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Arab boost for Afghan
resistance
By Amin Tarzi and
Kathleen Ridolfo
Recent published accounts
of the relationship between fugitive Jordanian Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi and Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda
network illuminate the relationship between the
two men and their movements' vision of
establishing an Islamic caliphate across the
Middle East.
The sudden rise in attacks
against coalition forces in Afghanistan supports
the theory that Arab militants in that country
have regrouped in an effort to provide a
reinvigorated Arab front against the United
States, while the continuing insurgency in Iraq
shows no signs of abatement, despite recent
reports that Zarqawi may be near death as a result
of a recent injury.
The Afghan front
Almost immediately after the June 1
suicide bombing of a Kandahar mosque that killed
mourners of an anti-Taliban cleric, Afghan
officials said it was carried out by Arab members
of al-Qaeda. "We have found documents on [the
bomber's] body that show he was an Arab," Kandahar
governor Gul Agha Sherzai told reporters, adding
that intelligence indicated that "Arab al-Qaeda
teams had entered Afghanistan and had been
planning terrorist attacks". Mohammad Hasham
Alikozay, director of the Public Health Department
in Kandahar, said the "features found" at the
explosion site indicated that the suicide bomber
seemed "to be an Arab".
In line with the
expectations of Afghan authorities and US-led
coalition forces, disruptive activities and
terrorist acts either committed by or in the name
of the Taliban and their allies have increased
since the weather improved in southern and eastern
Afghanistan. In April, US Major General Eric Olson
said there "has been an increase in Taliban and
enemy activity in the spring [compared to the
winter months]. And we anticipate that the enemy
has the intention of trying to raise the level of
activity this spring." However, Olson predicted
that these activities would lack cohesion and fade
in traditional Taliban strongholds.
Yet,
what has been different in recent months is the
sophisticated coordination of the disruptive
activities and the new methods employed by their
perpetrators.
The student-led
demonstrations that began peacefully on May 10 in
eastern Nangarhar province and spread to at least
13 other provinces around Afghanistan were the
first indication that a new, well-organized plan
against the government of President Hamid Karzai,
but especially against the US presence in
Afghanistan, was underway. While the
demonstrations were triggered by a report alleging
that some interrogators at the US detention
facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, desecrated the
Koran, the rallies quickly, and with a
coordination not seen in Afghanistan, became
violent and spread to several Afghan cities.
Coinciding with the student
demonstrations, a night letter reminiscent of the
days when Afghans were fighting Soviet troops was
circulated in parts of Kabul. Without making any
reference to the events in Nangarhar, the letter
announced that the "principle duty of the
mujahideen has just started". The unsigned letter
condemned the possibility of the establishment of
US military bases in Afghanistan and alleged that
Karzai and former Taliban members were in an
alliance with the purpose of turning Afghanistan
into a US satellite.
Karzai's government
initially blamed "enemies of peace and stability"
for fueling and politicizing student anger, in
particular, directing it toward US-Afghan ties and
Kabul's offer of amnesty to many former Taliban
members. The Afghan president said that "students
of medical and engineering faculties of Pakistani
and Iranian universities attend classes and
continue their lessons as usual, but Afghan
university and school students are taken out of
their classes and provoked to stage
demonstrations" to destroy lives and property in
Afghanistan.
While Karzai did not accuse a
specific country by name, Kabul's main
pro-government daily Anis wrote on May 17 that
Iran was spending "large sums of money and [had]
hired scores of mercenaries" to undermine
stability in Afghanistan. Anis alleged that the
demonstrations were planned by "reckless" Afghans
in consultation with the Iranian Embassy in Kabul.
The possible role of the Taliban is
unclear. No one has pointed a finger at the
Taliban for fueling the demonstrations and the
militia's spokesman, Mufti Latifullah Hakimi, has
denied any involvement.
The Taliban did
claim responsibility for the May 29 murder of
Mawlawi Abdullah Fayyaz, head of the Council of
Ulema of Kandahar and an ardent opponent of the
Taliban. However, Hakimi, commenting on the
suicide attack in the Kandahar mosque during
services held for Fayyaz, said: "This shouldn't
have occurred. We strongly condemn this act."
