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Moscow alienating its near
abroad
By Molly Corso
Russia has seen its influence in the
Caucasus - and the rest of the former Soviet Union
- wane significantly since the November 2003 Rose
Revolution in Georgia. Although economics play a
part in the drive to become closer to the United
States and the European Union, Moscow largely
blames post-revolution Georgia for the Orange
Revolution in the Ukraine and its perceived loss
of influence there.
While Georgian
President Mikhail Saakashvili and Ukrainian
President Viktor Yushchenko were in Strasburg for
a Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly
meeting, Russian President Vladimir Putin made no
secret of meeting separatist leaders in Moscow,
including the newly elected president of Abkhazia,
Sergei Bagapsh, and the defeated Ukrainian
presidential candidate Victor Yanukovych. Russian
policies have become increasingly anti-Georgian
since Saakashvili came to power, which regional
experts feel is Moscow's response to Saakashvili's
decidedly Western bent. But its decision to punish
Georgia and other opposition leaders in the former
republics may be working against long-term Russian
interests.
Abkhazia
The first
major blow to Russia's influence in its own
background was not the election in the Ukraine but
the October elections in Abkhazia. Abkhazia is
officially a part of Georgia, but gained de facto
independence from Tbilisi after Georgia lost
control of the republic following a war in the mid
1990s, a fact that is largely credited to Russian
interference. The ruling regime in Abkhazia is
supported by Russia. Russian peacekeepers monitor
its borders with Georgia, the Russian ruble is the
local currency and any economic development is
limited to Russian investors. Moscow also pays
Abkhaz pensions and has widely issued Russian
passports throughout the Abkhaz population.
Candidate Raul Khajimba actively
campaigned on a pro-Russian platform, promising an
increase in investments from Russia and stronger
relations with Moscow. Sergei Bagapsh, known in
the Russian media as the opposition candidate,
also pledged to foster greater ties with Russia.
Neither candidate spoke favorably of Georgia or
the possibility of improving Abkhaz-Georgian
relations. Tbilisi distanced itself from the whole
election; only Russia recognizes Abkhazian
independence and, therefore, the election. The
Russian media were the only source of
international coverage. Despite support from the
Kremlin and other Russian politicians, Khajimba
officially lost the election on October 3, an
event that nearly resulted in civil war when he
refused to accept the Central Election Committees
final count in favor of Bagapsh. Events came to a
head in December, when Bagapsh refused to give up
plans for his inauguration.
In response to
the unexpected turmoil in a republic fully
dependent on Russian support, Russia closed its
borders and cut off trade with Abkhazia, in effect
squashing the main source of income for most
Abkhaz, the citrus trade. While that show of
strength helped convince Bagapsh to bow to Russian
pressures, it also underscored what analysts say
caused his victory in the first place. The only
real difference between the two candidates was
Bagapsh's calls for a truly independent Abkhazia,
recognized by the international community. In its
current state, both Tbilisi and Sukhumi refuse to
have relations and Georgia refuses to allow any
trade to Abkhazia to cross its borders, even to
the extent that Saakashvili ordered Turkish boats
heading to Abkhazia bombed over the summer. That
limits Sukhumi to relations with Moscow. While it
is unlikely that any country in the international
community will recognize Abkhazian independence,
Bagapsh's strong stance in that direction was
perceived as a threat to the current status quo.
Thanks to the immediate embargo on
Abkhazian goods, Moscow was able to convenience
Bagapsh to accept a compromise between the two
former rivals. Days before the planned
inauguration, Bagapsh agreed to a revote and ran
with Khajimba as his vice presidential candidate.
Under the current agreement, Khajimba wields an
unusually large amount of power, including a
reported 40%of the state budget. Since his
election on January 12, Bagapsh has stepped up
rhetoric against Georgia and made open overtures
to strengthen Abkhaz-Russian ties. Moscow was able
to reel the wayside republic back in, but it took
a last ditch show of strength to do it.
