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The 'Talibanization' of
Central Asia
By M K Bhadrakumar
Three successive waves of political Islam
have swept over Central Asia during the 15-year
period since the disintegration of the Soviet
Union. They might seem dissimilar. But they have
common elements - the most important being that
they all had extra-regional profiles, even as they
sought a habitation and name in the region. To the
naked eye, they appear as interpolators on a
civilization that was historically eclectic. They
are the monstrous progenies of "foreign devils on
the Silk Road" - of Central Asia's globalization.
The first wave of political
Islam appeared in Tajikistan in 1992, seeking to
make the country an Islamic state. The Islamic
rebels were initially concentrated in the southern
provinces of Kulyab and Kurgan Tyube, but
incrementally linked up with elements in 
neighboring
Afghanistan. By 1996 they were operating from
within Afghanistan. Their leaders were domiciled
in Iran and Pakistan.
The Tajik civil war
involved factions, but they were ideological
overlaps of secular democracy, nationalist
reformism and Islamization. A listing of the
parties involved in the protracted Tajik peace
process under United Nations auspices (1994-96) is
revealing - Russia, the United States, Iran,
Pakistan, the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe and the Organization of the
Islamic Conference.
The American
perspective on the Tajik civil war (1992-96) was
that it was a power struggle involving clans or
regional cliques, and was engineered by Russia
with a view to justifying its military presence in
Central Asia. But, its reasoning was seriously
flawed - that there were no Islamist elements in
Afghanistan interested in a spillover into Central
Asia; the Taliban was an indigenous Afghan
phenomenon who did not have any regional agenda;
Afghan fratricidal strife was purely about
capturing power in Kabul; and that the Taliban
would be ultimately a factor of regional
stability. (Americans were not alone living in a
different intellectual universe. As late as June
1995, at a conference convened by the US Institute
of Peace, French scholar Olivier Roy laughed off
the very thought that there could be
"revolution-exporting Islamic fundamentalists in
Afghanistan".)
At any rate, alarmed by the
ascendancy of the Taliban (leading to the capture
of Kabul in 1996) and signs that the Tajik
Islamists were increasingly coming under the
influence of rival benefactors, Russia and Iran
swiftly closed ranks to bring about a Tajik
settlement, giving Tajik Islamists a role in the
government in Dushanbe. Ironically, the regional
rivalries hastened the Tajik settlement. The US,
predictably, debunked the settlement and continued
to move on the old track, encouraging Central
Asian states to forge cooperative links with the
Taliban regime in Kabul. This line continued
almost right up to the bombing of the American
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998.
No sooner than the Tajik settlement came
about, the Uzbek militants who fought alongside
the Tajik Islamists broke away and linked up with
the Taliban. The period from 1996-2001 saw the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) operating
from Taliban-ruled areas within Afghanistan and
stepping up violent activities inside Central
Asia, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in particular.
The IMU was the second wave of political
Islam to appear in Central Asia. Unlike the Tajik
Islamists, the IMU assumed distinct Wahhabi
trappings, and called for jihad against the
established secular regimes. The US approach was
once again imbued with regional rivalry with
Russia - that Russia was "exploiting" a
non-existent threat of militant Islam for the sake
of dominating Central Asia.
Washington
proceeded to adopt an ambivalent attitude toward
the regional initiative involving Russia and
Central Asian states (and subsequently including
Iran and India) for the strengthening of
anti-Taliban resistance in Afghanistan. The
American stance finally took a u-turn only with
the September 11, 2001, attacks. The US went on to
secure military bases in Central Asia on the new
imperative to forge a common front against
"Islamic terror".
The collaboration with
al-Qaeda was certainly the IMU's (and Taliban
leadership's) fatal mistake. In the American
military intervention in Afghanistan in October
2001, the IMU's cadres retreated to Pakistan's
tribal agencies - along with the Taliban. No one
knows what happened thereafter. According to some
Western media reports, the IMU leaders are in
American custody.
At any rate, in the void
left by the IMU, a third wave of political Islam
has appeared in Central Asia - Hizbut Tehrir (HT -
Party of Islamic Liberation). Unlike the earlier
manifestations of political Islam, HT claims to be
a pan-Islamic movement. HT subscribes to the goal
of establishing a Sharia-based caliphate in
Central Asia and "dividing Russia along the line
of the Volga" so as to liberate the "originally
Muslim lands".
