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Dominoes in the former Soviet
states
By Jeremy Bransten
PRAGUE - Kyrgyzstan's deposed president
had blunt advice from his forced exile in Russia
this week.
In an interview with Ekho
Moskvy radio, Akayev was asked what he would
counsel his fellow Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) presidents if they faced popular
uprisings that threatened to topple their
governments. Akayev's answer: learn from his
mistakes; use force.
"What lesson did I
learn from the March 24 events?" Akayev said. "Our
democracy is still weak, and it cannot protect
itself. So I would advise my colleagues to protect
democratic gains, including with the use of force
if needed."
It is easy to see how Akayev
might draw such a conclusion. If the Georgian,
Ukrainian and Kyrgyz popular uprisings have one
thing in common, it is that they succeeded in part
because massive force was not employed against
unarmed demonstrators.
But few observers
believe violence would have stabilized the
situation in any of these countries.
If a
leader is confronted with the choice between
fleeing and shooting his own people, the situation
has already spun out of control. The more
interesting question, say analysts, is how Akayev
was backed into a corner - and whether his
mistakes are being repeated by other leaders in
the CIS, making them vulnerable to similar
uprisings.
Sergei Luzyanin of the Moscow
Institute for International Relations says Akayev
made several cardinal mistakes that weakened his
rule. The first was to violate an unspoken
power-sharing agreement between representatives of
the country's northern and southern clans. Akayev,
a northerner, kept all the patronage posts for his
northern allies.
"Traditionally,
especially at the local government level, even
back in the Soviet period, there was a regular
alternation between the northern and southern
clans," Luzyanin said. "Under Akayev, this regular
exchange was disrupted, and the northern clan -
Akayev's clan - controlled the southern regions
and the southern clans were dissatisfied. This is
why Osh, Jalalabad, Batken blew up - because a
feeling of social injustice has accumulated there
during the 14 years of Akayev's rule. The unspoken
rule [about the alternation between north and
south], which had always been observed, was
broken."
Akayev went one step further,
gradually bringing his extended family into the
political process. Such nepotism came at the
expense of even his northern political backers,
breeding resentment within his own bureaucracy.
This turned into his Achilles' heel, says
Luzyanin, as civil servants lost any sense of
loyalty to the regime.
"[The civil
servants] all were saying: 'We're against him. But
we're biding our time, and as soon as we see the
first signal, we will hand over our boss.' Which
is exactly what happened," said Luzyanin. "Seventy
percent of government bureaucrats - including some
very important ones - as soon as it became clear
that Akayev's power was set to crumble,
immediately switched to the other side, either by
directly backing them or at least remaining
neutral in relation to the opposition."
Thanks to a faltering economy, aspects of
a free press, and the presence of non-governmental
organizations, many Kyrgyz were aware of the
situation and deeply dissatisfied.
Murad
Esenov, editor of the Sweden-based "Central Asia
and the Caucasus" journal, says the fact that
Kyrgyzstan - like Georgia and Ukraine - was
relatively more democratic than other CIS
countries speeded the demise of the regime.
"Many people think the Akayev regime fell
very quickly, but I don't share this opinion,"
Esenov said. "You need to look at what came before
recent events. We know very well that in
Kyrgyzstan, non-governmental organizations and a
[partially] free media functioned, and they had
been criticizing the government's policies very
harshly, for a very long time. Since the
government wasn't doing a very good job, public
opinion against the government had already been
formed."
The key ingredients to a popular
uprising seem to be clear: a corrupt government
that cannot distribute favors to enough people to
maintain support, perceived economic hardship, and
traces of democracy and partial freedom of the
press - so that people become aware of the
problem.
In the case of Ukraine, the
economy was not failing. But analysts say there
was no trickle-down effect. Because of corruption,
few people sensed any improvement in their
economic situation, despite statistics.
Lastly, rigged elections triggered public
outcry in all three cases - Georgia, Ukraine and
Kyrgyzstan.
If there is one country in the
CIS that best matches these criteria, says Esenov,
it is arguably Kazakhstan. Like the Kyrgyz
president, Kazakhstan's leader, Nursultan
Nazarbaev, has concentrated power in his extended
family. The Kyrgyz economy is doing well on paper,
but few people benefit. And thanks to partial
freedom of the press, the Kyrgyz public is
informed and opposition movements are growing.
"In Kazakhstan, the people do have a
certain amount of room to express their opinion,"
Esenov said. "When people can express their
opinions and the government has become mired in
corruption, naturally you get a situation, such as
the one we saw in Georgia and Ukraine and in
Kyrgyzstan."
Luzyanin agrees. But he also
says Nazarbaev has more at stake than Akayev. That
makes a confrontation with the opposition
potentially more dangerous.
"In
Kazakhstan, the opposition is stronger, better
organized, and more united," Luzyanin said. "It is
also true that the authorities are also more
organized, tougher, and more motivated that the
Akayev leadership. Akayev was on his way out; he
was nearing the end of his term and he was not so
motivated. But it's a different matter for
Nazarbaev. It is absolutely clear that an
escalation of this political struggle will now
shift to Kazakhstan. And it will be more
systematic and on a larger scale. The ultimate
results are not clear. We cannot say that the
opposition will triumph next year or at the end of
this year. But the fact that the political
situation will heat up is clear."
Some
people have also pointed to Azerbaijan as a
possible candidate for unrest, noting upcoming
elections in November and previous clashes between
the government and opposition. But Esenov believes
the economic situation in the country is less dire
than in Central Asia, making a revolution scenario
less likely.
"In Baku, unlike in Georgia
or Kyrgyzstan, there is not the same degree of
poverty," Esenov said. "There is not the same
level of unemployment. These factors, I believe,
make the prospect of a revolution in Baku more
distant. I don't think there will be a revolution
in Baku, in connection with the elections in
November. Although there is dissatisfaction,
undeniably, it has not taken over society to an
overwhelming degree."
Esenov also says
that, unlike their Kazakh counterparts, the
Azerbaijani authorities have made a significant
effort to co-opt the nation's young people and
university students, to keep them off the streets.
"In Azerbaijan, young people and students
have been largely drawn into politics - but on the
government's side," he said. "For example, the
youth wing of the [ruling] party - Yeni Azerbaijan
- has been very active. The youth wing of the
party is active in all institutions of higher
learning. They have meetings with students, hold
discussions, even readings of [President Heydar]
Aliev's works. They know that youth are the
driving force of any revolution and this
pro-government party is doing its utmost to co-opt
young people and bring them under their influence.
And I have not seen this in Kazakhstan."
If a country's leader is unable to deliver
tangible economic benefits to the people and wants
to remain in power, is the answer to clamp down on
democratic movements? The apparent stability of
highly autocratic regimes in Uzbekistan,
Turkmenistan, and Belarus would seem to indicate
"yes".
Popular dissatisfaction is
subjective by nature, so if people are not aware
of alternatives, they might continue to passively
support a repressive regime. But Luzyanin says
this cannot continue over the long term and, as
with the former USSR, apparent stability can be
illusory.
"[These regimes] are more
stable. But it does not mean that the system is
strong," he said. "The paradox is that the harsher
the regime, and the more it outwardly resembles a
fortress, the quicker it can collapse - all at
once. History knows many such examples."
As Ukraine's Prime Minister Yuliya
Tymoshenko noted last week, there will be other
revolutions in the CIS. When and where remains the
big question. But they will happen, she and other
successful revolutionaries believe.
Copyright (c) 2005, RFE/RL Inc.
Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave NW,
Washington DC 20036 |
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