The Orange Revolution
Despite a
much stronger Russian effort during the Ukrainian
election in November, the Russian-backed candidate
Viktor Yanukovych could not defeat opposition
leader Viktor Yushchenko. Analysts have debated on
what Yushchenko's victory will really mean for
Ukrainian-Russian relations, but regardless of
Yushchenko's Western-looking policies, Ukraine
remains a major Russian trading partner.
Historically, religiously and ethnically Russia
and Ukraine have close ties. The new president's
first international trip was to Moscow, albeit
quickly followed by the address at Strasburg.
The real question remains what this
growing trend of peaceful uprisings will mean for
the remaining Russian-supported presidents in
other former republics. However insulting
Yushchenko's victory is for Moscow, in the long
run it will only truly adversely affect
Russian-Ukrainian affairs if Putin decides to
punish Yushchenko like he is currently castigating
Georgian president Saakashvili. The Ukrainian vote
for Yushchenko was more a vote against rampant
corruption and the questionable election than a
vote against Russia. Yushchenko has gone out of
his way to pacify Russians in the eastern part of
the country, even defending the role of the
Russian language in Ukraine. His drive toward the
West is less a statement of anti-Russian sentiment
than as an accepted desire to improve conditions
in his country. But that can change if Russia is
not willing to actively work with Yushchenko.
Yushchenko has roughly a year to prove to
his divided country that Ukraine will benefit from
better relations with Western states. If Russia
tries to openly sabotage his effects - like it is
in Abkhazia and Georgia - Putin risks a much more
serious backlash during the upcoming parliamentary
elections. By supporting Yushchenko, Russia can
help strengthen Ukraine, which will result in a
deeper alliance between the two countries and
increase stability in the region. Any effort by
Moscow to further antagonize the country,
especially the western half, could have the
opposite effect.
New ethnic discord will
only weaken Russia's chance to increase its
influence in the region as both current leaders
and opposition forces throughout the former Soviet
Union are watching Ukrainian developments closely.
If it becomes apparent that Moscow will not
tolerate any action perceived to weaken its
influence in the region, economic and military aid
from the West will seem more desirable. While
existing leaders might welcome Russia's brand of
friendship, the opposition will work more strongly
to free their respective countries from Moscow's
influence if it becomes evident Russia sees them
not as sovereign states but as internal problems.
Special relationship with
Georgia
Moscow's continued interference
with ethnic problems within Georgia has not
strengthened its role in the Caucasus. Even before
the Rose Revolution, Russia's efforts to
destabilize the region and bring it into
submission with military force backfired. In 2002,
Moscow accused Tbilisi of harboring terrorists in
the lawless Pankisi Gorge that borders Chechnya.
Instead of resulting in an increase of Russian
military personnel to Georgia, the accusations led
to stronger ties between Georgia and the US and
the US-led "train and equip" program for the
Georgian army. Since Saakashvili came to power,
Georgia has made every effort to strengthen ties
with the US and Europe.
Russia's continued
support for separatist leaders in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia is meant to deter stability - and
therefore foreign investment - in Georgia.
However, in reality Russia's obvious interference
has helped the Georgian leadership turn to the
West for support and resolution. During his speech
in Strasburg, Saakashvili clearly stated that
Russia is not capable of leading Georgia to a
peaceful resolution in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
The Venetian Commission's decision to actively
participate in the development of a peace
settlement even further decreases Russia's
influence in its own near abroad.
Moscow's
newest tactic - vetoing the continuation of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) border patrol on the Chechen,
Ingushetia and Dagestani borders - has been more
successful. Under its current policy, Russia will
guarantee no international observers will be
monitoring the borders by late spring. When the
snow melts, Chechen rebels will have easy passage
into Georgia and - according to Russia - Moscow
will have ample cause to bomb the Pankisi Gorge,
or force Georgia into accepting more Russian
peacekeepers inside the Georgian border. Those
troops would be in addition to the soldiers
already in place along the borders of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, as well as the two Russian army
bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki.
But this
could also backfire. Saakashvili and his
administration have actively been searching for
willing replacements to the OSCE monitoring group
and the EU has tentatively expressed interest.
