Editor's note:
This report was filed before voting took place on
October 9. Afghanistan was due to begin counting votes
on Wednesday after rivals of President Hamid Karzai said
that they had withdrawn their rejection of the
presidential poll. Preliminary exit polls suggest that
Karzai will win by a landslide.
Afghanistan undergoes the first presidential elections in
the country's history on October 9. As if surprised by
the fact that Afghans could want a voice in their
country's future, President George W Bush touted the more than 10
million Afghans registered to vote as "a resounding
endorsement for democracy". The real surprise is that,
despite rampant anti-election violence and threats of
violence, so many people were brave enough to register.
This certainly indicates that Afghans are desperate for
a chance to control their own lives. But, even though
many will risk their lives to vote, the majority of
Afghans played no part in decisionmaking regarding the
schedule and structure of the elections, and will not
benefit from the results. This election process was
imposed by the US to solve "Afghan problems" as defined
by the US. In reality, the problems facing Afghans are
the results of decisions made in Washington in the 1980s
and 1990s. (1)
Test for US, not for
Afghans To the Bush administration and media
pundits, presidential elections in Afghanistan will
bring the country closer to being a "democracy", where
people decide their own fate. Business Week describes
the elections as a "first test" of Bush's claim that
Afghanistan and Iraq "are on the path to democracy". In
a Washington Post opinion piece, Andrew Reynolds of the
University of North Carolina similarly described the
elections as a "Test for Afghan Democracy". In this
view, any failure of the process will be caused by a
lack of readiness of Afghanistan and its people for
"democracy", not a failure of external players to
fulfill their responsibilities to the country.
What is being tested is solely the capacity of
Afghans to embrace democracy. Indeed, Business Week
describes only indigenous threats to the elections
exercise: "Power brokers are trying to cut deals to
eliminate competitive elections. Violence against
election workers and politicians is on the rise ...
Hardly anyone expects the voting to meet international
standards." A commonly cited statistic indicating voter
fraud is the estimated 10% over-registration
countrywide. According to Business Week, "Some areas
have registration rates as high as 140% of projected
eligible voters." This is definitely disturbing, and is
a blow to Bush's own election propaganda, since he uses
the "over 10 million registered" figure in campaign
speeches as an example of the success of his foreign
policy.
The focus on voter fraud, however, keeps
the emphasis on the Afghan failure to measure up to
international standards. Few media outlets have dared to
blame the US for the more egregious fraud of imposing
early elections on a still war-ravaged country where
Northern Alliance warlords legitimized by Washington
will continue to hold real power, regardless of who wins
the vote. If the Afghan elections fail, Afghans will be
blamed and Afghans will continue to suffer, seemingly as
a result of their own actions. (2)
Another point
rarely mentioned is that elections do not equal
democracy. J Alexander Thier, a former legal adviser to
Afghanistan's Constitutional and Judicial Reform
Commissions, is one of the few commentators who dares to
utter the simple fact: "Elections themselves are only a
small part of democracy." In Thier's opinion, "Effective
government service, protection of individual rights,
accountability - these are the true fruits of democracy.
Holding elections without the rule of law can undermine
democracy by sparking violence, sowing cynicism, and
allowing undemocratic forces to become entrenched."
Elections are merely "the end product of a successful
democracy". Regardless of who wins the elections and by
what means, civil society in Afghanistan is at the
moment anything but democratic. Foreign influence,
particularly US influence, has ensured that insecurity,
warlordism and a severely curtailed media are entrenched
features of the political landscape. (3)
In
reality the Afghan presidential elections will be a test
not of "Afghan democracy", but of the Bush
administration's ability to impose its political order
on a country. An editorial in Newsday holds that
"Historic elections in Afghanistan and Iraq are key
goals of US foreign policy, especially for President
George W Bush, who is campaigning on his determination
that they be held on schedule." Reynolds says the
elections will be "a watershed moment, equal in
importance to the post-September 11 ousting of the
Taliban." Since the warlords that now run most of the
country are as bad as or worse than the Taliban, the
ousting of the Taliban was more a watershed for
Washington than for the Afghan people. Similarly, the
Afghan elections are really a benchmark for the Bush
administration's foreign policy.
Reynolds argues
that "a legitimately elected administration in Kabul
would not just be good for the Afghans; it would be much
more likely to carry out the reforms the United States
so keenly wants." It is clear that the only outcome that
would be considered "legitimate" by the US is a win by
the incumbent, transitional President Hamid Karzai.
