Chemical 'warfare' angers
Afghans By Sudha Ramachandran
BANGALORE - With poppy cultivation in
Afghanistan touching new highs in 2004, eradication
measures to stamp out the cultivation of the crop are
expected to turn more aggressive in the coming months.
However, the deep rage and resentment generated by
recent incidents of aerial spraying of chemicals on
poppy crops in the eastern provinces of Afghanistan
indicates that the Afghan government, and the US and
Britain - the two countries that are at the forefront of
the international effort to combat the Afghan narcotics
trade - might need to move more cautiously.
According
to the UN Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004, opium cultivation
in Afghanistan this year has shown a 64% increase in comparison with 2003.
However, because of bad weather and disease, the 2004 opium yield
per hectare had been lowered by almost 30%, resulting in
a total output of 4,200 tons. While this is lower than the
1999 output of 4,600 tons, the 2004 output is 17% higher
than in 2003. Today Afghanistan accounts for 87% of the
world's opium cultivation and this year earned an
estimated US$2.8 billion. A tenth of the Afghan
population is involved in the production and trade of
opium.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai, in perhaps
his strongest remarks on the topic, has urged Afghans to
wage jihad - or holy war - against drugs, much as they
did against the Soviet army in the 1980s. Karzai,
Afghanistan's first popularly elected president, called
poppy farming a national disgrace.
Drawing attention
to the seriousness of the problem, Antonio Maria
Costa, director of the United Nations Office of Drugs and
Crime, said, "In Afghanistan, drugs are now a clear and
present danger. The fear that Afghanistan might
degenerate into a narco-state is becoming a reality," he
warned.
The 2004 survey reveals that opium
cultivation has spread to all of Afghanistan's 32
provinces, with 56% of total cultivation taking place in
only three provinces - Badakhshan, Nangarhar and
Helmand.
It was over the poppy fields in
Nangarhar province, in villages abutting the Tora Bora
mountains, that aerial spraying of chemicals kicked up a
controversy recently. According to reports in the media,
unidentified aircraft flew back and forth over poppy
fields in Nangarhar spraying "a snow-like substance" -
chemicals - on the crops. The chemicals have not only
destroyed the poppy crop, but also ruined fruit and
vegetables that were being cultivated there, besides
affecting the health of villagers and their livestock.
Hundreds of villagers have reportedly shown up at
hospitals with skin ailments and breathing problems.
Not surprisingly, the dusting of the poppy
crops with herbicide has triggered off immense anger among
the villagers, who see the destruction of the poppy crops
- their only source of income - as destruction of
their livelihood. The poorer farmers now face economic
ruin. Who is behind the chemical spraying of the crops
is still unclear. The Karzai government insists that
it is opposed to "aerial spraying as an instrument of
eradication" of the poppy crop and "has not authorized
any foreign entity, any foreign government, any foreign
company, or anyone else to carry out aerial spraying".
Most Afghans point an accusing finger at
the Americans or the British, but both countries have
denied involvement in the spraying. The US Embassy in
Kabul insists that the US government has "not conducted
any aerial eradication [of the poppy crop], nor has it
contracted or subcontracted anyone to do it on its
behalf". It also denies knowing who carried out the
spraying.
However, few in Afghanistan appear to
be convinced by the US denial. After all, as pointed out
by Hajji Din Muhammad, the governor of Nangarhar, "The
Americans control the airspace of Afghanistan, and not
even a bird can fly without them knowing."
Afghan officials have also pointed out that the
Americans have been arguing for many months now in favor
of chemical eradication of Afghanistan's poppy crops.
This is a strategy they have used to tackle coca
cultivation in Colombia, despite the anger it has
triggered among the coca farmers, and they are keen to
adopt that strategy in Afghanistan.
