Time to talk: US engages the
Taliban By Syed Saleem Shahzad
KARACHI - Despite deposing the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan in quick time at the end of
2001, the United States has not been able to rid
the country of the Islamic hardliners, who four
years later lead an Afghan resistance that shows
no signs of abating, let alone buckling.
US efforts to combat the Taliban include
outright military action (there are 18,000 US
troops in the country, in addition to 12,000
members of North Atlantic Treaty Organization in
the International Security Assistance Force), and
attempts to embrace "good" Taliban.
And
now, most significantly, come efforts to deal
directly with the real "problem" - Taliban leader
Mullah Omar, the only person with the ability to
influence decisions of import related to the Taliban
and
their future activities in the country.
Reports emerged in the Pakistani media at
the weekend that the US had contacted the Taliban
leadership with the aim of establishing a truce in
Afghanistan. The reported linkman is a Pakistani,
Javed Ibrahim Paracha, but he has denied the story,
saying he had never met any US officials, only US
businessmen.
There is more to this story,
though, according to information acquired by Asia
Times Online.
In fact, the latest
peace initiative was started a few months ago when the
US realized, finally, that it simply was not
making significant progress in stabilizing
Afghanistan, despite the relatively successful
conclusion of presidential and parliamentary
elections.
To date this year, about 90 US
troops have been killed in the country, compared
with the 186 who have died since the 2001 campaign
began. Resistance attacks have become more
frequent as well as more sophisticated.
The momentum for finding a strategy that
will allow for an honorable exit is becoming
irresistible.
Enter Mansoor Ijaz, a US
citizen of Pakistani origin with close ties to the
right wing of the Republican Party. In London,
with the help of British authorities, he began the
peace process.
Mansoor's point man
in Pakistan is Khalid Khawaja, a former
Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) official who
was a close friend of Osama bin Laden.
Khawaja's associates included Paracha, a former member
of the provincial assembly in North West
Frontier Province and leader of the Pakistan Muslim
League (Nawaz group). His claim to fame is his advocacy
for the families of al-Qaeda operators detained by
Pakistani authorities.
One of the
inducements put on the table for the Taliban
leadership was their inclusion in the government
of President Hamid Karzai, but Mullah Omar
rejected this, saying there could not be any form
of a deal until all foreign forces were pulled out
of Afghanistan. Thus there was no possibility of
the Taliban laying down their weapons.
"Actually, the media have jeopardized the
peace initiative when it is still in its initial
stages, though part of the news is correct, that
yes, there is a discourse between the Taliban and
the US, but it is wrong that any US officials met
Javed Ibrahim Paracha," Khalid Khawaja told Asia
Times Online.
Asia Times Online sources in
the Afghan resistance across the border from
Pakistan confirm that there has been recent
contact between Karzai and the Taliban leadership.
This took place through a go-between. Karzai,
according to the contacts, sought support for
himself and agreed that any cooperation with the
Taliban would hinge on one single point - the
evacuation of foreign troops.
The contact was
confirmed at a time the Afghan parliamentary results
confirmed that members of the former Taliban
regime and former mujahideen leaders had won seats
in parliament with heavy mandates.
The
general perception is that these new
parliamentarians are split into small political
groups, and will therefore not be able to make
much of an impression.
However, most of
the Taliban warlords who won in the elections are
still in contact with the Taliban leadership, and
so are the members of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's
Hizb-i-Islami, whose leadership sits quietly in
Peshawar, Pakistan. Veteran warlord Hekmatyar is
still active in the Afghan resistance.
Far from being splintered, these new
parliamentarians are believed to be in a decisive
position, and they are taking guidance from their
Taliban or Hizb leaders.
For instance,
once Mullah Omar received Karzai's communication
agreeing that the withdrawal of foreign troops was
the minimum starting point for any negotiations,
Mullah Omar called a shora
(council) and
then sent messages to all former Taliban members
in parliament to support Karzai.
Taliban unbowed As the might of
the US military descended on Kabul in late 2001,
the Taliban simply retreated, apart from sporadic
opposition. In that sense they were never
defeated. It took them some time to regroup, but
they have done that.
The reasons are
rooted in Afghan society. From the very beginning,
the Taliban movement was inextricably linked to
tribal bonds, especially as the Taliban brand of
Islam dovetails with Pakhtoon Wali (Afghan
tribal values). Tribes are the ultimate social
order in Afghanistan, and nobody will ever wash
that away.
Washington never truly came to
grips with this. They undertook decisions based on
universal wisdom and common sense to isolate the
Taliban, but failed to comprehend that this lonely
planet called Afghanistan has its own dynamics. As
a result, step after step to isolate the Taliban
simply complicated the situation.
In
mid-2003, the US agreed on a "good Taliban" policy
(see Asia Times Online, US turns to the Taliban,
Jun 14). Negotiations failed immediately as the
Taliban refused to remove Mullah Omar as their
head.
The US invested a lot of time and
effort in cultivating groups, some of which
cooperated, but invariably they drifted back to
the Taliban camp.
For example, the
Jamiat-i-Khudamul Furqan (or Koran) was a
breakaway faction carved out in Peshawar by the
ISI and US intelligence. Within a couple of years
it secretly joined the Taliban again.
Similarly, the Jaishul Muslim was formed
by the US in Peshawar to infiltrate the Taliban
and stage a coup against Mullah Omar. Once they
were effectively launched in Afghanistan with
money and weapons, a segment of the group promptly
pledged allegiance to Mullah Omar and is now
fighting alongside the Taliban resistance.
Tribal bonds and allegiances run too deep.
This is the reality, as obvious as the sand in the
broad light of day in the desert. Anything hinting
at a Taliban demise is a mirage.
The
administrations in Washington and Kabul at last
appear to have come to terms with this.
Syed Saleem Shahzad, Bureau
Chief, Pakistan Asia Times Online. He can be
reached at saleem_shahzad2002@yahoo.com
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