While there are 16 candidates running, the US media have
focused almost exclusively on Karzai, frequently dubbed
"the favorite" in news reports. For the Bush
administration it is imperative that their hand-picked
and well-trained candidate wins. Not only will the
anticipated victory of Karzai cement the current order
of US influence, it will signal a victory for the "war
on terror" as Bush defines it. As Reynolds notes,
"Karzai's victory ... would shine a ray of hope on an
otherwise gloomy series of US foreign policy
misadventures." (4)
Women are pawns
The Bush administration constantly calls
attention to the fact that 4 million of those who
registered to vote in Afghanistan were women. Just as
the "liberation" of Afghan women was used to justify the
bombing of Afghanistan three years ago, women's
participation in US-imposed elections is again used to
justify the US approach. While the administration deals
in broad statistics to paint a rosy picture, a closer
look reveals that the Afghan political environment,
controlled by US-backed warlords and a US-backed
president, remains extremely hostile to women. Women
comprise 60% of the population, but only 43% of
registered voters. Additionally, sharp differences in
literacy between men and women put women at a huge
disadvantage. Only 10% of Afghan women can read and
write. While school attendance for girls has increased
to about 50% nationwide, it is too early to affect women
voters. Furthermore, under Karzai's presidency, married
women were banned from attending schools in late 2003.
While much mileage has been squeezed out of the
notion that the US "liberated" Afghan women, only US$1
out of every $5,000 ($112,500 out of $650 million) of US
financial aid sent to Afghanistan in 2002 was actually
given to women's organizations. In 2003, according to
Ritu Sharma, executive director of the Women's Edge
Coalition, that amount was reduced to $90,000. At the
same time, women have increasingly been the targets of
violence. New studies by groups like Amnesty
International reveal that sexual violence has surged
since the fall of the Taliban, and there has been a
sharp rise in incidents of women's self-immolation in
western Afghanistan. Amnesty International has
documented an escalation in the number of girls and
young women abducted and forced into marriage, with
collusion from the state (those who resist are often
imprisoned).
US policy has empowered extreme
fundamentalists who have further extended women's
oppression in a traditionally ultra-conservative
society. In a public opinion survey conducted in
Afghanistan this July by the Asia Foundation, 72% of
respondents said that men should advise women on their
voting choices and 87% of all Afghans interviewed said
women would need their husband's permission to vote. On
International Women's Day this year, Karzai only
encouraged such attitudes. He implored men to allow
their wives and sisters to register to vote, assuring
them, "later, you can control who she votes for, but
please, let her go [to register]." Most of the
candidates running against Karzai have mentioned rights
for women in some form or another as part of their
campaign platforms. While this is obligatory in
post-Taliban Afghanistan, it remains little more than
lip service. Latif Pedram, a candidate who went slightly
further than others by suggesting that polygamy was
unfair to women, was barred from the election and
investigated by the Justice Ministry for "blasphemy".
Just like the Afghan constitution signed earlier
this year, which gives equal rights to women on paper,
this election will probably have little bearing on the
reality of Afghan women's lives. Denied an education and
underrepresented in voter rolls, with little control
over the patriarchal justice system and sexist family
attitudes, women are once more simply pawns within the
US-designed Afghan political structure.
Warlords: Now a problem for Bush A
recent countrywide survey of Afghans by the
International Republican Institute found that "over 60%
cited security as their primary concern, followed by
reconstruction and economic development". According to
65% of respondents, "warlords and local commanders are
the main sources of instability in the country". While
most women may need the permission of their husbands to
vote, their choices will be extremely limited, since
most Afghans are being intimidated by US-backed warlords
into voting for them. According to Brad Adams, Asia
Director at Human Rights Watch, "Many voters in rural
areas say the [warlord] militias have already told them
how to vote, and that they're afraid of disobeying
them." The intimidation tactics of General Abdul Rashid
Dostum and others are no secret, having even raised the
ire of former secretary of state Madeleine Albright. (5)
The wider context of the warlords' power is
rarely mentioned. As part of the Bush administration's
"war on terror", Washington made deals with Northern
Alliance warlords in its crusade against the Taliban.
Warlords were appointed to high-level government posts
and allowed to regain regional power. As many factions
fought one another for regional dominance, the US
actively denied the expansion of the International
Security Assistance Force from Kabul to the rest of the
country, thereby closing a crucial window of opportunity
to undermine the warlords early on. One should hardly be
surprised at the current situation, a natural outcome of
US policy over the past three years.
When their
actions only affected the lives of ordinary Afghans,
warlords were not a problem for the Bush administration.