While the EU's monitors are far from certain at
this point, any move to place independent
international monitors would work against Russia.
Under the OSCE, Russia had a say and a role in the
monitoring. If it becomes the duty of the EU - or
a mixture of observers from various countries -
Moscow's say would be diminished and its claims
that the Georgian government is not strong enough
to protect its own borders would be disproved.
Tbilisi and its allies are also becoming
more adamant about the remaining two Russian army
bases in Georgia. In January, Saakashvili attacked
the role of Russian peacekeepers inside Georgian
territory. Georgia has proposed creating joint
anti-terrorist centers with Russia on the current
army bases. So far Russia has shown no real
interest, but if it continues alienating itself
from the international community with coercive
tactics, Georgia will gain more support from the
international community and could garner the
necessary support to force Russian troops out of
the country all together.
Problems in
Armenia
Another potential defeat for
Russian influence is waiting in Armenia. In the
past, Armenia has been a bastion of Russian
support in the Caucasus. Russia has long supported
the country militarily and economically - for
example, Armenia receives all of its gas from
Russia. While only an estimated 20% of Armenia's
exports are purchased in Russia, a reported 2
million Armenians live there and their families at
home depend on the financial support they send.
Russia supported Armenia during the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Azerbaijan and
still stands firmly behind Yerevan during peace
talks about the contested territories. During the
civil unrest in Georgia leading up to the Rose
Revolution in 2003, both Russia and Armenia made
public statements about their mutually strong and
beneficial relationship. Russia strengthened its
already strong military presence in Armenia,
increased arms sales and even moved some soldiers
from bases in Georgia to Armenia during the
protests in Tbilisi.
Nevertheless,
Armenia's support for Russian influence is not as
strong as it was a year ago. While the opposition
was emboldened due to the success of the Rose
Revolution, another important negative development
for Russia came in September 2004, following the
terrorist attacks at Beslan. When Russia closed
its borders with Georgia following the attack,
hundreds of Armenian trucks and buses were
stranded for a month, unable to go to either
Russia or back to Armenia. While there are no
concrete figures for how much Armenian businesses
lost during that month, Armenians felt slighted by
their ally and insulted at Russia's reaction to
punish them along with the rest of the Caucasus.
That added to dissatisfaction with Russia's
continued support of President Robert Kocharian,
whose victory in 2003 is widely disputed by
opposition parties and the public.
Russian
diplomats were slow to react to the situation, and
statements from Moscow largely consisted in
recommending different routes into Russia. The US,
however, was not slow to act. Since the Rose
Revolution, Washington has been paying more
attention to Armenia. Sensing a weakness in
Russian-Armenian relations over the past year,
America has picked up the pace. A new consulate is
planned for Yerevan which reportedly will be the
biggest in the region. In addition,
American-driven aid projects have been on the
rise.
A third party could further weaken
Russian influence in Armenia. Yerevan and Iran
have held intense talks about a proposed gas
pipeline. While there are no investors yet, the
pipeline has the potential to free Armenia from
its current state of dependence on Russian gas.
Conclusion
Due to shortsighted
policies, Russia has already lost considerable
influence in Georgia. Moscow's erroneous politics
in Abkhazia and Ukraine resulted in embarrassment
and more strained relationships within Russia's
sphere of influence. If Putin does not reverse
this trend, Russia could lose support during the
next Armenian elections and further encourage the
currently weak opposition parties in Central Asia.
Although opposition presidents are well aware of
the importance of good relations with Putin,
political games force them to increasingly turn to
Europe and the US for aid and support in an effort
to balance more evenly between Russia and the
West. If Moscow does not start realizing that
coercive tactics in its near abroad are causing a
loss of support from these states, it will
continue to see its interests in the region
weaken.
Published with permission of
the Power and Interest News
Report, an analysis-based
publication that seeks to provide insight into
various conflicts, regions and points of interest
around the globe. All comments should be directed
to content@pinr.com |
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