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Who's afraid of Rashid
Dostum?
By M K Bhadrakumar
The attempt to assassinate Afghan Uzbek
leader Rashid Dostum on January 20 in Shibirghan
in the Amu Darya in northern Afghanistan bears all
the hallmarks of a political plot.
It comes at a crucial point in Afghan politics -
when "democracy" ought to be taxiing for takeoff.
And in that sense it bears comparison to the
assassination of Abdul Ali Mazari by the Taliban
in March 1995 and that of Ahmad Shah Masoud in
September 2001. Hazara unity (and Iranian
influence, though temporarily) suffered with
Mazari's death, which in turn impacted
significantly on the anti-Taliban resistance.
Masoud's departure of course turned the tide of
recent Afghan history. Dostum's absence would
create a political vacuum in northern Afghanistan
bordering Central Asia. Who is afraid of Rashid
Dostum?
Dostum's own "gut" reaction as he
emerged, visibly shaken, from the suicide bomber's
reach outside the mosque where he was saying
prayers for the Eidul-Azha was: "The investigation
has not been completed but personally I think this
was the work of terrorists and an al-Qaeda group."
Meanwhile, a man who claimed to speak on behalf of
the Taliban called Reuters on a satellite phone
out of nowhere to claim that the Taliban had
carried out the attack to avenge the killing of
their fighters in northern provinces during the US
intervention in 2001. "We will attack any Afghans
who are allies of the Americans or the present
government," he apparently rationalized. A local
security official in Shibirghan added to the
confusion by stating that it was a "plot
engineered in Pakistan". Curiously, a spokesman of
the Afghan Supreme Court rejected all these
theories. He concluded that Dostum's own people
staged the attack.
Some theories can
be eliminated - some cannot. Clearly, the
Taliban would have done something spectacular if
their atrophied limbs indeed possessed the muscle
to stage such an operation in faraway
Shibirghan. Shibirghan is vintage Dostum country.
Besides, what could they gain out of it at a time when
they are showing unprecedented flexibility to bring
on board all conceivable elements who would
militate against the US occupation? A gravitation of
disenchanted elements that feel sidelined in the
present dispensation in Kabul - that is what suits
the Taliban at the moment.
Could
"an al-Qaeda group", as Dostum suspects,
be responsible? Conceivably, Uzbek Islamists
allied to al-Qaeda under the leadership of
Tohir Yoldashev stood to gain as Dostum's removal
could give them access to the Amu Darya. But
according to sections of the Western press, the US
is manipulating Yoldashev.
Would the US go
that far to destabilize Uzbekistan? Would Pakistan
be involved? Unlikely, as Pakistan had cordial
dealings with Dostum, and he did not threaten
Pakistani interests. Would Uzbekistan or
Tajikistan or Russia be involved? Out of the
question - given Dostum's proven dependability for
preserving the stability of the Amu Darya region
as a cordon sanitaire between Central Asia and
Afghanistan.
Apart from local Shibirghan
authorities, the Interior Ministry in Kabul, the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization-led
International Security Force and the Americans
have dispatched teams to conduct independent
investigations. Considering that politics in
Afghanistan are largely the byproduct of many
major and minor intelligence operations, the
incident will probably remain wrapped in mystery.
What emerges is that a high of degree of
volatility characterizes the Afghan situation.
Dostum himself had just entered what could
be the most fascinating phase of his tumultuous
career. He has worn the plumes of a rabble-rousing
politician. He allowed his militia's disarmament.
He doubted the legitimacy of the Afghan
presidential elections, but allowed himself to be
persuaded by the Americans to partake. He garnered
10% of the votes as a presidential candidate,
establishing his leadership over a swath of land
stretching from Kunduz province to Faryab. His
influence in at least five provinces is widely
acknowledged. Most important, he was beginning to
talk the idiom of a politician. His metamorphosis
was far advanced.