Only now is Washington beginning to hold some of the
warlords at arm's length, as their presence reflects
badly on the carefully staged demonstration of
"democracy" via elections. Even worse, a warlord may
become president, thwarting the carefully planned
outcome. Yunus Qanooni of the Northern Alliance is seen
as a major challenger to Karzai. If Karzai doesn't win,
Afghanistan could spiral out of US control. To preserve
control, or at least validate the propaganda that
Afghanistan is a victory for the US "war on terror", the
Bush administration is actively lobbying Karzai's
opponents to not run. According to the Los Angeles
Times, 13 of the candidates, including Qanooni, have
complained about interference from Zalmay Khalilzad, the
US ambassador. Khalilzad has reportedly "requested"
candidates to withdraw from the race, attempting to
bribe them with a position in the cabinet. Senior staff
members of several candidates were described as "angry
over what many Afghans see as foreign interference that
could undermine the shaky foundations of a democracy the
US promised to build". (6)
US, Soviets
responsible for current predicament Andrew
Reynolds claims that the Afghan presidential election
"will present a choice between the old and the new,
between a state corrupted by private militias and
self-enriching warlords; and a new type of government
that bases its legitimacy on national rather than ethnic
identity". Unfortunately there is little in the Karzai
government that is new, unless your view of history
reaches back only a decade.
Reynolds' "new type
of government" is simply a reworking of what operated in
Afghanistan prior to 1919 under the British, and from
1979 to 1989 under the Soviet occupation: a client
regime whose major decisions were to a greater or lesser
extent controlled by a foreign power. In the Karzai
government, it is obvious that Washington runs the show.
According to the New York Times, US ambassador Zalmay
Khalilzad has "possibly as much influence" in
Afghanistan as L Paul Bremer had in Iraq. Khalilzad is
known as "the viceroy" because the influence he wields
over the Afghan government reminds some Afghans of the
excesses of British colonialism. Times reporter Amy
Waldman commented Khalilzad "often seems more like [the]
chief executive" of Afghanistan than Karzai. As
Khalilzad "shuttles between the American Embassy and the
presidential palace, where Americans guard Mr Karzai,
one place seems an extension of the other". (7)
It is the warlord-dominated situation in
Afghanistan that is the relatively new dynamic.
Reynolds' assertion that a client regime under Karzai
would be "new" is particularly chilling coming from an
American, since the warlords were first helped to power
by the US as a "solution" in the 1980s to the Soviet-run
client state. The Central Intelligence Agency and its
counterpart in Pakistan, the Inter-Services
Intelligence, pinned most of their hopes on the ruthless
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, now working with the Taliban
against Washington. Other warlords being supported with
US cash, weapons and logistical support included the
fundamentalists Abdul Rasul Sayyaf and Burhannudin
Rabbani, both big players in today's Afghanistan.
Current ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad was then, as he is
now, "a participant in US government deliberation" on
support for these factions. (8) Current US ally and
presidential candidate warlord Dostum was once a Soviet
ally. If the Afghan warlords are to be blamed for
hindering democracy in Afghanistan, ultimate
responsibility lies with the US and the Soviet Union for
empowering them in the first place.
When the
Soviet-backed Najibullah regime fell in 1992, the
US-sponsored factions turned their weapons on each other
in an attempt to gain control of the capital. Most
Afghans remember the period from 1992-1996, the time
between the fall of Najibullah and the coming to power
of the Taliban, as the most terrible in living history.
Significantly, it was during the period that US-backed
proteges were reducing Kabul to rubble that Washington
lost interest. By the time the Taliban arrived in 1996,
there was little left of Kabul to govern. (9)
The foreign-backed Taliban (supported chiefly by
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia) were initially seen as an
antidote to the anarchy caused by the foreign-backed
warlords, saving Washington the trouble of cleaning up
its own mess. According to the Washington Post, the Bill
Clinton administration believed that "a
Taliban-dominated government represents a preferable
alternative in some ways to the [current] faction-ridden
coalition". The Los Angeles Times opined that, "The
American aim [in Afghanistan] was ultimately met by the
Taliban." As today, solutions were seen in the light of
how they solved American, not Afghan, problems. (10)
The Clinton administration eventually distanced
itself publicly from the Taliban, while behind the
scenes cutting a deal with them on behalf of US company
UNOCAL to build a natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan
to Pakistan via Afghanistan. With his finger ever in the
Afghan pie, Zalmay Khalilzad was hired as an adviser to
UNOCAL.
It was not until the 1998 US Embassy
bombings in Kenya and Tanzania were traced to Osama bin
Laden that Washington's relationship with the Taliban
really soured. The US then reinstated covert support to
some of its former warlord allies. The September 11
attacks in 2001 allowed the US to bring old friends, now
known as the Northern Alliance, back to power, giving
them a new lease on political life. The warlords who are
today considered a problem were legitimized and
entrenched in the government three times in the past
three years under orders from Washington (at the 2001
Bonn meetings, at the 2002 emergency loya jirga,
and the 2003 constitutional loya jirga). (11)
Prospects for the future Likely
scenarios: Post-election Afghanistan will look very
much as it does today, if not worse. If Karzai wins with
the backing of some or all Northern Alliance factions,
their leaders will be awarded high-level positions,
further entrenching and legitimizing them. If Karzai
wins without enough support from his opponent warlords,
the losing parties may attack the central government,
returning the country to civil war. If Karzai loses, the
warlords might form an alliance government, a horrible
thought to contemplate considering the 1992-1996
"coalition government" of many of the same factions. In
the latter two scenarios, it is not clear whether the US
would intervene and re-install Karzai as president (as
it has done in Iraq with Prime Minister Iyad Allawi), or
allow Afghanistan to fester and implode (as it did in
the early 1990s). What is certain is that none of these
scenarios will lead to peace or real democracy.
