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Smokescreens in
Afghanistan
By M K Bhadrakumar
When a high-flier leaves a key diplomatic
post, a spat becomes almost inevitable. This is
for three reasons. First, it is seldom that yet
another high-flier replaces a high-flier. A sort
of "fatigue" develops after a spell of
breathtaking diplomacy - like a deep trough on a
roller coaster ride. Second, a high-flier is a
high-flier in his outpost largely because of his
networking back home; his success in the mission
abroad ultimately depends on his alliance-building
back home. But keeping coalitions at home while in
an outpost abroad is a rare skill. Third, thanks
to a support base back home, a high-flier rams his
diplomatic brief through no matter what the odds
are. His work usually unravels once he departs.
And a spat ensues.
The spat enveloping
Zilmay Khalilzad's departure from his assignment
as the American ambassador in Kabul, therefore,
could have been anticipated. (He now takes over as
ambassador to Iraq.)
Khalilzad had many
advantages. His formidable record in US diplomacy
and in the security establishment, and his profile
in academia and the corporate sector followed him
in his assignment in Kabul. Thus, every word of
his, every move he made was perceived as bearing
the George W Bush administration's imprimatur.
Afghans were simply overawed. With the added
advantage of being a native Afghan, he proved to
be a skilful "fixer". How he navigated Hamid
Karzai's ascent to presidency; how he took apart
the Northern Alliance and picked up the pieces he
wanted and cast away what he disliked; the
astuteness with which he elbowed out regional
powers from the Afghan chessboard - these bear
testimony to his mastery over a difficult brief.
But the spat has begun. Pakistan President
General Pervez Musharraf may have unwittingly
initiated a discussion during a visit to Australia
last week. Musharraf assessed that in "do-able"
terms, from a soldier's point of view, "we should
be able to bring a semblance of democracy that is
sustainable, ensuring the integrity of
Afghanistan" in a matter of 10 years. What has
been achieved during the past three-and-a-half
years since American troops landed in Afghanistan
is that "we've broken [al-Qaeda's] cohesion" and
its ability to function as a "homogeneous body
able to execute operations in a command and
control environment". But it will take 10 years
for an "ultimate dismantling, ultimate
elimination" of al-Qaeda from Afghanistan.
That was an unkind cut. If even a claim
cannot be made that the democracy project has been
a resounding success in Afghanistan, what remains
to justify triumphalism?
Separately,
senior Russian officials have spoken of
"irrefutable proof" of extremist elements linked
to the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan having
instigated last month's events in the city of
Andijan in Uzbekistan. An accusing finger was
pointed that neither US forces nor the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were doing
anything to curb the "export of terrorism" from
Afghanistan. There is renewed talk in the region
about the US's "double standards".
Tashkent has also made some serious
allegations. The Uzbek Foreign Ministry has hinted
that Americans might have precipitated Andijan
events as "tit for tat" for Tashkent's decision
some months ago to place restrictions on US
aircraft operating out of Karshi-Khanabad airfield
in Uzbekistan. Uzbek government media also
reported some sensational details of clandestine
meetings in recent months between American
intelligence officials in Afghanistan with Tohir
Yoldashev, leader of the Islamic Movement of
Afghanistan (IMU), an organization figuring in the
US government's list of terrorist organizations.
Washington has not responded to these
allegations. However, Khalilzad hit back, but
pointedly at Islamabad. He sidestepped the Russian
and Central Asian allegations. He insinuated that
Pakistan was not doing enough to curb Taliban
activities. Afghan Defense Minister Rahim Wardak
also joined issue. He made a counter allegation
that "regional powers" which were "rattled" by the
prospect of a long-term US military presence in
Afghanistan were supporting al-Qaeda and the
Taliban. Wardak said "more than one country ...
including some that did not border Afghanistan
directly" was supporting the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
Pakistan, predictably, dismissed
Khalilzad's accusation, and ignored Wardak's,
claiming that the ambassador was out of tune with
Washington. The Pakistani spokesman pointed out
that Washington had repeatedly stated its
appreciation of Islamabad's contributions to the
"war on terror".
Many issues have suddenly
come into the open. What exactly is the balance
sheet of the war on terror in Afghanistan? If 10
more years are needed to eliminate al-Qaeda from
Afghanistan, what has been achieved so far? Did
the US actually use its military presence in
Afghanistan to instigate the IMU to create
problems for the Uzbek government? Are the
regional powers undercutting the US-led war on
terror? Is the war on terror degenerating into
geopolitical rivalries?