Anti-narcotics officials in Kabul argue that the
recent chemical spraying appears to have been carried
out not so much with the intention of eradicating the
poppy crop - the plants are too young at this juncture
for spraying to take real effect, they point out - as it
is to stir anger among the farmers. According to these
officials, therefore, the chemical spraying was the work
of major players in the Afghan drug trade, who are
seeking to build up mass opposition to the "real"
eradication efforts planned for the next few months.
Whatever the motivation of those behind
the chemical spraying, it is clear from the recent
episode in Nangarhar province that adopting tactics such as
crop-dusting raids as part of a new robust and aggressive
policy to fight the Afghan drug trade could prove
counter-productive. It could alienate the very people -
the Afghan peasants - whose support the US-backed
government is trying to win over.
Critics of
the US-British approach have pointed out that in order
to check the supply of narcotics to their countries
they are targeting desperately poor farmers, while
avoiding the political price that comes with taking stern
action to tackle demand for drugs in their countries. Some
have suggested action against those higher up in
the narcotics trade chain. But this the Americans and
the British have failed to do. Those who languish in
Afghan jails for narcotics-related offences are the
small-time peddlers, not the big players in the business. US
forces have also ignored warlords' involvement in the
opium trade in exchange for their help in fighting
al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
Analysts have also
argued that Washington has exaggerated the links between
al-Qaeda and the drug trade. In an article in Terrorism
Monitor, Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy draws attention to "the
minimal role this [the drug economy] plays in al-Qaeda's
finances". He points out that "a few cases have been
highlighted by the media as evidence of al-Qaeda tapping
into the opium economy of Afghanistan, even though the
claims in themselves do not constitute an argument for
the existence of any organized form of
'narco-terrorism'."
He cites the findings of the 9-11
Commission, according to which there is "no substantial
evidence that al-Qaeda played a major role in
the drug trade or relied on it as an important source of
revenue either before or after" September 11, 2001, and that
"intelligence collection efforts have failed to
corroborate rumors of current narcotic trafficking. In
fact, there is compelling evidence the al-Qaeda
leadership does not like or trust those who today
control the drug trade in Southwest Asia, and has
encouraged its members not to get involved."
Chouvy points out, "Recent efforts to link the
narcotics economy to terrorism really aim at linking the
war on drugs to the war on terrorism, and vice-versa.
While drugs and terrorism are not necessarily the two
faces of the same coin in Afghanistan, the war on drugs
and the war on terrorism may serve the same political
agenda. A clear example is the current efforts of the US
Southern Command to guarantee the prolongation of its
enhanced funding by raising the threat of
'narco-terrorism' in Latin America, where US military
aid and training, which previously were focused on
counter-narcotics operations, have now been re-tasked as
counter-terrorism responsibilities."
That Afghanistan's booming opium
trade poses a threat to stability and security
within the country and outside cannot be denied.
Washington's anxiety to tackle the problem is therefore
understandable. The problem lies with its approach
to fight the problem. Some in the administration of US President
George W Bush have called for direct US military
action against traffickers in Afghanistan. But others
have argued that battling Afghanistan's drug trade
is primarily a law-enforcement problem, not a military one,
and must be led by local Afghan forces. Drawing US
troops into drug fights, they have cautioned, would
alienate Afghan peasants and undermine the core US
military mission in Afghanistan of fighting the
insurgents.
Alienation of Afghans is just
what might happen under the new US plan, which among other
things calls for destruction of poppy fields covering an
area five to seven times larger than that eradicated
this year. The destruction is to be offset by more than
$100 million in aid to Afghan farmers to plant
substitute crops and for other rural economic
development projects.
The anger that was
generated by the recent "mysterious" chemical spraying
in Nangarhar signals that Washington's war on poppy
cultivators in Afghanistan could go very wrong.
Washington will have to take on the big players in the
opium trade, but that it appears reluctant to do, as
some of them are its allies. Besides, it is reluctant to
open up new fronts to fight in Afghanistan.
Sudha Ramachandran is an independent
journalist/researcher based in Bangalore.
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