Imaginary scenario: If the US wanted to
be truly bold, it would create the conditions for peace,
justice and democracy in Afghanistan. The first step
would be to completely end all support for the Northern
Alliance warlords and anyone else with a poor record on
human rights. The US would then assist the United
Nations in disarming warlords and their private armies,
and work toward reducing the number of available
weapons. Coupled with disarmament would be a "justice
and reconciliation process" defined by the Afghans, by
which those responsible for human-rights violations
would be held accountable. Ideally, US and Soviet
officials would be reprimanded, if not criminally
prosecuted.
Instead of focusing on the failed
"hunt" for al-Qaeda and Taliban members, the US could
save lives by ending its own military campaign.
Instead of restricting the international
peacekeepers to Kabul, the US should fund the expansion
of their mandate to the entire country, sending a clear
signal to warlords and the former Taliban that the war
is over. This would provide a sense of security for
Afghans interested in participating in democratic
exercises like elections. International peacekeepers
that truly keep the peace, instead of fighting "wars on
terrorism" or buying "hearts and minds" would enhance
the trust in aid agencies and allow them to remain
impartial while they handle the needs of ordinary
Afghans.
Instead of holding aid to rural Afghans
hostage to information on "terrorists", or conducting
expensive, wasteful, token reconstruction projects, the
US should shut down its "Provincial Reconstruction
Teams" (PRTs). These PRTs have militarized the
distribution of aid, jeopardizing the safety of real aid
workers who are for the first time associated with US
military goals (US Secretary of State Colin Powell calls
them "force multipliers"). This in turn jeopardizes
Afghans' access to aid.
Instead of pouring money
into keeping only Kabul safe for Karzai, the US could
fully fund reconstruction and the basic human needs
(food, shelter, health care, education) of Afghan
people, especially women. The healthier and safer the
people of Afghanistan, the better able they would be to
exercise democratic rights and organize against
religious fundamentalist forces and women's oppression.
This aid should be unconditional, given as reparation
for the damage caused by US-backed factions over the
past two decades.
Sadly, it is highly unlikely
that the US, with either Bush or John Kerry at the helm,
would embark on such a constructive series of projects.
For that to happen, the US would have to, for the first
time, put the human needs of the Afghan people over the
military needs of its empire.
(2) S Crock, "A Treacherous Test for Afghan
Democracy", Business Week, October 4, 2004; A Reynolds,
"A Test for Afghan Democracy," Washington Post,
September 25, 2004.
(6) On the warlord challenge to
Karzai, see Sedra, "Democracy Before Peace"; On
Khalilzad bribery, see P Watson, "US Hand Seen in Afghan
Election", Los Angeles Times, September
23, 2004.
(7) Reynolds, "Test for Afghan Democracy", A
Waldman, "In Afghanistan, US Envoy Sits in Seat of
Power", New York Times, April 17, 2004; Watson, "US Hand
Seen".
(8) By his own admission: Z Khalilzad, "
Afghanistan: Time to Reengage", Washington Post, October
7, 1996.
(9) J Burns, "With Kabul Largely in
Ruins, Afghans Get a Respite from War", New York Times,
February 20, 1995.
(10) M Dobbs, "Analysts Feel
Militia Could End Anarchy", Washington Post, September
28, 1996; Editorial, Los Angeles Times, September 30,
1996.
(11) E Sciolino, "State Dept Becomes
Cooler to the New Rulers of Kabul", New York Times,
October 23, 1996; J. Ingalls, "The United States and the
Afghan Loya Jirga: A Victory for the Puppet Masters", Z
Magazine, September 2002; J Ingalls, The New Afghan Constitution: A Step
Backwards for Democracy, (Silver City, NM
& Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus, March
2004).
Jim Ingalls and Sonali
Kolhatkar are codirectors of the Afghan Women's
Mission, a US-based non-profit organization that works
in solidarity with the Revolutionary Association of the
Women of Afghanistan. They both write regularly for
Foreign Policy In Focus. Jim is a staff scientist at the
Spitzer Science Center, California Institute of
Technology. Sonali is the host and co-producer of
Uprising, a daily public affairs program on KPFK
Pacifica Radio. Together they have published many
articles on Afghanistan and are working on their first
book about US policy in Afghanistan. For more
information visit www.afghanwomensmission.org and www.rawa.org