Some answers are
available. On the security front, the war on
terror has successfully dispersed various
international militant networks thriving in
Afghanistan under the Taliban regime. In October
2001, as American troops moved in, Taliban militia
and its allied cadres gingerly retreated into the
tribal agencies in Pakistan. But where did the
Taliban go? American military commanders and
authorities in Kabul have lately begun to admit
that their claim that the Taliban were a spent
force was made hastily and that the Taliban have
regrouped. A pattern is setting in. A lull
prevails during winter months, but with the advent
of spring the Taliban reappear and another
"fighting season" commences. Every year the hope
is that by the next "fighting season" an Afghan
force will be equipped to take them on. But with
each fighting season the Taliban are becoming more
audacious, better coordinated and apply new
"techniques".
Wasn't this was the pattern
during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the
1980s too? The US forces, too, are hitting back.
(So did the Soviet army.) Almost every day we come
across body counts of how many Taliban fighters
have been killed. But the Taliban seem to have no
difficulty in getting their ranks replenished.
Also, no one can tell whether all those killed are
actually Taliban fighters. Indeed, it is getting
difficult to tell who is a Taliban member. All
sorts of elements seem to share the objective of
keeping the Afghan pot boiling. Wanton killings by
US forces are certainly fueling anti-American
sentiment among Afghan people, and in turn
generating sympathy for the Taliban cause.
Meanwhile, the US-sponsored strategy of
wooing "moderate" Taliban into the political
mainstream is floundering. The strategy was a
flawed one to begin with. Its pursuit regardless
only exposed that the Taliban were much more
cohesive than the Americans had been led to
believe. The Taliban thereby scored a big
propaganda point. The failure of the US attempt to
split the Taliban now leaves a gaping hole in the
overall political strategy. How to bring alienated
Pashtuns into the political mainstream? Without
Pashtun support, Hamid Karzai's leadership cannot
consolidate.
Again, militia commanders who
fell in line with the American diktat (thanks to
Khalilzad's "negotiating skills") remain restive.
Without Khalilzad's commanding presence, they may
revert to their old ways. They have many scores to
settle. Their acceptance of centralized rule by
Kabul was never to be taken for granted. Can
Karzai inspire in them the awe that Khalilzad
could by his sheer presence? Recent incidents in
Badghis, Badakhshan and Herat do not bode well.
Unfortunately, the US has shifted the
burden of responsibility to curb drug trafficking
from Afghanistan toward Central Asia, which is a
main source of funding for militants, to the
Afghan government - though the government has no
effective control of the country. Thus,
Afghanistan's opium production remains at a high
level; and the militants have easy access to
funding sources. The drug trafficking also spawns
corruption within Karzai's government.
The
bulk of the cadres allied to the Taliban, such as
the IMU (numbering 3,000 to 5,000 fighters),
Uighur groups and Chechen militants, have shifted
to Tajikistan and the Ferghana Valley. A nexus is
forming between the militants, drug mafia and
criminal elements on both sides of Afghan-Tajik
border. Evidently, the war on terror in
Afghanistan is spilling into Central Asia. The
Bush administration's democracy project can be
expected to create more tempests in the region.
The indefinite postponement of the London
conference of Afghanistan's donors underscores
that security issues occupy center stage, and
reconstruction activities remain on hold. If the
prospects look gloomy, is Pakistan to be blamed?
There is uneasiness in Kabul whether
Khalilzad's as yet unnamed successor will match
his clout. The Kabul setup has reason to feel
worried - like passengers left behind on a forlorn
jetty just as dusk is falling. That the captain is
sailing away for an important destination like
Baghdad offers little consolation. President
George W Bush did well by telephoning Musharraf
and Karzai to affirm that Afghanistan was not far
from his thoughts.
But will such gestures
do? The alignment of forces among Afghans will
never be the same in the period ahead. In the
post-Khalilzad phase, the buck stops with Karzai.
Afghans are waiting and watching. But, will the US
forces (or NATO tomorrow) allow Karzai to be the
monarch of all he surveys in his domain? If Karzai
can carry his baton successfully through the
parliamentary elections of September 16, his
leadership will gain traction. And authentic
politics could be deemed to have commenced.
M K Bhadrakumar served as a
career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service for
over 29 years, with postings including India's
ambassador to Uzbekistan (1995-1998) and Turkey
(1998-2001).
(Copyright 2005 Asia
Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact us for information on sales, syndication and republishing.) |
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