In late November, Dostum publicly
raised his political demands. At a meeting
with officials of the United Nations and the Afghan
Defense Ministry in Shibirghan on November 29, he
voiced the grievance that his fighters who had
disarmed were yet to be "rewarded" as per
understanding: "As we were together with our
international friends in tough situations and in
fighting international terrorism, we offer our
sincere assistance in the reconstruction and in
maintaining lasting stability in the country. We
want the professionalism and competence of those
officers and soldiers who were disarmed to be
appreciated."
Soon afterward, large
demonstrations were held in Mazar-i-Sharif,
Shibirghan and Faryab, where Dostum's followers
voiced disappointment over his exclusion from
Hamid Karzai's cabinet. They complained that Kabul
was ignoring Uzbekis. They criticized that the
"English-speaking cabinet" in Kabul was not
representative of their country as a number of
them (half a dozen of whom hold doctorates from
Western universities) were from the Afghan
diaspora. They disowned two ethnic Uzbeks in the
cabinet.
Dostum's supporters also began
criticizing back-room dealings with erstwhile
Taliban elements. They said "moderate Taliban" was
an oxymoron and the game plan was to marginalize
the erstwhile mujahideen politically. The Afghan
opposition held a meeting in Kabul on January 11
where issues that were thought to have been
"settled" were resurrected - about legitimacy of
power, the working of federalism, the current
interlude (pending parliamentary elections in May)
of rule by presidential decree and so on. The lid
was coming off the can of worms.
The Afghan paradox has many faces. First
and foremost, Americans succeeded beyond
anyone's expectations (including their own, perhaps) in working
out the present political contract -
browbeating various Afghan protagonists into submission,
bullying them when necessary, threatening them if
need be, stooping to conquer them by blackmail
at times. The triumphalism peaked when such a
formidable figure as Ismail Khan, former governor of
Herat province, was checkmated through "statecraft".
But in the process Afghan polity had become even
more brittle. Most Afghan protagonists simply gave
way to US pressure tactics, overawed by the
imperial might of the superpower. Now, the paradox
is that the US has been so utterly successful in
putting together a political contract on its
absolute terms that it must carry the process
forward - something like what the witches would
have advised William Shakespeare's Macbeth to do.
As it became clear that Dostum was
raising the banner of revolt (within the four walls
of democratic opposition), US Ambassador Zilmay
Khalilzad rushed to Mazar-i-Sharif. But Dostum is
not the only figure in Afghanistan's "democratic
opposition" who may need to be pacified. Time will
tell. In times of weakness, people like Dostum, or
even Ismail Khan, may hunker down. But can it be
assumed as their willing, infinite acquiescence?
The way out of the impasse would be an
inclusive approach that allows a truly broad-based
government. But that would mean loosening of the
American grip. Democratic pluralism requires
power-sharing and a genuine willingness to share
power. Does the US want to see that happen in
Afghanistan?
The US "lone ranger"
approach poses problems for regional powers too.
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov summed that
up in a speech at the Council of Foreign Affairs
in New York on January 13: "The first presidential
election in that country, the victory of Karzai
and the inauguration of a new cabinet of ministers
are a new, important step toward implementing the
Bonn Agreement. At the same time, we believe that
a number of prominent and widely popular leaders
of the ethnic minorities could also have been
seated in the new government, because inside the
government they would have been more useful than
remaining in the opposition. Along with that, we
consider it as dangerous the pattern of inviting
the so-called moderate Taliban. I don't believe
that Taliban can be 'moderate', or 'radical'. I
don't believe in such divisions."
The parliamentary elections could lead to a
political accommodation of various shades of
opinion - such as Dostum's. But elections cannot
be held until such time as their outcome can be
ensured. That means rule by decree in the interim.
Dostum has a point: what does he do if he were conclusively
to bid farewell to arms?
M K
Bhadrakumar is a former Indian career
diplomat who has served in Islamabad, Kabul,
Tashkent and Moscow.
(Copyright 2005 Asia Times Online
Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us for
information on sales, syndication and republishing.) |
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