefdoms strong
- we essentially tied the hands of President Karzai and
the few reformers in the new government who did want to
bring about positive political change. As a result we
have a government in name only overseeing dysfunctional
and increasingly corrupt ministries who most Afghans
perceive as doing nothing. Worse still, Afghans see a
deteriorating security situation, with the US-led
coalition fixated on the Taliban and al-Qaeda but doing
little to address the primary security concern of
Afghans, which is to see the warlords and commanders who
are making their lives so miserable disarmed."
Wilder, like the doctor Zahine, believes that
the warlords are paper tigers. "These warlords who we
now think are so powerful were relatively easily
defeated by the Taliban and barely retained control of
one province of Afghanistan when the US-led coalition
took on the Taliban after September 11 [2001]. The
Americans won the war, but then we acted like the
Northern Alliance won the war, let them enter Kabul despite
the US telling them not to, and then handed power over
to them on a silver platter. The recent moves that
were supported by the US to drop Minister of
Defense [Mohammed] Fahim as Karzai's vice-presidential
candidate, and the removal of Ismael Khan as the
governor of Herat province, are important and positive
moves that are sending an important signal that the
rules of the game are changing. I hope they are changing
and that there is now a recognition that the old
strategy of accommodating the warlords was a flawed one.
It will be a tragic mistake if these positive moves were
just part of a short-term deal that will be reversed
after the elections. I am not saying that there should
never be any room at the table for any of the political
power-holders of the past, only that if they are given a
seat at the table they must agree to play by the new
rules of the game, which is rule by law, and reject the
old rules of the game of ruling by the gun. They can't
continue to be allowed to have it both ways and have
positions of power in the government but play by the old
rules," said Wilder.
Interviewed again at the
end of September, Wilder was no longer fighting to
postpone the elections. "It's now passe, we lost that
battle," he said, adding that his concerns are now "even
at this late date, what can be done to make the process
credible and the results perceived as legitimate? At
this point we just don't know how Afghans will react to
the elections. We don't know how many logistical flaws
will get turned into conspiracy theories in this deeply
suspicious political environment which, in turn, could
help reduce the perceived legitimacy of the election
results."
One of the biggest
concerns, according to Wilder, remains the deteriorating
security situation and whether or not fear of Taliban attacks
on voting centers could keep voters in some regions
from turning out to vote on Saturday. "A climate of fear could
keep voters away from the polls, especially female
voters. Too-low turnout figures could call into question
the legitimacy of the result." Wilder feels that on the
one hand the international community has
pressured Afghanistan into holding elections prematurely, but
on the other hand has been unwilling to commit
the necessary security resources to protect the
electoral process. He does point to the newly committed
1,100 troops from the US Army's 82nd Airborne as a
"useful addition", but it critical of North Atlantic
Treaty Organization member states for not doing enough.
"NATO claims Afghanistan is its top priority in the
world, but it certainly doesn't look that way sitting
here in Kabul."
Returning to his concerns about
the warlords, Wilder explained that what happens after
the elections could do more to determine the perceived
legitimacy of the elections in the eyes of Afghans than
what happens on election day. "If what happened at Bonn
and the loya jirga happens again after the
elections, and Afghans see the new president appoint a
cabinet dominated by the same faces they blame for much
of the past 25 years of war, Afghans will ask what was
the point of holding elections. Elections are an
incredibly important tool - one of the only political
tools we have left in Afghanistan to legitimize a new
political order. It's therefore very important that they
are done right and that they are perceived to bring
about positive political change. If the end result of
the presidential and parliamentary elections is to
legitimize the status quo, and to have a parliament
dominated by warlords [some of whom are war criminals]
and drug lords, we will have squandered an incredible
opportunity and discredited electoral democracy in the
eyes of Afghans. I don't think we're going to have
another opportunity like this one to get it right in
Afghanistan."
Wilder is concerned that
all the rumors of deal-making are leading to
increasing apathy as well as cynicism among many voters who
suspect that there still is a "business-as-usual agenda". "Very few
of my staff even registered to vote because they feel
it's already a done deal because of the strong US
support for President Karzai. I actually think turnout
in urban areas where voters are best informed will be
quite low because people don't see candidates
campaigning in the streets, only in the backrooms, where
they suspect unholy deals and alliances are being made.
I think particularly damaging for the US is the strong
perception that the US Embassy is playing a role in
facilitating deal-making between President Karzai and
some of his major opponents to ensure that Karzai wins
in the first round of the election and that there's no
need for a runoff election [some cynically point out
that this would be after November 2]. This is dangerous
because if we do end up with a 'business as usual'
government in Afghanistan it will be the US that is
blamed, and not President Karzai, who many Afghans view
as a puppet of the US."
In Gardez, the capital of
Paktia province, the United Nations has already reduced its staff
by 75% amid rumors that armed men with turbans and long
beards are prowling the streets on motorcycles, ie,
Taliban. On September 16, all roads to Gardez were
blocked off from miles away, first by teenage Afghan
soldiers then by American marines. Thousands of men
carrying traditional swords and shields danced in
circles to welcome the visiting Karzai, beating up a
cloud of dust. Gardez actually means "dust spreading" in
Pashtu, and as visibility lessened it became clear how
well suited the appellation was.
Uniformed men with rocket-propelled-grenade launchers
stood on rooftops. After two helicopters landed, there
was a telltale whistle in the air, followed
by the interminable second of wondering what to do
and where would the incoming missile land, and then
a muffled explosion in an empty lot. The locals
were nonplussed, but Karzai's security did not greet the
missile, which was at least a kilometer away from where he was
to land, with the same aplomb, and promptly canceled
the visit, to the disappointment of the expectant throngs
of men. Karzai later claimed that it was not his
decision to cancel the visit, rather it was taken by
his US security detail, an admission of how little control
he has. But the incident highlighted the
complete dependence the international community has on
Karzai. "We have no plan B," confessed one UN official. A
high-ranking police officer from the Dari-speaking Shi'ite
sect that inhabits Pashtun-majority Gardez was
dismissive as he watched Karzai's helicopter turn
around. "I feel embarrassed," he scoffed. "Who is he? He
should learn from [ayatollah Ruhollah] Khomeini's
revolution in Iran," recalling that Khomeini had landed
in Iran unescorted by security, whereas the Shah whom he
deposed had, like Karzai, been dependent on US
support.
A UN official dealing with security and
demobilizing the militias in Gardez saw the incident as
prescient. "Karzai is president now and he'll be
president on October 10," he said. "What's going to
change? On October 10 he still won't be able to land in
Gardez."
PART 1: 
killing tens of thousands and causing much
of the city still to look like excavated
archeological ruins. Many Afghans blame Masoud and the other
warlords for their past quarter-century of poverty, oppression
and war. 
