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Revival of the
Taliban
By Syed Saleem Shahzad
KARACHI - Two types of Taliban have left
their leader Mullah Omar to join with Kabul:
first, those organized by Pakistan's
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in Peshawar soon
after the fall of the Taliban in 2001, and second,
those who were arrested in Afghanistan and
subsequently cultivated. Except for a few, all are
mullahs.
The vast majority of Taliban
commanders retreated to Pakistan or adopted a
low-profile private life in Afghan villages
pending Mullah Omar finalizing a new guerrilla
strategy similar to that adopted by the Iraqi
resistance. The results of this are expected to
manifest themselves within a few months.
Asia Times Online was the first
publication to write about the Taliban's new
strategy (see Osama adds weight to Afghan
resistance, September 11, 2004), which was the
brainchild of a few Taliban who were sent to
northern Iraq before the US invasion of
Afghanistan in 2001.
Oriented with the
Ansarul Islam in northern Iraq by al-Qaeda-linked
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, they were taught the
guerrilla tactics then being successfully applied
in various Iraqi cities - and which still are. The
group returned to Afghanistan some time ago. One
of the members was Mehmood Haq Yar, an expert in
guerrilla and urban warfare.
Asia Times
Online has learned that this Iraq-style resistance
is to be activated in Afghanistan. The central
command of the Iraqi resistance has been
eliminated and various groups, mostly Islamists,
are engaged in guerrilla activity on an
independent basis. This decentralization is the
guarantee of their security and successful
clandestine operations.
An identical
tactic has been adopted in Afghanistan. On the
advice of Haq Yar, all prominent commanders have
withdrawn from the battlefield. The most prominent
ones, such as Maulana Jalaluddin Haqqani,
Saifullah Mansoor and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, took
refuge in tribal areas between Afghanistan and
Pakistan, while the rest were asked to stay with
the local population.
This caused a lull
in the resistance, which was the aim. A new
generation of mujahideen not known in Afghanistan,
including Arabs, Pakistanis, Afghans and others,
was selected and kept at remote positions. They
are all familiar with the latest guerrilla tactics
and oriented only for specific missions.
For instance, a small group was assigned
to disrupt oil supplies in Spin Boldak. They were
specifically launched to hit that target, and when
they achieved their goal they scattered to await
the next assignment. Similarly, a group were
assigned to blow up a helicopter in Ghazni. They
were given maps, flight routines etc, and once
they achieved their mission, they dispersed.
Thus, unlike in the past, the Taliban
movement is now target-oriented rather than
reliant on the random attacks it previously
adopted. Asia Times Online sources say that there
are only a few hundred of these small teams. Their
initial targets are Khost, Ghazni, Kandahar and
Jalalabad, with June earmarked for attacks in
Kabul.
Previously, the Taliban's
unorganized approach and lack of communication and
proper planning resulted in heavy casualties, and
exposure of its network. Thousands of youths have
been killed or captured in the past three and a
half years.
The new strategy is much more
secure and highly clandestine, and the teams are
unknown, thus they have the element of surprise on
their side.
Taliban
'sellouts'?
Those Taliban who have
approached Kabul are mostly those organized by the
ISI under the name of Jamiatul Furqan or Jamiatul
Khudamul Koran. They include small provincial
ministers and mullahs who were pitched in Peshawar
as moderate Taliban. Pakistan sought to promote
them to regain influence in the country.
Initially, the US did not entertain the idea as
they were considered an insignificant bunch of
mullahs.
However, as US efforts in
Afghanistan faltered, with the help of the ISI,
Washington accepted the idea and invited the
Taliban to Kabul, mindful of their show-case value
for the world media as "good" Taliban who could
join President Hamid Karzai's government.
The other batch of Taliban included such
people as Mullah Jalil and Mullah Abdul Salam
Rocketi. Jalil was once the right-hand man of
Mullah Omar and was arrested in Pakistan. Rocketi
was a powerful commander who was captured in
Afghanistan. Apparently, Rocketi is doing his
level best to show his moderate face to the US and
get an important slot in the government. In the
presidential elections last October he was seen in
Zabul with bags full of money to woo people to
vote for Karzai.
For the mullahs who have
"turned", they probably saw that they had little
chance of survival if they did not go along with
the ISI and subsequent US plans. Commanders such
as Rocketi were captured and also had little
option but to play along.
But it is clear
that once the Taliban start getting some success
in their next phase - primarily aimed at the
foreign forces in the country - mass mobilization
will be the next step. Past experience suggests
that it will start from the Pakistani border town
of Chaman, where thousands are already waiting,
and very much like the past, those who have been
compelled, like Rocketi, to change sides, will be
the first new rebels.
Syed Saleem
Shahzad is Bureau Chief, Pakistan, Asia Times
Online. He can be reached at saleem_shahzad2002@yahoo.com.
(Copyright
2005 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved.
Please contact us for information on sales, syndication and republishing.) |
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