HT remains in many ways an
enigma wrapped in mystery - much like the Taliban.
American media organs periodically interview HT
spokesmen, but no one says where its leadership is
based. HT is believed to be getting its financing
from "Arab charities" and its "branches" in some
Western countries. HT resembles a hierarchical
pyramid consisting of five-member cells at its
base, each with a leader. No two cells interact
directly. Leaders of every four cells are grouped
as a local body under a naquib who, in
turn, belongs to a regional council headed by a
muta'amad (head of a region). The
muta'amads work independently under the
amir's (supreme leader's) supervision. The entire
arrangement is on a "need-to-know" basis.
The recruits are not required to have any
detailed knowledge of Islam but must be committed
to the jihad and the Sharia-based goals of the
party. They attend clandestine "study classes"
stretched over months that can extend up to 18
months. The curricula ranges from religion to
world politics.
Without doubt, the great
social and economic upheavals in the Central Asian
region provide a fertile ground to HT. To quote
the well-known scholar, Anatol Lieven, "In
depressing circumstances, adherence to a radical
Islamic network provides a sense of cultural
security, a new community and some degree of
social support - modest, but still better than
anything the state can provide." Thus, American
specialists on Central Asia have begun describing
HT as the region's "most popular radical Islamic
group".
The HT spokesmen openly
acknowledge that the present "revolutionary
climate" in Central Asia works to their advantage.
Associated Press news agency reported on May 1
that, "according to Dr Imran Waheed, HT's
London-based spokesman, the region remains a
fertile recruiting ground, with local membership
soaring". Western think-tanks estimate HT's hard
core to be in the region of 20,000 cadres. Central
Asian security agencies put the figure as 60,000.
By any reckoning, HT would be the single-biggest
cadre-based political movement today in the
region. HT professes non-violent methods. But it
is believed that HT has a parallel military
structure. It is an intriguing thought how exactly
HT co-relates with the dormant IMU cadres in
Central Asia, estimated by Western intelligence
agencies to be in the region of 3,000-5,000
militants.
Central Asian countries and
Russia have proscribed HT as a terrorist
organization. Uzbekistan has blamed HT and/or IMU
for several incidents of violence. But the US
refuses (unlike Germany) to list HT as a militant
organization, apparently for want of evidence.
Conceivably, the US's regional policy
considerations would explain this differentiated
approach. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization's
lead role in combating religious extremism in the
region after all makes this Russia and China's
"crusade" against militant Islam.
Indeed,
the leader of the Islamic Party of Tajikistan,
Deputy Prime Minister Hoji Akbar Turajonzoda, has
alleged that HT is a Western-sponsored bogeyman
for "remaking Central Asia". He said, "A more
detailed analysis of HT's programmatic and
ideological views and concrete examples of its
activities suggests that it was created by
anti-Islamic forces. One proof of this is the
comfortable existence this organization enjoys in
a number of Western countries, where it has large
centers and offices that develop its concept of an
"Islamic caliphate".
Osh and Jalalabad,
the cities which spearheaded the regime change in
Kyrgyzstan, happen to be HT strongholds. HT will
hugely gain in an entire belt stretching from the
Fergana provinces of Namangan, Andizhan and Kokand
(contiguous to Osh and Jalalabad) to the adjacent
Penjekent Valley (Uzbekistan) and Khojent
(Tajikistan).
Similar to the early 1990s
when the Taliban seemed an alternative to
mujahideen misrule, it is tempting to view HT as a
counterpoint to Central Asia's political elites.
But can that be the whole picture? The Afghan
experience should offer sobering thoughts.
Afghanistan too, like Central Asia, had its
history - into which Islamists were introduced as
agents of change. Many thought that these
Islamists would be birds of passage for a time of
transition. Instead they settled in. So much so
that Afghan President Hamid Karzai faces an
existential dilemma distinguishing the good, bad
and the ugly among them.
M K
Bhadrakumar is a former Indian career diplomat
who has served in Islamabad, Kabul, Tashkent and
Moscow.
(Copyright 2005 Asia Times
Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us
for information on sales, syndication and republishing.) |
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