It is difficult to differentiate between
wanton acts of violence in Afghanistan. Some
attacks, carried out in the name of the Taliban,
are actually committed by drug dealers or other
criminals. And the Taliban often claims
responsibility for acts of violence that it has
not committed. However, what is noteworthy in the
student demonstrations and the mosque bombing is
the coordination and means of committing these
violent acts.
Suicide bombings are very
rare in Afghanistan and the Taliban seldom resort
to this tactic to achieve their goals. Moreover,
there is not a single record of a suicide attack
inside a mosque in that country, as has been the
case in Iraq. The Kandahar attack may be the
beginning of a new front by al-Qaeda-inspired
terrorists, possibly backed by regional countries,
to recalibrate their anti-US activities in
Afghanistan.
The Iraqi front
Al-Zarqawi: The Second al-Qaeda
Generation, a recently published book on
Zarqawi - who pledged his group's loyalty to bin
Laden last year - chronicles Zarqawi's presence in
Afghanistan and his relationship with al-Qaeda,
which funded Zarqawi training camps in Herat
before the US-led invasion in 2001. Following the
invasion, Zarqawi and other al-Qaeda leaders
scattered and regrouped in Iran, pledging to
reassemble in Afghanistan in seven years' time,
Sayf al-Adl, the official in charge of security
for the Global al-Qaeda of Islam Army, recounted
in the book.
Zarqawi and his associates'
return to the Afghan front before the seven-year
hiatus mentioned by al-Adl may be directly linked
to two issues. Firstly, it concerns the
ineffectiveness of the Taliban and the low-level
al-Qaeda support provided to them in order to
inflict heavy damage on the Kabul government or
US-led coalition forces in Afghanistan.
Also related to this point is the relative
success of the political process in Afghanistan
after the Taliban had vowed to disrupt the
electoral process there. However, the second and
more urgent factor for Zarqawi and his backers to
reopen the Afghan front is most likely linked to
the official signing of the "strategic
partnership" between Kabul and Washington in May.
The partnership binds the two countries in a
formal agreement and allows for an indefinite US
military presence in Afghanistan.
Al-Adl
further documented Zarqawi's decision to establish
his network of fighters in Iraq in 2001, an
undertaking assisted through his relationship with
the Ansar al-Islam terrorist network based in
Iraqi Kurdistan close to the Iranian border. That
relationship was reportedly forged in Afghanistan.
"We began to converge on Iran one after
the other. The fraternal brothers in the peninsula
of the Arabs, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates
who were outside Afghanistan, had already arrived.
They possessed abundant funds. We set up a central
leadership and working groups," al-Adl recounted.
"We began to form some groups of fighters
to return to Afghanistan to carry out
well-prepared missions there. Meanwhile, we began
to examine the situation of the group and the
fraternal brothers to pick new places for them.
Abu Musab and his Jordanian and Palestinian
comrades opted to go to Iraq ... [an] examination
of the situation indicated that the Americans
would inevitably make a mistake and invade Iraq
sooner or later. Such an invasion would aim at
overthrowing the regime. Therefore, we should play
an important role in the confrontation and
resistance. It would be our historic chance to
establish the state of Islam that would play a
major role in alleviating injustice and
establishing justice in this world," al-Adl said.
Zarqawi has established a vast network of
fighters in Iraq, and Iraqi authorities have
indicated that the network includes Arab nationals
as well as Afghan and Pakistani fighters. His
Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn
allegedly has close ties to the Ansar al-Sunnah
Army, an outgrowth of Ansar al-Islam.
US
and Iraqi authorities claim that successes have
been made through a string of recent military
operations targeting the groups.
A Mosul
operation on May 28 led to the capture of Zarqawi
aide Mutlaq Muhammad Mutlaq Abdullah (aka Abu
Ra'd). Iraqi Major General Khalil al-Ubaydi
announced on June 4 the arrest of an Ansar
al-Sunnah member identified as Mullah Mahdi -
al-Ubaydi contended that Mahdi carried out attacks
at the direction of Zarqawi. And Iraqi authorities
this week announced a $50,000 reward for
information leading to the capture of Ansar
al-Sunnah leader Abu Abdullah al-Shafi'i.
Copyright (c) 2005, RFE/RL Inc.
Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty,
1201 Connecticut Ave NW, Washington DC 20036 |
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